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ABSTRACT 
 
The vertically fragmentation of production has changed our ability to analyze countries’ 
patterns of specialization, as well as the relationship between trade and economic growth, 
revealing the need for using metrics that incorporate the emergence of global and regional value 
chains. This research aimed to investigate the conceptual and methodological aspects of trade 
integration in the context of vertically fragmented production and emergence of global and 
regional value chains, to evaluate different patterns of specialization, as well as to understand 
how trade’s responsiveness to income has changed at the current phase of globalization. For 
our purposes, this research is divided into three main sections. In the first section, we presented 
some of the key concepts in global value chains (GVCs) theorization, emphasizing the concepts 
and measures of economic and social upgrading, to further examine the manifold outputs from 
participation in GVCs and to contribute to the organization of a formal theoretical apparatus 
within the GVC literature. We argued that GVC has become a practical and useful explanatory 
framework for understanding how firms and countries are engaged in the process of value 
creation, distribution and capture. The second section has quantified a country's engagement in 
GVCs from 1995 to 2011, as well as the regional trade dynamics of global production sharing, 
using value-added trade metrics built from international input-output tables. We presented a set 
of stylized facts to illustrate the importance of the value-added framework to our understanding 
of global trade and production. Further, our contributions to the literature on the geography of 
global value chains and its regionalization are centered on the analysis of the pattern of 
participation of South America in value chains compared to other regional blocs, as well as on 
the creation of a hubness measure in value-added terms. The third section seeks to analyze one 
of the multidimensional effects of countries’ engagement in GVCs, investigating the relation 
between countries’ participation in GVCs and economic growth. In particular, our empirical 
exercise was based on a dynamic error correction model to examine the short-run and long-run 
dynamics of the import-income relationship for a broad sample of advanced economies and 
developing and emerging countries. This issue has received renewed attention given the 
sluggish performance of world trade in recent years. In summary, the changing trade-income 
relationship has posed some challenges that may have consequences for the long-term 
economic growth dynamics across countries, being even more important for developing and 
emerging economies, and ultimately can transform the idea that trade integration can promote 
economic growth into a fallacy. Therefore, we have reinforced the need for measurement tools 
that encompasses the increasingly complex economic reality within global and regional value 
chains and can guide strategic policy responses for trade integration to ensure economy-wide 
benefits and sustained economic growth.  
 
 
Keywords: vertically fragmented production; global value chains; regional value chains; 
pattern of specialization; international input-output table.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESUMO 
 
A fragmentação vertical da produção mudou a capacidade de analisar os padrões de 
especialização dos países, bem como a relação entre comércio e crescimento econômico, 
revelando a necessidade de usar métricas que incorporem o surgimento de cadeias globais e 
regionais de valor. Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo investigar os aspectos conceituais e 
metodológicos da integração comercial no contexto da produção verticalmente fragmentada e 
do surgimento de cadeias globais e regionais de valor, avaliar os diferentes padrões de 
especialização, bem como compreender as mudanças na capacidade de resposta do comércio 
às variações de renda na atual fase da globalização. Para cumprir nossos propósitos, esta 
pesquisa está dividida em três seções principais. Na primeira seção, apresentamos alguns dos 
conceitos-chave da teorização das cadeias globais de valor (CGVs), enfatizando os conceitos e 
métricas de upgrading econômico e social para analisar mais detalhadamente os diferentes 
resultados da participação nas CGVs e então contribuir para a organização de um aparato 
teórico formal no contexto da literatura CGV. Argumentamos que as CGVs se tornaram um 
quadro explicativo prático e útil para entender como as empresas e os países estão envolvidos 
no processo de criação, distribuição e captura de valor. A segunda seção quantificou o 
envolvimento de um país nas CGVs de 1995 a 2011, bem como a dinâmica comercial regional 
de compartilhamento da produção global, usando métricas de comércio de valor adicionado 
construídas a partir de tabelas insumo-produto internacionais. Apresentamos um conjunto de 
fatos estilizados para ilustrar a importância da abordagem de valor-adicionado para a 
compreensão do comércio e produção globais. Além disso, nossas contribuições para a 
literatura sobre a geografia das cadeias globais de valor e sua regionalização estão centradas na 
análise do padrão de participação da América do Sul nas cadeias de valor em comparação a 
outros blocos regionais, bem como na criação de uma medida de hubness em termos de valor-
adicionado. A terceira seção procurou analisar um dos efeitos multidimensionais do 
envolvimento dos países nas CGVs, investigando a relação entre participação nas CGVs e 
crescimento econômico. Em particular, nosso exercício empírico baseou-se em um modelo 
dinâmico de correção de erros para investigar a dinâmica de curto e longo prazo da relação 
entre importações e crescimento econômico para uma ampla amostra de economias avançadas 
e países em desenvolvimento e emergentes. Essa questão recebeu uma atenção renovada dada 
a lenta performance do comércio mundial nos últimos anos. Em resumo, a mudança da relação 
comércio-renda colocou alguns desafios que podem ter consequências para a dinâmica de 
crescimento econômico de longo prazo em todos os países, sendo ainda mais importante para 
economias em desenvolvimento e emergentes e, em última instância, podem transformar a ideia 
de que a integração comercial pode promover crescimento econômico em uma falácia. Portanto, 
essa pesquisa reforçou a necessidade de utilizar ferramentas de medição que englobem a 
realidade econômica cada vez mais complexa das cadeias globais e regionais de valor e possam 
orientar respostas políticas estratégicas para que a integração comercial assegure benefícios 
econômicos e crescimento econômico sustentado. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: produção verticalmente fragmentada; cadeias globais de valor; cadeias 
regionais de valor; padrão de especialização; matriz insumo-produto internacional. 
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Introduction 
 
The role of international trade for growth and development is a heated and highly 
debated topic on the research field of economics. A vast literature argued that trade can spur 
economic growth in a number of ways through the diffusion of knowledge and technology, 
greater variety of imported input factors, more effective allocation of domestic resources, and 
increasing the size of the market. As such, trade integration is considered a powerful tool to 
promote economic growth and better living standards (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND; THE WORLD BANK; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 2017; UNCTAD, 2013b; 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 2014). These benefits rest on a supposedly fundamental 
rationale, trade openness. However, the political backlash to this assumption in recent years, 
with the widespread of protectionist speeches gaining popular support, reveals, once again, that 
the nexus between trade, economic growth, and sustainable development are not automatic or 
even homogeneous across and within countries. 
Beyond the recent political wave of discontents with globalization, the signs that 
the interconnections between countries through trade, and hence the meaning of trade 
integration, have deeply changed are also posed both in theoretical and methodological 
domains. One of the most striking features of the recent wave of globalization is the surge of 
production fragmentation into various stages internationally dispersed. In addition to its pure 
expansion, trade has changed with the emergence of borderless production systems, and so has 
changed the linkages between trade, growth, and development.  
This vertically fragmented production structure is commonly associated with global 
value chains (GVCs). This means that GVCs are an expression of an unprecedented 
fragmentation of production processes in an increasingly interconnected global economy, 
where the production of most goods relies on several stages located in different countries and 
intermediate inputs are crossing borders multiple times. As GVCs have become more pervasive 
over the past two decades, it becomes clear that the idea of becoming more integrated through 
minimizing imports and expanding exports will probably not enhance economic and social 
gains in the twenty-first century production. This new global production-trade paradigm has 
challenged our conventional wisdom. Indeed, some of the national development strategies that 
were used in the past are now almost unthinkable in the context of importing to export. This 
challenge is not restricted to policy responses, but it extends to theorization and the 
measurement tools that have been used to address the gains and losses from increasing trade 
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integration.  
Nevertheless, the widespread of GVC trade does not reflect an equal involvement 
in GVCs across all countries. In fact, the concept of “global” value chain hides different 
regional patterns of trade integration. In other words, GVCs are not really global. Nor are the 
benefits from GVC integration spread equally among and within economies. Firms are the 
actual actors that have to face the outsourcing and offshoring decisions, which can decrease the 
cost of production and increase competitiveness; meanwhile they can also raise other costs by 
increasing the complexity and uncertainty associated with internationally dispersed activities 
(TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016). Nevertheless, the outsourcing and offshoring decisions of 
firms are influenced by national policies and geopolitical environment. Thereby, some 
developing countries have benefited from the movement of parts and components, technology, 
knowledge, and know-how, and others were able to improve the density of their production 
structure, while some economies did not achieve either. These issues are particularly relevant 
for developing and emerging country firms and countries that aim to capture a bigger share of 
the dynamic gains from trade and who has generally been taught that the greater the country's 
participation in world trade, the better. 
The central assumption of this research is that the vertically fragmentation of 
production has changed our ability to analyze countries’ patterns of specialization, as well as 
the relationship between trade and economic growth, from traditional trade measures based on 
gross data, revealing the need for using metrics that incorporate the emergence of global and 
regional value chains. Yet, the effects of the new global production on the trade-income 
dynamics should not be taken as constant. 
Recently, the responsiveness of trade to changes in income have raised several 
questions concerning its causes and consequences for the long-term economic growth dynamics 
across countries. Faced with the current trade slowdown, some studies have related this 
phenomenon with potential changes in the relationship between trade and income and then have 
investigated the behavior of trade responsiveness to changes in income, or more specifically 
the elasticity of imports to changes in income, and its cyclical and structural determinants. In a 
nutshell, cyclical factors are responsible for changes in trade elasticities that would dissipate 
after the recovery of the weak economic environment. However, the dismal performance of 
global trade growth in more recent years has called attention to the possibility of a deeper and 
longer-term change was established in the relationship between economic growth and trade. 
However, the empirical evidence on the drivers of this shift remains inconclusive. 
Thus, one of the main purposes of this research is to explain how trade's 
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responsiveness to income has changed at the current phase of globalization, and the particular 
role played by vertically fragmented production across global and regional chains in this 
development. That is relevant because the symbiotic relationship between trade and economic 
growth is one of the basis of development strategies that advocates for greater trade integration. 
That is, the behavior of the relationship between trade and economic growth may show signs 
that the strategies of greater trade integration will not achieve the same results as in other 
periods. In addition, the effects of the new global production on the trade-income dynamics 
have not been deeply investigated. In order to do that, instead of simply analyzing the global 
trade-to-output ratio, this research captures the effects of vertical specialization on the 
independent effect of changes in income on trade, i.e. on the estimated income elasticity of 
trade. In addition, it reveals the need for measurement tools that encompasses the increasingly 
complex economic reality within GVCs and can guide strategic policy responses for trade 
integration to ensure economy-wide benefits and sustained economic growth.  
This work is divided into three main sections. The first section, composed of one 
chapter, is dedicated to understanding the key concepts in GVC theorization to further examine 
the manifold outputs from participation in GVCs. Chapter 1 introduces the topic in greater 
depth, reviewing the main strands of chain- or network-based research and the facilitators of 
the emergence of GVCs. Henceforth, the analysis addresses the concepts and means of 
measurement of one particular dimension of the value chain analysis, the upgrading, which is 
twofold: the economic and social upgrading. Thereby, we emphasize that the economic gains 
from GVC participation may not automatically translate into improvements in living standards. 
The analysis focuses on how both dimensions are related to each other and provides the key 
elements for thinking about GVCs not simply as a buzzword but as a logical framework, even 
though a systematic theoretical foundation is still missing.  
The second section quantifies a country’s involvement in GVCs during the 1990s 
and 2000s, as well as the regional trade dynamics of global production sharing. The 
interdependencies between industries in fragmented and internationally dispersed production 
networks have imposed the need to use more accurate empirical measures. Before the 
emergence of GVCs, it was possible to compare gross-trade data to data on value-added without 
overstating the amount of domestic value-added in exports. However, the use of traditional 
global trade statistics may lead to a significant amount of double counting, since exports 
increasingly rely on significant (direct and indirect) intermediate imports. When based on gross 
concepts, the analyses may present a misleading portrait of which country ultimately benefits 
from bilateral trade flows by exaggerating the importance of producing countries at the end of 
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value chains, and even more importantly, it may lead to misunderstanding regarding the relation 
between trade and macroeconomic variables. 
The second section is divided into chapter 2 and 3. Chapter 2 provides a set of 
stylized facts regarding the degree and nature of countries’ interaction within GVCs. For that 
purpose, it integrates the most widely accepted metrics based on the concept of trade in value 
added, presenting its techniques and describing the specificities of the most used international 
input-output tables. Understanding the metrics used to assess how countries are integrated into 
GVCs and how they are interacting with its trade partners is crucial for building strategies 
consistent with the current global trade dynamics. It is not possible to assume which are the 
potential trajectories to follow without having a reliable map in hands, which clearly could not 
be build based on traditional gross trade metrics in the current phase of globalization.  
Chapter 3 seeks to investigate the shifting patterns of global production, illustrating 
that different regional blocs play different roles in GVCs. This chapter provides evidences about 
the regional linkages of global production, considering both GVC trade within and across 
regional blocs, named Factory Asia, Factory North America, and Factory Europe. In addition, 
it investigates another regional bloc that is often disregarded in the GVC literature, Factory 
South America. More specifically, the chapter seeks to investigate how is the pattern of 
participation of South America in value chains compared to other regional blocs. In addition, it 
analyzes to what extent the intra-regional linkages of the South American regional-bloc have 
given rise to inter-regional linkages, and particularly what is the role of China in this changing 
scenario. 
The third section seeks to analyze one of the multidimensional effects of countries’ 
engagement in GVCs, investigating the relation between countries’ participation in GVCs and 
economic growth. This issue has received renewed attention given the sluggish performance of 
world trade in recent years. The reasons for the weakness in global trade growth are still unclear 
and it is also uncertain what is exactly behind the recent changes in the relation between trade 
and economic growth. In fact, some signs of a deeper change in trade’s responsiveness to 
changes in income were already posed before the Global Financial Crisis.  
With that in mind, Chapter 4 investigates the changes in the trade-income 
relationship between cyclical and structural factors under an import demand function 
framework applied to a broad sample of advanced economies (AE) and developing and 
emerging countries (EME). Essentially, several explanations concerning the causes of the 
recent trade slowdown are tied to an investigation about the decline in the global income 
elasticity of imports, and this chapter evaluates its behavior for a broad sample of countries. It 
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also follows the literature that builds on the structural factors behind the recent change in the 
trade-income relationship, focusing on one particular factor: the country’s participation in 
GVCs. The chapter seeks to answer the following questions: are there more structural factors 
operating in the recent behavior of trade elasticities? How has trade elasticity varied over time, 
and between both groups of AE and EME? How is the behavior of trade elasticities associated 
with countries’ participation in global value chains? To address these questions, we estimate a 
dynamic panel error correction model, focusing on two sets of issues. Firstly, we investigate 
the responsiveness of imports to changes in income and whether structural factors have played 
a leading role in trade elasticities’ behavior over the period 1989-2014. Secondly, we advance 
the import demand function by further accounting for the contribution of both backward and 
forward participation in GVC. In particular, the focus is on the effects of countries’ GVC 
participation on the behavior of the long-term trade elasticity, for which we consider and expand 
the twofold country's GVC participation concerning both buying and selling perspectives. 
Overall, the changing trade-income relationship has posed some challenges that may have 
consequences for the long-term economic growth dynamics across countries, and ultimately 
can make the expectation based on the idea that the more integrated the country into GVCs the 
better not be fulfilled.  
This research finishes with an additional chapter to provide the concluding remarks. 
Besides the main conclusions of the thesis, this chapter indicates some of the main strategic 
questions of this research agenda on GVCs and policy options to guarantee the mechanisms 
through which countries can maximize the benefits from participating into GVCs. 
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SECTION I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Chapter 1. The key concepts in Global Value Chains analysis 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The increasingly interconnected global economy has posed significant challenges 
to theorization in the field of economics. The traditional tools of economics, e.g. the theories of 
supply and demand and national comparative advantage, remind us of simpler times when 
several assumptions of mainstream economics were taken without considering the rising 
complexity brought by global integration (STURGEON; VAN BIESEBROECK; GEREFFI, 
2008). Over the last decades, the global economy has become more integrated through trade 
simultaneously to a disintegration of the production processes led by firms that have found a 
way to become more competitive through outsourcing their non-core activities both 
domestically and abroad (FEENSTRA, 1998). There is a substantial change from what used to 
be analyzed in terms of international trade theories as a passive process of actors reacting to 
market signals to what is now debated in terms of value chain analysis as a dynamic and 
asymmetric system of organization and coordination by economic and non-economic actors 
(NEILSON; PRITCHARD; YEUNG, 2014). In that spirit, different conceptual models were 
formulated in recent years to understand the emergence of global production and distribution 
systems, which combine several economic and non-economic actors operating through 
complex structures of power relationships. While global value chains (GVCs) are an expression 
of this unprecedented fragmentation of production processes, it also became a practical and 
useful explanatory framework for understanding how firms and countries are engaged in the 
process of value creation, enhancement and capture. This issue is particularly relevant for 
developing and emerging country firms and countries that aim to capture a bigger share of the 
dynamic gains from trade.  
GVCs are commonly used as an analytical tool for understanding not only how 
firms and countries participate in the global economy but also how would be the policy 
environment needed for an efficient allocation of resources (KAPLINSKY; MORRIS, 2003). 
The recent developments in value chain theorization have transformed a heuristic device into 
an analytical tool, providing a logical structure for studies at the country and firm levels. In 
order to analyze the emerging pattern of global trade, which has been named a shift from “trade 
in goods” to “trade in value-added” or “trade in tasks” (OECD, 2013), the GVC approach 
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provides a view of global industries from two contrasting vantage points: top down and bottom 
up (GEREFFI; LEE, 2012). The central concept for the top-down view is “governance”, which 
focuses mainly on the power relationships between firms that set the parameter to other firms 
in the chain, and the key concept for the bottom-up view is “upgrading”, which refers to the 
possibility of moving up in the value chain and focuses on the strategies used by countries, 
regions or firms to maintain or improving their positions in the global economy (FREDERICK, 
2014; GEREFFI; FERNANDEZ-STARK, 2011; GEREFFI; LEE, 2012). More ambitious than 
previous approaches, the GVC framework aims to capture the determinants of the organization 
of global industries (BACKER; MIROUDOT, 2013), and both perspectives are what suggests 
the originality and singularity of this framework.  
Upgrading, which is usually associated with “moving into higher value-added 
stages”, is commonly followed by positive spillovers regarding technology and productivity. 
Therefore, we emphasize the economic mechanisms in the process of GVC participation that 
have enhanced productivity growth. However, this narrow view of upgrading regarding firm-
level competitiveness misses how the gains are distributed to workers regarding wages and 
improved working conditions. There are concerns that the economic gains from greater 
integration in GVCs may not be translated into improvements in living standards. For that 
reason, several scholars started to distinguish between two different dimensions of upgrading, 
and even more importantly, most of the recent analysis focuses on how both dimensions are 
related to each other. While economic upgrading is mostly seen in terms of the efficiency of 
production processes and the peculiarities of products and tasks developed by producers, some 
scholars may say that the different paths of upgrading are not linear, involving learning, the 
development of national and firm-level capabilities, and innovations (NATHAN; SARKAR, 
2013; OECD; WTO; UNCTAD, 2013). 
However, it is important to highlight that GVC analysis does not tell the whole 
story. Even in theoretical terms, a systematic framework on the specificities of GVCs is still 
missing. In general lines, there is a significant number of empirical studies of different value 
chains, without any substantial causal explanation for understanding economic development 
within this new geographical pattern of value creation and capture in the global economy. In 
this sense, it is important to understand that the GVC framework has several limitations and 
must not be taken as a panacea for economic development. 
The aim of this chapter is to reflect upon some of the conceptual aspects of GVC 
theorization to further understand the complex balance between opportunities and risks 
commonly associated with greater integration into GVCs. In particular, this chapter reviews 
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and synthesizes the definitions and means of measurement of one particular dimension of the 
value chain analysis, which has two perspectives: the economic and social upgrading. It is usual 
to assess the concepts of economic and social upgrading by using different measures under 
distinguished levels. These different measures are applied to several case studies, challenging 
the possibility of extracting general conclusions about the outcomes of GVC participation. The 
choice to analyze this twofold dimension is consistent with the attempt to contribute to the 
organization of a formal theoretical apparatus within the GVC literature, given the notable 
diversity of definitions and measures. By reviewing the main definitions and measures 
addressed in the GVC literature, this chapter considers that no single measure should be used 
to determine the outcomes from GVC integration. This choice also reflects the view that not all 
firms and countries are equally engaged in GVCs and, more importantly, the gains from GVC 
participation are not symmetrically distributed among all firms and countries. Hence, it is 
argued that economic upgrading does not drive to social upgrading automatically and regardless 
of the context, indicating the important role to be played by policymakers.  
The analysis proceeds in seven sections, including this introduction. Section 2 
presents a brief set of concepts and analytical tools that differentiate three strands of network- 
or chain-based research that are relevant to describe the new patterns of global production. 
Section 3 discusses the main facilitators of the phenomenon of GVCs and, as the new wave of 
globalization has deeply changed the magnitude, structure, and role of international trade, 
various terms relating to GVCs start to be used interchangeably (in annex 1.1 we recover some 
of these basic concepts with regard to its meanings). Section 4 addresses the widespread 
outcomes related to GVC integration regarding economic upgrading, discussing the 
connections between GVC participation and increased productivity. We review the main 
definitions and measures addressed in the GVC literature and highlight that no single measure 
could be used to determine the outcomes from GVC participation. Section 5 discusses the 
effects of GVC participation on living standards and conditions of employment, which are 
referred to as social upgrading and have been incorporating other social aspects, such as gender 
equality. In section 6 we outline the relationship between both dimensions of upgrading, 
considering both neoclassical and institutionalist explanations for the connection between 
upgrading and the social impacts of GVC participation. Lastly, section 7 presents a 
systematization of this discussion, addressing its policy implications and the need for 
developing better quantitative measures of GVC participation to explain the effects of 
countries’ involvement in GVCs. 
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1.2. Commodities, chains and networks: the three strands of research 
The economic literature has adopted a variety of terminologies to describe the new 
patterns of global production and distribution systems. GVCs, sometimes called global 
commodity chains (GCCs), global supply chains or global production networks (GPNs), have 
become a commonly used acronym to describe both the firm and the industry-level value chains 
that covers several countries (IMF, 2013). Since the early 1990s, this new development of 
global economy has been theorized under sustained academic research and can be viewed as a 
type of industrial organization research. Industrial organization research focuses on how 
economic agents, places and processes are connected to each other and commonly uses a chain-
based structure to represent how production is organized and geographically dispersed around 
the world (FREDERICK, 2014). Therefore, as a paradigm for thinking about economic 
globalization, this section highlights the existence of two other key interlinked strands of 
network- or chain-based research besides the GVC framework, as described by Coe et al. 
(2008b): the Global Commodity Chain (GCC) and the Global Production Network (GPN) 
approaches.  
The core of all three conceptualizations is similar – “the nexus of interconnected 
functions, operations and transactions through which a specific product or service is produced, 
distributed and consumed” (COE; DICKEN; HESS, 2008a, p. 272). Even though these different 
approaches commonly show overlapped features, in practice, each one provides different 
perspectives of the structure and dynamics of global industries. Those different perspectives 
are related to different disciplines of three main sciences that conduct industrial organization 
research: Management Science, Sociology and Geography. Each one uses different names1 to 
describe and analyze chain-based organizational structures, but all of them are connected in 
some extend to the field of Economics (FREDERICK, 2014). Apart from this, Strategic 
Management has economic competitiveness as a major subject, meanwhile other areas, such as 
Sociology and Geography, are more focused on economic development. Those different 
subjects directly reflect into the units of analysis used by each chain-based approach. According 
to Frederick (2014), a value chain approach produces a virtual division between the macro 
(global), meso (inter-firm), and micro (firm) level of analysis and it should be noted that each 
field adopts different levels of analysis – Management (micro-focus: processes); Sociology 
                                                        
1 Management Science uses the concept of “supply chain”, “firm value chain” and “value system”; Sociology uses 
“global value chain” and “value-added chain”; and Geography uses “production network”, “global production 
network” and “filière”. Meanwhile, “industrial cluster” is a concept used by all three main sciences (FREDERICK, 
2014). The author also highlights that the overlaps of those areas result in the fields of strategic management, 
economic sociology and economic geography.  
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(meso-focus: people); Geography (meso-focus: places); and Economics (micro or macro-
focus). 
 
On the macro level, it seeks to understand the roles and impacts of 
international institutions, organizations and standards on how and where new 
and existing products and technologies are developed and located. On the 
meso level, it seeks to understand the types and impacts of inter-firm 
relationships and national institutions (i.e. industrial policy) on economic 
development and a product’s innovation to commercialization lifecycle. On 
the micro level, it seeks to understand how individual firms and/or the 
attributes of a particular product create opportunities or risks to the 
development of an industry or technology, or the development of such within 
a particular geographic location (FREDERICK, 2014, p. 6). 
 
Despite their peculiarities, a general distinction can be made between the positive 
and the normative approaches to chain-based analysis. According to UNIDO (2009b, p. 4–5), 
the positive or analytical approach suggests that “the value chain is an heuristic device that 
helps in understanding the actors and linkages that are engaged in the production, processing 
and marketing of products and services”; i.e. a positive analysis would help to find out how 
value chain function. This means that value chains are a descriptive construct that provides a 
heuristic framework for the generation of data (KAPLINSKY; MORRIS, 2003). On the other 
hand, the normative or operational approach suggests that a spotlight on value chains leads to 
development, i.e. better coordination among actors and the development and upgrading of 
critical activities would lead to better ability to compete and achieve a better position in the 
value chain. The type of development at which each approach aims would be a key aspect to 
distinguish different approaches in the value chain literature2. To sum up, the principles that 
unify different strands in a normative sense, according to UNIDO (2009b) are: i) development 
of competences and skills, commonly called upgrading; ii) setting-up and improving the 
                                                        
2 According to UNIDO (2009b), four main strands of value chain analysis approaches can be distinguished: i) 
supply chain management; ii) industrial cluster development; iii) the global value chain; and iv) the innovation 
system. The first approach is used by scholars mostly from the field of Strategic Management and Business 
Administration, which focus on the firm’s value addition strategy and use terms such as “value chain management” 
and “supply chain management”. The “management” concept is related to the idea of reducing costs and improving 
the firm’s competitiveness, following Porter’s original approach of the firm development. This would be the only 
approach to focus in a unique type of development. There would be another three types of “development” 
perspectives: i) Commodity and product group development – when value chain analysis are used to develop 
specific commodities and products, usually identified based on ad hoc analysis by governments and the private 
sector; ii) Industry and sector development – when the value chain analysis are used to stimulate the development 
of a whole sector, having concentrated the policies for industry/sector development strategies; iii) Development in 
the less developed countries – often used by international development agencies, the focus is building capacities 
among under-developed businesses and small producers in less developed countries, even if this means the creation 
of entire new value chains (UNIDO, 2009). The second approach, industrial clusters, would be the only strand of 
value chains analysis devoted to the whole range of different developments; meanwhile the global value chain and 
the innovation system approaches are focus on those last three types of development.  
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linkages among chain actors; and iii) foster competitiveness among and within chain actors, 
considering entire chains, clusters and industries.  
Most importantly, recent developments in value chain theorization has transformed 
an heuristic device into an analytical tool, providing an analytical structure (KAPLINSKY; 
MORRIS, 2003). The analytical focus changed from trade in finished goods between national 
economies to cross-border trade of fragmented production under global coordination of firms, 
imposing significant challenges to theorization. Therefore, in this section, we discuss in details 
a set of concepts associated with this new paradigm of world production, distinguishing 
between the GCC, GPN and GVC frameworks. 
 
1.2.1. The Global Commodity Chain (GCC) framework 
During the end of the 1970s, an article by Hopkins and Wallerstein presented the 
general idea of tracing back all the sets of inputs and transformations that culminated in an 
“ultimate consumable”, describing them as a linked set of processes called “commodity chain” 
(HOPKINS; WALLERSTEIN, 1977). This perspective intend to orient the world-systems 
program in a different understanding from the orthodox way of thinking about globalization 
(BAIR, 2005). Only a few years later the authors offered a short definition of  ‘commodity 
chain’ as a “network of labor and production processes whose end result in a finished 
commodity” (HOPKINS; WALLERSTEIN, 1986, p. 159 apud BAIR, 2005). The concept of 
“global commodity chains” was later introduced by Gereffi (1994) and marked a different 
strand in the commodity chain research3. Put simply, the GCC framework focuses on the power 
relations embedded in the value chain, i.e. the inter-firm networks in global industries.  
The GCC framework analyzes the structure and dynamics of transnational 
production systems from which emerged particular patterns of coordinated trade. Looking 
ahead from the state influence in shaping global production systems4, Gereffi (1994) recovery 
the concept of commodity chains by focusing on the strategies of the private economic agents 
that control them, the firms, and their interrelationships. Part of the explanation for this change 
of perspective is the context of trade liberalization that restricted the ability of setting tariffs 
and local content rules (STURGEON, 2008).  Another important feature is that the GCC 
                                                        
3 According to Bair (2005), the world-systems theorists are concerned with the commodity chains’ structure and 
the reproduction of a stratified and hierarchical world-capitalist economy, using long-range historical analysis. For 
a broader distinction between the world-system and the GCC research agenda, see Bair (2005).  
4 This state influence, e.g. local content rules and tariffs, is highlighted by the world-system theory. See Hopkins 
and Wallerstein (1977, 1986). 
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perspective goes beyond the geographical spread of economic activities across nations, named 
“internationalization”, and includes their organizational scope, i.e. the degree of functional 
integration between those activities dispersed across countries, named “globalization” 
(GEREFFI; MEMEDOVIC, 2003). Hence, the production systems are segmented and 
dispersed across countries by large firms as part of their global production and distribution 
strategies. More simply, GCC analysis gives special attention to the most powerful or lead firms 
in an industry, because they would be the chain drivers, given their influence over the others 
participants and their potential role as agents of upgrading and development5 (BAIR, 2005).  
Gereffi (1994) argues that GCCs have three6 main dimensions: i) an input-output 
structure; ii) territoriality; and iii) a governance structure. While the first and the second 
dimensions are related to inputs linked in a sequence of value-adding economic activities that 
can be in spatial dispersed or concentrated networks, the third dimension suggests that the 
power relationships determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated, 
influencing not only the scope and dynamics of a chain, but the possibility of change. The 
governance dimension shed light to the question of which firms are most able to control various 
aspects of the production process and how they manage the value created in the chain (BAIR, 
2005). Initially, the GCC framework builds on a key distinction made by Gereffi (1994) 
between alternative modes of organizing international industries: producer-driven and buyer-
driven commodity chains.   
Producer-driven commodity chains refer to industries dominated by transnational 
corporations, usually large manufacturing firms. In these industries, the most technology- and 
capital-intensive products are made (e.g. cars, computers and aircrafts) being more vertically 
integrated along all segments of the supply chain, though with the common strategy of 
subcontracting components for the most labor-intensive production processes (GEREFFI, 
1994; GEREFFI; FERNANDEZ-STARK, 2011). Usually integrating an international 
oligopoly, the lead firms that coordinate the production networks are placed upstream and 
control the design of products and most of the assembly (BAIR, 2005; GEREFFI; 
MEMEDOVIC, 2003). Meanwhile, buyer-driven commodity chains refer to industries in which 
“large retailers, brand-named merchandisers, and trading companies play the pivotal role in 
setting up decentralized production networks” (GEREFFI, 1994, p. 97).  Buyer-driven chains 
                                                        
5 The process of linking up with the lead firms would be a condition for development under the GCC approach 
(GEREFFI; KAPLINSKY, 2001). 
6 In his original contribution, Gereffi (1994) identified only three dimensions, although later he added “institutional 
context” as a fourth dimension.   
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are more common in labor-intensive and consumer-goods industries, especially of relatively 
simple products. While producer-driven chains have more linkages between affiliates of 
multinational firms, buyer-driven chains usually establish linkages between legally independent 
firms typically located in the Third World. 
The buyer-driven chains are known for frequently do not own any production 
facilities, i.e. they are “merchandisers” responsible for the design, marketing and brand 
development, but they are not “manufacturers” because they do not make the products they sell. 
In other words, retailers and branded marketers control a production that can be totally 
outsourced (ODDONE; PÉREZ; ANTUNES, 2014). One of the reasons for this is the fact that 
innovations in buyer-driven chains are more related to product design and marketing, turning 
the outsource of manufacturing to be relatively easy for lead firms7, meanwhile the producer-
driven chains face technology and production expertise as their core competencies, restricting 
the possibility of outsourcing most of the manufacturing (STURGEON, 2008). According to 
Gereffi (1994), the profits in buyer-driven chains are not relate to scale economies, volume and 
technological advances as is the case for producer-driven chains, but rather from the 
combinations of design, high-value research, sales, marketing, financial services, among others, 
that allow the lead firm to manage these production and trade networks. Moreover, buyer-driven 
chains are globally decentralized factory systems with low entry barriers controlled by firms 
that develop and sell brand products (UNIDO, 2009a).  
Governance is one of the most studied features of chain-based analysis, not only 
because it helps to explain the current global scenario but also because is embedded with the 
possibility of change. Understanding governance and how a chain is controlled and coordinated 
can facilitate a firm entry and the development within global industries (GEREFFI; 
FERNANDEZ-STARK, 2011). Governance is understood as the framework in which firms will 
operate economically and interact, and is considered a dynamic element that evolves through 
time according to the changing strategies of the lead firms (GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; 
STURGEON, 2005). However, these changing strategies are exactly what turned this bimodal 
GCC typology8 of buyer- and producer-driven chains increasingly difficult to assign nowadays 
characteristics of global production.  
                                                        
7 According to Gereffi and Memedovic (2003), lead firms are those that have control access to major resources 
that generate the highest returns, such as new technologies, brand names or consumer demand. This not necessarily 
involves making finished products, nor being located in a specific link of the chain.   
8  The GCC typology is based on a static, empirically situated view of technology and barriers to entry 
(STURGEON, 2008). 
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A number of studies started to assess the shift in the organization of global 
production towards less vertically integrated and external networks (FEENSTRA, 1998; 
JONES; KIERZKOWSKI, 2001; STURGEON, 2008). Over the last decades, transnational 
corporations changed their strategies profoundly, establishing linkages between buyers and 
suppliers in both producer- and buyer-driven chains. Under the chain governance perspective, 
a typical “manufacturer” in a producer-driven chain has become a broader version of a buyer-
like through outsourcing. Less integrated chains was being driven by the emergence of large 
retailers and by the widespread belief in the economic benefits of the maximization of 
shareholder value, including the shifting of fixed assets and risk to suppliers (LAZONICK; 
O’SULLIVAN, 2000; STURGEON, 2008).  
Therefore, already in the 1990s, before being widely used in the 2000s, there was a 
change in terminology from “global commodity chain” to “global value chain”, replacing the 
word “commodity” with “value” and incorporating the analysis of trade and industrial 
organization in the international business literature (BACKER; MIROUDOT, 2013). 
Meanwhile, recent studies started to use the concept of ‘global production networks’, and not 
‘chains’, to highlight the complexity of a vast number of interlinked activities with multiple 
producers interacting in different countries. Both strands of research are closely related, being 
connected by several fields of social science, such as economic geography, economic sociology, 
development research, regional studies, international economics, and international business 
(YEUNG; COE, 2015). 
A great number of works was produced on GCC framework over the time. 
According to Bair (2005), we can underline at least three significant contributions that GCC 
research has made: first, the GCC framework is a methodological advance, because it provides 
significant insights about international production networks in different sectors with a method 
that allows to analyze globalization in situ. It makes possible to map and analyze the path of 
different commodity chains, operationalizing the global-local nexus and giving more emphasis 
to the role of firms as potential development’s agents. Second, GCC research contributed 
theoretically to our understanding of how global economy works, highlighting the nature of 
power relations within a chain (their governance structure). Third, GCC has inspired the chain 
research to move forward to policy recommendations. This last contribution has oriented most 
of the work on GVC approach, which has raised questions about what should be the effective 
policy interventions that would enable local firms to improve their positions in a value chain, 
in a process named “upgrading”, and how local firms can gain competencies and skills required 
to participate in GVCs (BAIR, 2005). Finally, one could say that the GCC approach was a 
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pathbreaking paradigm in the literature, with significant distinctions from the previous world-
systems perspective and with several implications for the following researches. 
 
1.2.2. The Global Value Chain (GVC) framework 
The value chain describes “the full range of activities which are required to bring a 
product or service from conception, through the different phases of production, delivery to final 
consumers, and final disposal after use” (KAPLINSKY; MORRIS, 2003, p. 4). These activities 
are not restricted by production per se, including others links, such as design, marketing, 
distribution and recycling, which gradually add value, as described and popularized by Porter 
(1985), and can be contained within a single geographic location or even a single firm. In a 
broader sense, a value chain can be understood as a set of business, activities and relationships 
engaged in creating a final product or service (UNIDO, 2009b). It builds on the idea that the 
value chain describes how different economic actors, separated by time and space, aggregate 
value to products or services, step-by-step and beyond manufacturing. When it comes to 
emphasize the manufacturing and the distribution-related steps, the concept commonly used is 
supply chain, which is also known as the industry-level value chain9. Therefore, is important to 
highlight that a value chain does not necessarily reflect a physical transformation.  
Tracing back the history of the concept of value chain before being widely used in 
the 1990s, we find the first value chain studies in the 1960s and 1970s, with the aim of 
identifying development options for mineral-exporting countries (GIRVAN, 1987 apud 
KAPLINSKY, 2000). We also find similar concepts that fell into disuse, e.g. filiere (French 
scholars used this term to describe the flow of physical inputs in the production of a final 
product, and in general had been applied to domestic value chains analysis, especially to 
agriculture study cases) and value stream (which now is called value chain) (KAPLINSKY; 
MORRIS, 2003). There was a change of perspective by adding ‘global’ 10  to the concept, 
pointing out that a value chain can be more or less extended, besides being divided among 
multiple firms and geographic spaces. In this sense, the concept of GVC emphasize the potential 
large distance between the local producer of goods and services and its global consumer (BAIR, 
2005). In a general sense, GVCs involve four features that differentiate them from traditional 
                                                        
9 According to the IMF (2013), an “industry” value chain is often performed by networks of firms and evolves a 
vast number of processes; meanwhile, ‘value chains’ are commonly referred to as a chain of activities that a ‘firm’ 
operates in a specific industry.  
10 Value chains are considered “global” when they include steps, processes, and actors from at least two countries 
(GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005). 
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production and trade: i) customization of production; ii) sequential production decisions from 
buyer to suppliers; iii) high contracting costs; iv) global matching of goods, services, production 
teams and ideas (ANTRÀS, 2015 apud TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016). Thus, one can say that 
the key features of the phenomenon of GVCs are the international dimension of production 
process and the “contractualization” of buyer and seller relationships (TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 
2016).  
Some authors consider that the GVC analysis was originated in the GCC 
framework, gaining popularity in the early 2000s as a way to analyze the geographical 
fragmentation and internationalization of supply chains (FREDERICK, 2014; GEREFFI; 
HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005; GEREFFI; LEE, 2012). The first formal organization on 
GVC research11 was created at a workshop in Bellagio (Italy) in September, 2000 as result of 
an initiative to bring together scholars with research on different aspects of global networks 
(BAIR, 2005). Given the variety of terminologies, some authors argued that the analysis of 
similar developments across different sectors might be unclear. In this sense, they agreed that 
the study of economic globalization needed a common terminology to describe their collective 
analytical project and agreed to use a value chain label instead others such as commodity chains 
or supply chains. Besides been broadly used in recent academic publications that focuses on 
value creation and value capture across a wide range of economic activities, the GVC concept 
has been adopted by several important international organizations, such as the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (GEREFFI; LEE, 2012). However, as questioned by Bair (2005), would 
this change in nomenclature from “commodity chain” to “value chain” reflect something else? 
Or is just a matter of using a broader terminology, without the misleading association with 
primary products that the term ‘commodity’ might denote? In other words, would the GVC 
research be considered another approach with singular aspects and distinctions from other 
approaches?  
To answer those questions we need to clearly identify which are the common 
features between the GCC and GVC analysis from what distinguishes both frameworks. First 
of all, is important to note that a large part of the authors from GCC framework has further 
contributions under the GVC perspective. Furthermore, the scheme created by Gereffi (1994, 
1995) to comprehend and describe the structure, dynamics and relationships among firms in a 
commodity chain, i.e. the four building blocks: input-output structure; territoriality; governance 
                                                        
11The Global Value Chain Initiative is housed at Duke University. See www.globalvaluechain.org. 
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and institutions, is also used under the GVC perspective. These four building blocks are used 
to reach the GVC approach focuses on how value is created, enhanced and captured within the 
GVCs. One can understand this four building blocks into a two-part research approach: value 
chain mapping, which uses input-output structure and geography to describe the structure of 
the chain; and value chain analysis, which uses governance and institutions to evaluate the 
current economic organization of the chain, in terms of actors, places and processes, and how 
it might evolve in the future (FREDERICK, 2014).  
In a general sense, the GVC framework indicates how a sector, firm or country 
participates in the sequence of activities in a value chain, and furthermore which activities and 
technologies will be kept within a firm as a core competency and which will be outsourced to 
other firms domestically or abroad. Even though the focus was initially on economic and 
competitiveness issues, GVC analysis is currently incorporating other aspects, such as social, 
labor regulation, gender and environmental (GEREFFI; FERNANDEZ-STARK, 2011).  
In order to analyze the emerging pattern of global trade, which has been named a 
shift from “trade in goods” to “trade in value added” or “trade in tasks” (OECD, 2013), the 
GVC approach provides a view of global industries from two contrasting vantage points: top 
down and bottom up (GEREFFI; LEE, 2012). Being more ambitious than the GCC approach, 
the GVC theoretical framework aims to capture the determinants of the organization of global 
industries (BACKER; MIROUDOT, 2013), and both perspectives are exactly what suggests 
the originality and singularity of the GVC framework. While the main concept for the top-down 
view is “governance”, which focuses mainly on the power relationships between firms that set 
the parameter to other firms in the chain, the key concept for the bottom-up view is “upgrading”, 
which refers to the possibility of moving up in the value chain and focuses on the strategies 
used by countries, regions or firms to maintain or improving their positions in the global 
economy (FREDERICK, 2014; GEREFFI; FERNANDEZ-STARK, 2011; GEREFFI; LEE, 
2012) 12 . Apart from being used under the GCC framework, these concepts were further 
developed in a more formal and dynamic structure of value chain governance and in a 
differentiated and multi-dimensional upgrading scheme of strategies.  
                                                        
12 The bottom-up view, upgrading, will be discussed more properly in the next chapters. But simply put, there 
would be four types of upgrading: (1) product upgrading, the development and marketing of a product with 
improved performance characteristics; (2) process upgrading, the development and implementation of new or 
significantly more efficient production process; (3) functional upgrading, engaging in new and superior activities 
in the value chain; (4) inter-sectoral upgrading, moving to new productive activities or sectors, using the 
knowledge, skills and technological capabilities acquired previously (ECLAC, 2014, p. 23). 
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In the context of chain governance, the key questions are which activities and 
technologies a firm should keep in-house and which should be outsourced, and furthermore 
where this activities should be located (GEREFFI, GARY; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005). 
In other words, when a firm decides where to locate their activities and with whom to partner, 
the decisions that have been made are on where to invest and from where to trade (UNCTAD, 
2013b). These decisions impact the process of value creation and capture in host countries, and 
have to be considered under the (typically the lead firm) firm’s coordination of their GVCs. 
Accordingly, GVCs involves a trade-investment nexus that includes: first, cross-border intra-
company trade within the network of foreign affiliates (Foreign Direct Investment – FDI); 
second, contractual partners firms (non-equity modes of investment – NEMs); and third, cross-
border intercompany arm’s length transactions. Each one, or a combination of them, is chosen 
as an optimal mode of managing complex GVCs given an equation that involves elements such 
as transactions costs, power relations and the risks of outsourcing. Furthermore, “differences in 
industry drivers and dynamics, as well as TNC strategic responses to these, lead to a variety of 
GVC patterns – so their governance also necessarily varies considerably” (UNCTAD, 2013a, 
p.141).  
 More than simply random interactions or the obligation of a single agent of the 
GVC, chain governance is collective and ensures that the interactions between firms allows for 
reducing costs and risks along the GVCs (UNIDO, 2009b). As GVCs have developed, the 
insufficiency of the previous two-sided governance framework (in-house (buyer-driven chains) 
and arm’s-length (producer-driven chains) global supply relations) became apparent, giving 
place to a multiplicity of lead firm-supplier relations. Under a new scale of operations and 
increased technological sophistication, the suppliers have establish a new set of relations with 
lead-firms, which involves several degrees of investment, technical support and long-term 
contracting and monitoring (TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016). In order to assess this more hybrid 
patterns of relationships between firms in GVCs, Gereffi et al. (2005) elaborated a more 
nuanced scheme of governance relationships, a five-categories typology: market, modular, 
relational, captive and hierarchy.  
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In a more general sense, this typology13  is closely related to transactions cost 
economics14 and is constructed under three criteria15: i) the complexity of transactions in terms 
of the information and knowledge related to product and process specifications; ii) the ability 
to codify transactions and thus be efficiently transmitted without the need for a specific 
investment; and iii) the capabilities in the supply base in relation to the requirements of the 
transaction (COE; DICKEN; HESS, 2008a; GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005). 
The five governance structures are: 
i) Market governance: governed with little explicit coordination, this structure 
involves simple transactions, which firms have little interaction and the information on product 
specifications can be easily transmitted. These interactions are not completely transitory, as is 
the case of spot markets, and their peculiarity is the minimum costs of switching to new partners 
on both sides. With exchanges that usually occur at arm’s length, the central governance 
mechanism is price rather than a powerful lead firm (ECLAC - ECONOMIC COMMISSION 
FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2014; GEREFFI; FERNANDEZ-STARK, 
2011; GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005; TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016).  
ii) Modular governance: modular value chains usually present suppliers that make 
products or provide services to a customer’s specifications, having more substantial 
relationships than in simple market structures and with a high volume of information. Although 
the interactions between firms can be very complex, this structure is defined by low switching 
costs and few transaction-specific investments (suppliers use generic machinery and take full 
responsibility for process technology), revealing complex transactions that are still easy to 
codify. The central governance mechanism is information technology and standards for 
exchanging information (GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005; TAGLIONI; 
WINKLER, 2016).  
iii) Relational governance: relational value chains occur when firms rely on 
complex information, which is difficult to transmit or learn; resulting in a relatively small group 
of localized firms sharing knowledge among them. These interactions between buyers and 
sellers often create mutual dependence and high levels of assets specificity, which can be 
                                                        
13 According to Gereffi et al. (2005), this typology is analytical, not empirical, although it is in part based on 
empirical observations, and it was conceived to be a simple framework.  
14 Transaction costs economics explains why firms should keep certain activities and technologies in-house in 
terms of the complexity of inter-firm relationships and the asset specificity. Although, this does not mean that 
complex and tightly coordinated inter-firm relationships will always result in vertical integration (GEREFFI; 
HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005).  
15 Each criteria is consider under only two values: high or low, resulting in eight possible combinations, but only 
five would be actually found (GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005). 
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governed through reputation, social and spatial proximity, family and ethnic ties. Even with 
mutual dependence, one can see that lead firms still have the capacity to specify what is needed 
and the ability to strive some control over suppliers. Given the time need to build these 
interactions based on trust and mutual reliance, the cost of switching to a new partner is high 
(GEREFFI; FERNANDEZ-STARK, 2011; GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005; 
TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016). 
iv) Captive governance: in these value chains, small-scale suppliers tend to be 
dependent on one or few large buyers, which often exercise a great power. The name “captive” 
refers to the restrained condition of the suppliers in face of great switching costs. Commonly 
these structures are defined by a high degree of monitoring and control by lead firms, which 
the core competence tend to be in areas outside production (GEREFFI; FERNANDEZ-STARK, 
2011; GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005; TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016). 
v) Hierarchy governance: this chain-governance is characterized by vertical 
integration, i.e. by transactions that occur within a single firm and its subsidiaries. The great 
form of governance is managerial control within lead firms, which develop and produce 
products in-house flowing from managers to subordinates, or headquarters to subsidiaries. This 
commonly occurs when product specifications cannot be codified, products are complex, or 
highly competent suppliers are difficult to find (GEREFFI; FERNANDEZ-STARK, 2011; 
GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005; TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016).  
The five GVC-governance types are related to the values of the three key variables 
that determine them, each one with a different trade-off between the benefits and risks of 
outsourcing (GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005). Figure 1 illustrates this discussion 
in graphic form.  
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Figure 1.1 - Five GVC Governance Structures 
 
Source: Gereffi et al. (2005, p. 89).16 
 
From a developing perspective, the study of chain-governance is crucial for 
understanding how firms in those countries can gain access to global markets, the benefits and 
risks associated to becoming more integrated, and how is possible to increase the net of gains 
from participation in GVCs (GEREFFI; HUMPHREY; STURGEON, 2005). Although chain 
governance deals with power asymmetry and its abuse by certain agents, most of the analysis 
of chain governance structures do not consider a wide range of relationships between firms and 
non-firms and restrict the analysis only to relationships between firms and suppliers. 
Furthermore, the reasons for deciding whether to integrate production of intermediate inputs or 
outsource it, and for supplier locations (offshoring), reveal that the firm’s governance decisions 
go beyond mere transactions costs and core competencies, encompassing the search for greater 
flexibility, diversification of location to reduce risk, and lower productions costs (MILBERG; 
WINKLER, 2013).  
Therefore, it is important to highlight that the GVC approach does not have a 
unified theory. But instead it is build upon a set of analytical methods and it can focus on many 
aspects simultaneously, depending on the scholarly approach. In fact, the “firm perspective”, 
commonly used in the field of International Business, defines GVCs as “fragmented supply 
                                                        
16 “The small line arrows represent exchange based on price while the larger block arrows represent thicker flows 
of information and control, regulated through explicit coordination” (GEREFFI, GARY; HUMPHREY; 
STURGEON, 2005, p. 88). 
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chains, which have internationally dispersed tasks and activities coordinated by a lead firm (a 
TNC)”, showing a different emphasis when compared with the “country perspective”, from the 
field of Economics, which consider that “GVCs explain how exports may incorporate imported 
inputs; i.e. how exports include foreign and domestically produced value added” (UNCTAD, 
2013b, p. 153). In addition to this distinct defining concepts, GVC analysis can be distinguished 
in two main approaches: micro and macro (AHMAD, 2013). The micro approach is generally 
conducted for specific products, as is best characterized by the Apple Ipod example 
(DEDRICK; KRAEMER; LINDEN, 2009). But from a different perspective, some studies have 
adopted a macro approach based on inter-country input-output tables to catch all the upstream 
effects and have a bigger picture of the effects of GVCs on several economic dimensions 
(JOHNSON; NOGUERA, 2009; KOOPMAN; WANG; WEI, 2008). Up to now, the GVC 
literature has mainly focused on empirical analyses and case studies (micro approach), 
describing how different types of governance determine different types of upgrading at the firm 
level (ECLAC, 2014; HUMPHREY; SCHMITZ, 2002). But recently this emphasis has 
changed. 
In recent years, the GVC approach has been adopted by several international 
organizations concerned with economic development. Understanding that one of the central 
hypotheses of the GVC framework is that “national development requires linking up with the 
most significant lead firms in an industry” (GEREFFI; MEMEDOVIC, 2003, p. 4) reveals an 
important perspective of the GVC analysis: it is not about the profits of the companies in each 
segment of the value chain but on the whole value created and how it is distributed along the 
chain (UNIDO, 2009b). This is exactly why governance and upgrading are the two central 
analytical tools of GVC analysis, since both have influence under the distribution of value 
among actors along the chain. In other words, GVCs matter for economic development because 
“the ability of countries to prosper depends on their participation in the global economy”, which 
is largely told as their role in GVCs (GEREFFI; LEE, 2012).  
The GVC framework aims to understand what are the new features in power 
relationships of global-scale economic activities. In this sense, GVCs studies consider not only 
the efficiency of the production link in the chain but also those factors that determine the 
participation of particular groups of producers in final markets. Therefore, by being intrinsically 
systemic and integrated, GVC analysis turned possible to analyze agents, links and processes 
more closely. To sum up, the GVC approach helps to understand the structural shifts in the 
global economy and the interconnectedness of economies, their specialization in tasks and 
business functions rather than in specific products, and also gives insights into economic 
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governance (BACKER; MIROUDOT, 2013). Furthermore, GVC analysis are useful for new 
producers (including poor countries) who are willing to enter global markets looking for 
sustainable income growth and also as an analytical tool for understanding the policy 
environment (ECLAC, 2014b; KAPLINSKY; MORRIS, 2000). 
 
1.2.3. The Global Production Network (GPN) framework 
The relation between production, distribution and consumption, especially in terms 
of its geographical and organizational complexity, is also represented by a different 
terminology: the concept of network. ‘Global production networks’ (GPN) is a concept created 
by the “Manchester School” of economic geographers (COE et al., 2004; DICKEN et al., 2001; 
ERNST, 2002; HENDERSON et al., 2002) to represent generically a form of economic 
organization through which several transactions, spatially dispersed across countries, are taken 
to produce a product or service in the current global economy. GPNs would be organizational 
platforms through which different actors dispersed geographically compete and cooperate for a 
greater share of value creation, transformation and capture (YEUNG; COE, 2015). The view is 
that is not only firms who operate GPNs, but a wide range of different actors, among them is: 
state, international agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and industry 
associations, each one with their own agendas. In a general sense, GPN is an organizational 
innovation seen as an outcome of globalization that combines concentrated dispersion with 
systemic integration, encompassing both intra-firm and inter-firm linkages (ERNST, 2002). 
The concept of GPN builds upon the work of Gereffi previously discussed, but also 
incorporates several distinctions. An elementary distinction is the use of the term “production” 
in the place of “commodity”. Henderson et al (2002) consider that the term “commodity” 
denotes the idea of standardized products, which would not include most of the post-fordist 
forms of activities, but more importantly the use of the term “production” is supported due to 
its analytical emphasis on the social processes that are embedded in producing goods and 
services. The authors also consider that adopting the term “global” shows an analytical concern 
in making a clear distinction from state-centric views, which commonly use the terms 
“international” and “transnational”. In addition, the notion of networks emphasizes the nature 
and extent of horizontal, diagonal, as well as vertical links between economic actors (i.e. inter-
, intra- and extra-firm relationships, including non-firm organizations), forming a wide set of 
non-linear and multi-dimensional structures of economic activities (HENDERSON et al., 2002; 
STURGEON, 2001).  
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The GPNs are thus “complex political-economic systems in which markets, and 
their associated distribution of resources and authority, are constructed within, as well as 
actively shape, their socio-political context” (LEVY, 2008, p. 1). In other words, GPNs are “an 
organizational arrangement comprising interconnected economic and noneconomic actors 
coordinated by a global lead firms and producing goods or services across multiple geographic 
locations for worldwide markets” (YEUNG; COE, 2015, p. 32). As the global economy 
becomes geographically and organizationally more complex, production networks are 
presented as a generic form of economic organization (COE; DICKEN; HESS, 2008a). These 
authors understand that production networks are dynamic per se, once they would always be, 
by definition, in a process of flux, both organizationally and geographically17. In this sense, 
none of them would remain unchanged for a very long time, responding to internal and external 
factors, what reveals that the analysis of production networks requires a heuristic framework 
that is time and space18 sensitive. For those authors, the GPN concept provides exactly this 
dynamic heuristic framework. 
In methodological terms, the GPN approach is related to:   
 
i) The networks of firms involved in R&D, design, production and marketing of a 
given product, and how these are organized globally and regionally; ii) the distribution 
of corporate power
19
 within those networks, and changes therein; iii) the significance 
of labour and the processes of value creation
20
 and transfer; iv) the institutions (…) 
that influence firm strategy in particular locations absorbed into the production chain; 
and v) the implications of all these for technological upgrading, value-adding and 
capturing, economic prosperity etc. for the various firms and societies absorbed into 
the chains (HENDERSON et al., 2002, p. 447). 
 
Building on elements of the GCC/GVC frameworks, the GPN framework 
recognizes that: i) input-output structures are central to understand where intra and inter-firm 
networks takes place, e.g. value creation and working conditions; ii) the “territoriality” of 
                                                        
17 GPNs do not connect economic agents only in terms of functional activities and territoriality but also in terms 
of social and spatial arrangements (HENDERSON et al., 2002).  
18  Space is not seen in absolute terms, but as “spatial fields and relational scopes of influence, power and 
connectivity” (HENDERSON et al., 2002, p. 442). 
19 The authors consider “power” within GPNs in three forms: i) corporate power: the extend to which the lead 
firm is capable of influencing other firms decisions and resources allocations; ii) institutional power: the power 
exercised by the national/local state, international inter-state agencies, “Bretton Woods” institutions (IMF, World 
Bank) and the WTO, and UN agencies; and iii) collective power: actions of collective agents such as trade unions, 
employers associations, NGOs, etc. 
20 The authors consider “value” as surplus value (Marxian notion) and economic rent.  
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production networks, i.e. the economic, social and political arrangements, is central for 
understanding the developmental consequences at the local level (HENDERSON et al., 2002). 
In addition, some authors consider that a value chain would be a sub-set of a production 
network, what turned them to be governed by the same set of rules (STURGEON, 2001). This 
means that governance patterns are considered an important dimension for both value chains 
and production network analysis, being distinguish between how loosely coordinated (market-
based trading structures) or intensely coordinated (vertically integrated) is a value 
chain/network (GEREFFI, 1994). 
Network-style governance refers to situations in which “the lead firm exercises 
power through coordination of production vis-à-vis suppliers (to varying degrees), without any 
direct ownership of the firms” (FREDERICK, 2014, p. 8). In more specific terms, there are 
three network-style governance: i) authority or captive networks; ii) relational networks; and 
iii) virtual networks21 - each one with a different outcome in terms of advantages and limitations 
for firms and countries. The first governance style, captive networks, refers to networks with a 
high degree of coordination or control by the lead firm, and usually occurs between small 
dependent suppliers and few buyers (FREDERICK, 2014). Sturgeon (2001) presents this 
governance-style in two sub-categories: i) intra-firm networks, which is based on the power of 
the administrative control; and ii) captive networks22, or inter-firm, which the lead firm has 
power to coordinate tiers of captive suppliers, based on long-term relationships. The second 
governance style, relational networks, is related to a set of long term personal and inter-firm 
relationships, most of them between small and co-located firms, which is built based on mutual 
reliance, usually given their social and spatial proximity 23  (named “social networks” and 
“agglomeration networks”, respectively), reputation, and others, in order to share knowledge. 
Last but not least, the third governance style, virtual networks, refers to a model of fluid 
relationships (low barriers to entry and exit) that was built mostly by American companies, 
which is based on “linking highly innovative but deverticalized lead firms with sets of highly 
functional suppliers” (STURGEON, 2001, p. 13). This would be the category with greater 
organizational flexibility and agility (“geographic agility” and “output agility”). Even though 
all three different types of governance has its advantages and disadvantages, Sturgeon (2001) 
                                                        
21 Also referred as “modular networks”, it occurs when the firms undertake complex transactions, which are easily 
to codify  (FREDERICK, 2014). 
22 According to Sturgeon (2001), this last category of close buyer-supplier linkages has some advantages, such as 
high efficiency, flexibility and close coordination of “just-in-time” deliveries, while it also has several 
disadvantages, most related to their mutual dependence. 
23 Sturgeon (2001) highlights that, in most cases, social and spatial proximity are closely related, but this is not a 
rule. Moreover, relational networks would also commonly operate within the limits of a specific locality.  
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considers that in recent years virtual networks has become the most effective competitive 
instrument for American lead firms and their turn-key suppliers. 
From a more critical perspective, the GCC/GVC frameworks would be essentially 
linear structures that have a narrow focus on the governance of inter-firm transactions, which 
are likely to under-theorize the origins and dynamics of various kinds of networks (COE; 
DICKEN; HESS, 2008a; YEUNG; COE, 2015). According to Yeung and Coe (2015), the static 
conception of industrial governance 24  turned the GVC framework myopic to aspects of 
territorial organization and most of all inept to theorize the competitive dynamics and 
evolutionary processes in production networks. The result is a vast literature that uses the GVC 
framework as a “methodology” and not a “theory”, with plenty empirical work on particular 
value chains of specific firms or products. Meanwhile, the GPN framework would go beyond 
this linearity, incorporating all different set of actors, directions and relationships, and being 
concerned with the territorial development impacts of networks (COE; DICKEN; HESS, 
2008a). This means that not only the actor’s inter-related actions are considered, but also the 
broader structures and institutions that they are embedded. In a broader sense, others authors 
claim that there would be no “structure”; consequently there are no “micro”, “macro” and 
“meso” levels (URRY, 2003 apud COE; DICKEN; HESS, 2008a).  
The nested relationships within the GPNs are simultaneous and dynamically inter-
connected processes, with asymmetries of power in their essence (COE; DICKEN; HESS, 
2008a). Because of the economic and political character of GPNs, we can say that they evolve 
complex forms of governance at multiple levels that are capable of striving regulatory and 
coercive authority, along with facilitate both technical coordination and knowledge’s diffusion 
among activities (ERNST, 2002; LEVY, 2008). About this complex asymmetry of power 
within GPN, some general lines can be draw out: i) the scarcity and the capacity of controlling 
the access to the asset in question are two decisive features of the relative power of actors; 
consequently the actors in the weakest position are exactly those producing commodities that 
are easily replaceable; ii) the actor’s position within a GPN can contribute with the bargaining 
power, and this would not be a static scenario, i.e. the firms/countries can upgrade their assets 
and competencies  (COE; DICKEN; HESS, 2008a).  
The GPN framework encompasses the global, regional and local economic and 
social dimensions of certain aspects of economic globalization, specifically those related to 
production and consumption, and how the inter-organizational connections are related to 
                                                        
24 Gereffi et al.’s (2005) governance typology.  
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economic development (HENDERSON et al., 2002). These developmental consequences are 
usually seen in terms of the distribution of power and value creation and capture within the 
GPN, which are influenced by the socio-political contexts. However, one would have the early 
stage of GPN theorization (named “GPN 1.0.”) as an insufficient developed theory of global 
production networks, because even though it builds on three interrelated conceptual categories 
– value, embeddedness and power, it has not developed the causal mechanisms to provide a 
dynamic and coherent theory (YEUNG; COE, 2015).  
The recent theoretical advances in the academic literature, which has been named 
GPN 2.0, aims to contribute with the development of a more dynamic theory of global 
production networks by having an analytical focus on the actors, more specifically their 
strategies and organizational configuration within and across industries and localities, as well 
as on the structural competitive dynamics25 and their risk environment (YEUNG; COE, 2015). 
In other words, the recent academic advances are actor-centered conceptualizations of the 
causal mechanisms 26  that shape different organizations of GPNs across industries and 
territories, leaving behind the narrow focus on the industry approach of GVC/GCC governance 
(on already existing interfirm governance structures) and the micro-level analysis of industrial 
upgrading and local development.  
The GPN approach is considered a quite potential research field (LEVY, 2008). In 
the one hand, some critical gaps in the GPN studies have been identified: i) a typology that 
covers the entire range of spatial scale (local, domestic, international, regional and global-
scale); ii) a better-specified terminology on productive actors, since, more than a semantic 
problem, the false homogeneity (and false heterogeneity) of a set of terms (e.g. “original 
equipment manufacturer” (OEM)) could ignore important analytical differences (or mask 
similar patterns); iii) most of the studies do not consider how central is the problem of logistics 
to coordinate and integrate operations; iv) the treatment of the firms as a black box, e.g. the 
simplistic dichotomy of a lead firm, which plays a dominant part in GPNs, and supplier firms; 
v) the disposition for ignoring the natural environment under GPN analysis (COE; DICKEN; 
HESS, 2008c; STURGEON, 2001). On the other hand, is important to highlight some learning 
points: i) the GPN framework incorporates a wide range of (economic and non-economic, firms 
                                                        
25 More specifically, their work aim to explain why and how three forms of competitive dynamics (optimizing 
cost-capability ratios, sustaining market development, and working with financial discipline) interact with actors 
(firms and nonfirms), producing four different strategies for GPN organization: i) intrafirm coordination; ii) 
interfirm control; iii) interfirm partnership; and iv) extrafirm bargaining (YEUNG; COE, 2015). In reality, those 
strategies are not isolate and can be combined in several ways.  
26 This means “structural dynamics as causality and firm-specific strategies as mechanisms” (YEUNG; COE, 2015, 
p. 33). 
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and non-firms) actors; ii) it is concerned with the territorial development impacts of networks 
in multi-scalar dimensions (from local to global networks), which; iii) are influenced by the 
social-political context; iv) it is not based on a narrow emphasis on the power relationships of 
firms, but includes collective and institutional power; v) it is oriented to understanding value 
creation, enhancement (e.g. in terms of upgrading) and capture (COE; DICKEN; HESS, 2008c). 
The following section addresses the main driving forces behind the emergence of GVCs.  
 
1.3. The main facilitators of GVCs emergence 
GVCs are one of the most prominent features of globalization27. The phenomenon 
of breaking the production process into parts, which will be performed domestically or abroad 
with increasing interaction among economic and non-economic agents, has variously been 
called by several terms, each one with a partial perspective of this multifaceted research object. 
Fragmentation, offshoring, outsourcing, disintegration of production, intra-product 
specialization, vertical specialization, second unbundling28 and slicing up the value chain29 are 
some of the concepts30 or “language” used to explain the new global economy in the context of 
GVCs (BALDWIN, 2006; MENG; FANG; YAMANO, 2012).  Whilst the fragmentation of 
production and the outsourcing of activities across countries are not new phenomena31, the 
importance of internationally fragmented production has undoubtedly been growing over time. 
Thereby, to understand why GVCs emerged, allowing some countries to specialize in specific 
                                                        
27 By ‘globalization’ we do not simply mean a more integrated global market. Globalization concerns a functional 
integration between economic activities that are now internationally dispersed (GEREFFI, GARY; 
MEMEDOVIC, 2003). Whilst globalization is a complex, multifaceted and more recent phenomenon, 
‘internationalization’, defined as the “simple geographical spread of economic activities across national boundaries 
with low levels of functional integration” (DICKEN, 2011, P.7), does not represent a new characteristic of global 
capitalism. In this sense, globalization can be defined in more general terms as “the pervasive decline in barriers 
to the global flow of information, ideas, factors (especially capital and skilled labor), technology and goods” 
(KAPLINSKY; MORRIS, 2003, p. 15), and according to the authors, international integration through trade is one 
important indicator of globalization. 
28 From a historical perspective, Baldwin (2006, 2013) studies some of the main transformations of international 
trade over the last centuries, understanding globalization as two great unbundlings. The first unbundling was 
mostly about the geographical separation of consumption and production that was made possible by the steam 
revolution, especially railroads and steamships, leading to lower transportation costs and turning profitable to 
produce at vast scales. This first paradigm is still characterized by locally clustered production, although dispersed 
internationally, once the proximity reduces the costs of coordinating the complexity of production. More recently, 
lower transmission and coordination costs turned possible to geographically separate the production stages without 
loosing efficiency or timeliness, giving place to a new paradigm, the second unbundling.  
29 Originally used by Krugman (1995). 
30 As all of them indicate the same fact, an upsurge of trade in parts and components, the use of these multiple 
terms may require a more precise analysis of its meanings. See Annex 1.1.  
31 For decades, factories in developing nations have imported parts and components from countries with more 
advanced technology, though generally these imports were only for the assembly of local sales (TAGLIONI; 
WINKLER, 2016). 
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tasks or components rather than entire final products, one has to investigate the driving forces 
underlying the expansion in international trade and the growing interconnectedness of 
production processes across countries. 
The pace, scale and scope of GVCs have raised a number of questions about what 
are the factors influencing the decision by firms to internationally fragment their production. 
And as discussed in Hillberry (2011 apud AMADOR; CABRAL, 2014), it is quite difficult to 
separate the driving forces that impact on the internationally fragmentation of production from 
those of the increase in international trade.  
One of the main factors discussed in the literature is the lowering of trade costs. 
Trade costs include the whole range of costs between supplier and final consumer, e.g. in the 
case of goods, would be the sum of land transport, port costs, freight and insurance costs, tariffs 
and duties, non-tariff costs, mark-ups from importers, wholesalers and retailers; and in the case 
of services, include communication costs, and trade barriers as non-tariff measures (BACKER; 
MIROUDOT, 2013). Other important costs related to GVCs are coordination costs. Some 
studies observed that the level of fragmentation will be determined by technical characteristics 
of products and the costs incurred when the stages of production are placed in different 
locations, specifically a trade-off between lower production costs and higher coordination costs 
(BACKER; MIROUDOT, 2013; JONES; KIERZKOWSKI, 2001).  
Lower trade costs are primarily a result of technological advances, especially in 
transportation and communication. Putting the decline in transportation costs in perspective, 
Hummels (2007) argues that both ocean and air shipping had experienced significant 
technological improvements (e.g. advances in materials, the adoption of jet aircraft engines, 
greater inter-modality of freight, automation and containerized shipping), being critical to the 
first and second era of globalization, respectively. The information and communication 
technology (ICT) advances made it possible to coordinate this new complex paradigm of 
production at distance. Whilst several costs have to be considered with the international spatial 
dispersion of production stages, cheaper and more reliable ICT tools have increased the 
tradability of goods and services (OECD, 2013). More recently, a more advanced level of 
automation and connectivity in the production process has been broadly discussed, with a 
digital transformation that has been exponentially growing by the use of several technologies 
(e.g. sensors, 3D printing, powerful computing processes, intelligent logarithms, intelligent 
robots, autonomous drones, and the so-called “internet of things”). Many of these technologies 
are not new, however, the recent boost in computing power and the reduction in cost, turned 
45 
 
 
them suitable for industrial use32.  
As it is discussed in Baldwin (2013), before the ICT revolution, a great part of 
international sourcing was done among mature economies. The new feature is that developing 
nations become part of international production networks, importing inputs for processing them 
and export in the form of goods, parts, components, and services (TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 
2016b). Technological innovations turned possible to coordinate all stages of production at 
distance without increasing the coordination costs, but most importantly was the vast wage 
differences between developed and developing countries what turned this globally dispersed 
production profitable (BALDWIN, 2013). Thereby, according to the author, was possible to 
combine developed-economy technology with developing-nation labor. 
Furthermore, Athukorala (2005) observes that there is a two-way link between the 
expansion of international product fragmentation and the improvement in 
production/communication technology, with the former resulting in lower production costs and 
rapid market penetration, encouraging new technological efforts and further product 
fragmentation. However, this trend is not restricted to technological change. The author 
observes that when it comes to the expansion of international product fragmentation, three 
mutually reinforcing developments over the past decades have to be considered: i) the 
liberalization policy reforms, which has been responsible for removing trade and investment 
barriers; ii) technological innovations in communication and transportation, which decreased 
the distance between nations; and iii) production technology, which turned possible to slice up 
the value chain into finer and portable components. Therefore, international competition, which 
used to occur mainly at the level of sectors, started to be defined at the level of production 
stages. And besides the technological perspective, trade and investment liberalization has also 
played a role in lowering trade costs.  
The fragmentation of production beyond national borders was also facilitated by 
trade liberalization policy reforms in both home and host countries. This process has resulted 
in falling trade barriers, first in advanced economies and more recently in many developing 
                                                        
32 The term "industry 4.0" has been used as an acronym for a broad process of changing the bases of industrial 
production, which has also been called "Fourth Industrial Revolution" and "Advanced Manufacturing". The 
industry 4.0 introduces a new way of producing compatible with the concept of "intelligent factory", in which 
production processes are monitored by a cyber-physical system (CPPS) with a very high technological and 
automation level, making use of systems developed and equipped to control autonomous robots with low 
dependence on operations controlled by people. According to DELOITTE (2015, p.5), “CPPSs are online networks 
of social machines that are organized in a similar way to social networks. Simply put they link IT with mechanical 
and electronic components that then communicate with each other via a network. Radio frequency identification 
(RFID) technology, which has been in use since 1999, was a very early form of this technology”. For a further 
discussion about industry 4.0, see Mckinsey & Company (2011, 2015) and GTAI (2016). 
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countries (RIAD; ERRICO; HENN; SABOROWSKI; SAITO; TURUNEN, 2011). A 
worldwide process of trade liberalization was in progress since World War II, with notable 
reduction of global tariffs as the result of multilateral and bilateral free trade negotiations under 
the GATT (KRUGMAN, 1995), and leaping into the 1980s and early 1990s, trade was 
facilitated beyond arm’s-length operations through FDI and trade in services, as most of the 
countries liberalized their capital accounts (AL-HASCHIMI et al., 2015)33. Miroudot, Lanz and 
Ragoussis (2009) argue that trade tariffs on intermediate goods has been lower than those on 
final goods during the last 20 years, what partially explains this new dynamic of trade in 
intermediate goods as the main driver of global trade. From a political perspective, GVCs has 
raised in a period of trade and investment liberalization and deregulation (FEENSTRA, 1998). 
Thereby, regulatory reforms, especially in transport and infrastructure sectors, have also 
contributed to lower trade costs.  
These technological and political developments have enabled firms to look at 
relative costs and factor endowments, building more efficient value chains (OECD, 2013). 
Hence, a part from lowering international trade costs, other important motivations are cost 
efficiency and market access (UNESCAP, 2015). According to the report, spreading production 
stages internationally may allow firms to achieve cheaper inputs and large economies of scale 
(which is desirable for certain tasks of GVCs involving high fixed costs), and can be related to 
institutional factors or the availability of infrastructure and related costs. One may say that the 
fundamental rationale of GVCs is economic efficiency and competitive advantage, which are 
based on transaction cost minimizing behavior of firms (BHATIA, 2013). Following, another 
important motivation is access to foreign markets, both to strategic inputs (intermediate-import 
and -export markets) and the entry into new markets (with the proximity to final demand as a 
key-factor) (UNESCAP, 2015). This last motivation is in accordance with the greater 
participation of emerging market economies, which has experienced a rapid integration into the 
world economy (AL-HASCHIMI et al., 2015). Furthermore, the emergence of Asia, especially 
China, has not only boosted international trade but radically increased the size of world demand 
(BACKER; MIROUDOT, 2013). In a GVC context, it is important to highlight that the benefits 
                                                        
33 According to Al-Haschimi et al (2015), most of the standard trade models are unable to explain the impressive 
increase in trade as a share of global output because they usually are restricted to one factor, trade liberalization. 
From a wider perspective, the authors consider that the growth of international trade was fostered by at least four 
fundamental structural developments. Besides a worldwide process of trade liberalization, the authors highlight a 
greater participation of emerging market economies, capital accounts liberalization, and technological advances 
as key factors. In other words, according to the authors, would be a contradiction to explain the second wave of 
globalization using the falling in tariff barriers as single parameter, because the trade growth substantially outpaced 
output growth after the mid-1980s, and tariff liberalization was better well founded until the mid-1980s. 
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from local agglomerations are commonly related to social-, environmental factors and trade 
agreements. To sum up, the report considers that “for GVCs to emerge, trade costs must be low 
enough to enable firms utilizing country-specific advantages related to cost efficiency and/or 
market access” (UNESCAP, 2015, p. 107).  
One of the main driving forces of the emergence of GVCs are the changes in 
corporate thinking and business strategies. As trade costs have decreased drastically in the past 
years, turning international sourcing of intermediates cheaper and easier, firms changed their 
global strategies (e.g. offshoring of non-core activities; with greater use of cross-border non-
equity modes; including other forms of production organization besides vertical organization, 
such as mergers and acquisitions, and joint ventures) (OECD, 2013; OECD; WTO; UNCTAD, 
2013; UNCTAD, 2013a). As it is discussed in Milberg and Winkler (2013), offshoring is not a 
new business practice, but it is part of a larger business strategic shift over the last twenty-five 
years, involving a search for lower costs and more flexible process of “mass customization”. 
According to the authors, firms have demonstrated an increasing concern for core-segments of 
their value chains and for shareholder value in the short-run (the “shareholder value 
revolution”). In a general sense, the lead firms are continuously re-evaluating the risks of 
offshoring or outsourcing their production in the light of several changing aspects, such as 
technological and political changes, geographical shifts in demand, changing consumer 
preferences, and locational risks (BHATIA, 2013).  
More recently, one may observe the consolidation of some GVCs, given an 
increasingly difficult access to trade finance and higher levels of uncertainties in the supply of 
some inputs, which reflects higher transaction costs (BACKER; MIROUDOT, 2014). 
Therefore, the idea that there would be an unlimited expansion of GVCs is not sustained in the 
most recent period. Beyond a physical limitation that reflects the optimal level of fragmentation, 
which is explained by technical features of products and the costs associated with splitting the 
production stages in different locations, companies have reassessed their strategies of 
offshoring. They have been driven by complex tradeoffs that can affect their global 
performance and not only by a particular facilitator, such as lower labor costs (e.g. rising wages 
in China). The drivers vary from more control of the product, especially the technology, to 
underestimation of the full cost of offshoring, an increase in the cost of shipping and a decrease 
in domestic energy prices in the United States (BACKER et al., 2016; COHEN, LEE, 2015).  
The nowadays global economy is clearly not about a mere quantitative geographical 
spread, but about “the qualitative transformation of economic relationships across geographical 
space”, involving a set of distinct driving forces (DICKEN, 2011, p. 7). In this sense, the review 
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of the vast literature on the facilitators of GVCs is beyond the scope of this section. GVCs are 
multifaceted, and so are its driving forces. But GVCs are not all equally complex and 
widespread (OECD, 2013). Nor are the gains from GVCs. The next section addresses the 
widespread benefits usually associated to greater participation in GVCs across countries.  
 
1.4. Economic upgrading: definitions and measures 
One of the main reasons why value chain analysis is valuable is its capacity to assess 
who is benefitting from GVC participation, whether households, firms, sectors, regions or 
countries, and a particular challenge is to unravel analytically and empirically what are the 
outcomes associated with increasing participation in GVCs. Even though the analysis does not 
allow establishing causality 34  (TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016), the strategy of deepening 
integration into GVCs has been seen as an opportunity for countries to improve their 
competitiveness by greater access to global markets. Thereby, the economic gains of 
participating in GVCs are conceived in the GVC literature regarding economic upgrading. 
Upgrading, which is commonly referred to as “industrial upgrading” or “economic 
upgrading”35, is defined by Gereffi (2005, p. 171) as “the process by which economic actors – 
nations, firms, and workers – move from low-value to relatively high-value activities in global 
production networks”. Cattaneo et al. (2013) consider upgrading as a dynamic movement, 
highly associated with increased benefits from one stage of production to another within the 
value chain. It is often implicitly assumed that the benefits from GVC participation are not 
equally distributed among all production stages and a position in higher-value-added activities 
generates larger economic benefits, including higher incomes, high-wage employment, and 
positive spillovers regarding technology (OECD, 2013). Once countries and firms are 
integrated into GVCs, upgrading their position in value chains may raise as the best long-term 
strategy for preserving and capturing more gains of participation in GVCs (CATTANEO et al., 
2013). Therefore, the positioning of a producer within a GVC and the nature of the value chain 
are taken as important aspects to understand the distribution of risks and opportunities of GVCs’ 
participation (GEREFFI; LUO, 2015). 
                                                        
34 According to Taglioni and Winkler (2016), it is not simple to establish the exogeneity of GVC participation. In 
this sense, the causality between GVC participation and country performance could run in both directions, whether 
one consider GVC integration as endogenous to the developments in the economic environment.  
35 The GVC literature initially referred to “industrial upgrading”, as most of the analysis used to focus on labor-
intensive manufacturing, such as garments and footwear (GEREFFI, 1999; 2005). But in recent years, the concept 
of “economic upgrading” has been used as a broaden definition, which is not restricted to a specific manufacturing 
and is more suitable to analysis across sectors, including agriculture and services (BARRIENTOS; GEREFFI; 
ROSSI, 2010; ROSSI, 2013). 
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But upgrading is not always about “moving up the value chain”.  According to 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2003, p. 38), it is important to understand the challenge of upgrading 
from a wider perspective, which involves “changes in the nature and mix of activities, both 
within each link in the chain, and in the distribution of intra-chain activities”. In other words, it 
is about “making better products, making them more efficiently, or moving into more skilled 
activities” (GIULIANI; PIETROBELLI; RABELLOTTI, 2005, p. 552). Economic upgrading 
has often been associated with increasing competitiveness in higher value-added products, 
tasks, and sectors (TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016), and may be identified as “directly related 
to increases in competitiveness in value added process and with national gains in productivity 
and labor qualifications” (SALIDO; BELLHOUSE, 2016, p. 9).  Put it simply, upgrading refers 
to “the improvement of a firm’s productivity and competitiveness through the creation of 
technological and managerial capacity to ensure its inclusion in GVCs” (UNIDO, 2015, p. 21). 
The GVC literature has mainly focused on the ability of producers to engage in 
more knowledge-intensive activities and on their ability to learn, i.e. the enhancement of 
technological capabilities for developing new products or processes. In this sense, upgrading is 
also understood as the ability to innovate to increase the value added of products and processes 
(GIULIANI; PIETROBELLI; RABELLOTTI, 2005; HUMPHREY; SCHMITZ, 2002; 
KAPLINSKY; READMAN, 2001). As such, there is a logical contradiction when the concept 
of upgrading is used as a synonym for innovation, yet it is also understood as the outcome of 
an innovation process, resulting in several empirical studies of upgrading mixing up causes and 
effects (MORRISON; PIETROBELLI; RABELLOTTI, 2007). Although the capacity to 
innovate is associated with the producers’ ability to increase value added, it is necessary to 
compare it with the innovation efforts of their rivals, whether to truly increase both value added 
and market share. This means that if the rate of innovation is lower than of its rivals, the 
outcome may be declining value added and market share (KAPLINSKY; READMAN, 2001).  
Furthermore, according to Taglioni and Winkler (2016), upgrading is not 
exclusively about transitioning from an agricultural to a services economy, as traditional 
international trade and development views (“old paradigm”, as named by GVC literature) 
suggest. But it is about achieving higher value-added production via skills and know-how, 
capital and technology, and process upgrading. This means a rupture with the old sector-based 
paradigm focused on final goods and moving a step forward to a new paradigm focused on 
intermediates. From a developing country perspective, economic upgrading overcomes the old 
paradigm based on exploring their comparative advantage on cheap labor costs to become a 
path to pursue development build on skills and value-added (ROSSI, 2013).  
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 In the context of GVCs, there are four equally relevant trajectories that firms can 
adopt to upgrade (HUMPHREY; SCHMITZ, 2002; KAPLINSKY; MORRIS, 2003), namely: 
i) process upgrading: occurs when firms are increasing value-added shares in existing GVC 
tasks by having a better organization of internal processes than those of rivals or by introducing 
new technologies, which turn possible to process more complex tasks, resulting in efficiency 
gains and reduced per-unit costs, in other words, it is productivity growth in current activities; 
ii) product upgrading: firms are producing new products in the existing value chain (higher 
value-added products) or even improving old ones faster than their rivals, in a process that 
usually involves moving into more sophisticated product lines, more skilled jobs or the 
acquisition of technology capability; it can be measured as the value added per unit of output; 
iii) functional upgrading36: occurs when firms increase the overall skill content of activities, 
i.e. firms are increasing value added by changing the activities that are performed by the firm 
or by moving the locus of activities to new segments of a GVC associated with higher value-
added; it can be measured as a higher share of value added in the output of the final product; 
and iv) chain (or inter-sectoral) upgrading: participating or moving horizontally to new GVCs 
that produce higher value-added per unit of output and requires similar knowledge and skills. 
Jiang and Milberg (2012) created a new category of upgrading, named vertical 
upgrading, that captures structural changes in the import content of export at the sectoral level, 
isolating the changes in import content from the growth in exports. In other words, the authors 
focused on the type of industrial upgrading that is directly related to vertical specialization, i.e. 
upgrading associated with capturing a higher proportion of domestic value-added. However, 
their measure of vertical upgrading shows a few limitations. They highlight that even if a sector 
upgrades vertically, this does not necessarily mean that the sector is moving to higher value-
added production, and more importantly, vertical upgrading is not a concept related to 
technological change. This means that a sector that shows vertical upgrading may actually be 
experiencing functional or chain upgrading given a change to higher-tech or higher value-added 
foreign inputs as it is producing domestically a higher value-added product, for instance.  
The literature on GVCs emphasizes the case studies of functional upgrading, i.e. 
moving to higher value-added tasks. From a dynamic perspective, the trajectory of functional 
upgrading process is made of steps from assembly typical of export-processing zones to original 
equipment manufacturing (OEM) to original brand name manufacturing (OBM) and original 
                                                        
36 According to Barrientos et al (2010), a functional upgrading can occur in at least two different ways: vertical 
integration (adding new capabilities to a firm or cluster) or specialization (substituting an activity for another). 
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design manufacturing (ODM) (GEREFFI; FERNANDEZ-STARK, 2011) 37 . There are, 
however, other forms of learning processes equally relevant. Additionally to the primary four 
paths of upgrading, UNIDO (2015) presents three other forms: i) organizational upgrading (the 
organization of producers in business units, e.g. cooperatives or joint business), ii) territorial 
upgrading (the focus is on a certain locality), and iii) structural upgrading (which is related to 
firm size and business structures). Moreover, Fernandez-Stark et al. (2011; 2014) present two 
other types of upgrading: i) entry into a GVC by a new actor; and ii) end-marketing upgrading, 
which means moving into more sophisticated markets with rigorous standards or into larger 
markets with mandatory production on a larger scale and price accessibility.  
This last type of upgrading reveals how deeply mistaken is the narrow view of 
upgrading simply as the need to capture a growing share of a product’s value 38 . Whilst 
upgrading is interpreted as the need to capture a growing share of domestic value added in 
exports, most of the authors that propagate this simplistic, and perhaps erroneous, idea make 
use of the “smile curve” thesis to put forward the idea that it may be better to move away from 
the assembly stage of the GVC, given its small share of value of the final products 
(KOWALSKI et al., 2015).  
The “smile curve” is one of the most reproduced diagrams in discussions about the 
different opportunities usually associated with different stages of a value chain and it was first 
articulated around 1992 by the founder of Acer, Stan Shih, to represent Acer’ strategy of 
upgrading from assembly to higher value-added activities in the value chain for computers 
(LOW, 2013). This diagram asserts that manufacturing, especially the final assembly, adds 
smaller shares of the final product value than post- or pre-manufacturing services (e.g. 
marketing, distribution, sales/after service, or concept, R&D, design, branding, respectively). 
This hypothesis is presented in a graph with Y-axis for value-added and X-axis for value chain, 
resulting in a curve with the shape of a smile (YE; MENG; WEI, 2015). After the second 
unbundling, it seems like the smile curve has deepened, increasing the difference among stages 
(BALDWIN, 2013). However, this view of upgrading simply as “moving up the value chain” 
do not consider the volume of the activity, which is as much, or more, crucial as the share of 
the product (OECD; WORLD BANK GROUP, 2015). Using the manufacture of garments as 
example, the joint report from OECD and The World Bank Group shows that in spite of just 
                                                        
37 One may say that there is a hierarchy in upgrading, as firms are moving from assembly to ODM in a process 
that reflects their developed capabilities. In other words, the degree of disembodied activities increases in a 
trajectory from process upgrading to product, through functional and finally chain upgrading (KAPLINSKY; 
FAROOKI, 2010; KAPLINSKY; MORRIS, 2003). 
38 This idea is commonly driven by the oft-cited iPad case study. 
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being considered a relatively labor-intensive process with a small share of the total value of the 
final product, it is also possible to say that important benefits can be obtained from the 
specialization of SMEs in this manufacturing activity and their aim to perform on a larger scale.  
Some authors understand that the possible paths that firms have undergone through 
participating in GVCs can be resumed into two broad categories: the low road and the high 
road (KAPLINSKY; MORRIS, 2003; KAPLINSKY; READMAN, 2001).  Simply put, it is 
about two routes to raising international competitiveness that depends on production costs 
(MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011). The low road is a trajectory of firms that fight to keep 
competitive based on lowering wages and profit margins. Usually from developing countries, 
those firms are trapped in low value-addition activities and become engaged in a “race to the 
bottom”, facing a situation of immiserizing growth39 (KAPLINSKY; READMAN, 2001). The 
low road based on lowering wages is often named “social downgrading”. On the other hand, 
the high road is about raising productivity and increasing value added as a result of innovation, 
which is commonly facilitated through knowledge gained from other firms in the GVC 
(BERNHARDT; POLLAK, 2015). Instead of that built on developing countries’ comparative 
advantage on cheap labor costs, this path is based on skills and added value, and it is identified 
as “economic upgrading” (ROSSI, 2013). Furthermore, those who pursue a high road exhibit 
the ability to enter a virtuous circle of participation in GVCs and reach sustained income growth 
(KAPLINSKY; READMAN, 2001). But what explains the differences between both roads to 
competitiveness? One of the possible explanations considers the role of different capabilities 
of firms to “upgrade”, or in other words, their ability to learn (GIULIANI; PIETROBELLI; 
RABELLOTTI, 2005; KAPLINSKY; READMAN, 2001). Therefore, the next sub-section 
emphasizes the role of innovation and learning capacities for boosting productivity spillovers 
from GVC integration.  
 
1.4.1. Upgrading, productivity and technology spillovers 
One of the most discussed dimensions of GVC participation is technology. Several 
studies show the positive effects of transferring technology and knowledge through GVC 
participation, which would lead to increased productivity and greater opportunities for 
                                                        
39 “Immiserising growth” was first defined by Jagdish Bhagwti in 1958 as a theoretical situation where economic 
growth may drive a country to a worse outcome than before the increasing of the overall economic activity, e.g. if 
producers are competitive only through continual devaluation of the currency, this may led to a reduction of the 
international purchasing power of domestic incomes; increased exports can only be paid for by lower wages; if 
growth is export-led, this may lead to a fall in terms of trade (KAPLINSKY; READMAN, 2001). 
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economic growth (NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE, 2013a; OECD, 2013; WTO, 2014a). 
Moving into higher value-added stages is commonly followed by positive spillovers concerning 
technology, productivity and skill upgrading, leading to endogenous technology creation 
(SHEPHERD, 2015). The different paths of upgrading may not be linear, involving learning, 
the development of national and firm-level capabilities and innovations (NATHAN; SARKAR, 
2013). Hence, successful upgrading paths do not depend only on the value added trade 
participation and domestic value added, but may also depend on participating in GVCs of 
increasing technological sophistication (OECD; WTO; UNCTAD, 2013). But what are the 
economic mechanisms in the process of GVC participation that have enhanced productivity 
growth? 
According to OECD (2013), besides the general impacts of globalization on 
productivity as a result of greater access to foreign knowledge and technology, the scope for 
specialization and economies of scale, and the impacts of international competition on 
improving efficiency, GVCs participation has an additional effect: it may increase productivity 
by facilitating access to cheaper or better-quality intermediate inputs. By analyzing the OECD 
countries, the report claims that those countries with higher share of imported intermediate 
goods present on average higher productivity, which would be the result of three effects: i) a 
price effect: lower prices of intermediates as the result of stronger competition among producers 
of intermediated; ii) a supply effect: greater variety of intermediates available; iii) a productivity 
effect: increased intermediate imports may spur innovation by improving access to foreign 
knowledge. As firms within countries deepen their access to GVCs, this affects their potential 
for learning and productivity growth. Thereby, GVC integration has also affected technology 
and knowledge transfers. Piermartini and Rubinova (2014) shows that technology and 
knowledge transfers tend to be higher across countries that are more connected within GVCs. 
Shepherd (2015) examines some vectors through which technology transfer may take place 
within GVCs, explicitly and implicitly, ranging from inward FDI, technology licensing, 
imported intermediates and capital goods, to demand effects. Furthermore, Amiti and Konings 
(2007) shows that imported intermediates are related to higher technology transfers if compared 
with imports of final goods.   
GVC integration has strong potential for productivity gains via several transmission 
channels (“dynamic productivity effects”), even though static labor productivity is negative for 
employment creation (i.e. when the same amount of value added is created with fewer workers) 
(TAGLIONI, WINKLER, 2016). This said, Taglioni and Winkler (2016) have identified the 
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main transmission channels for economic and social upgrading40, namely: i) forward links: 
sales of GVC-linked intermediates to the local economy, resulting in an upsurge of production 
and/or productivity in downstream sector; ii) backward links: GVC-linked purchases of local 
inputs, rising production and/or productivity in several upstream sectors; iii) technology 
spillovers: improved productivity of local firms in the same or related downstream/upstream 
sectors as a result of GVC production; iv) skill demand and upgrading:  similar to iii), but 
connected through training of and demand for skilled labor; v) minimum scale achievements: 
for example, when GVC participation stimulates investments in infrastructure that would 
otherwise not be profitable and that may spur local production in other sectors.  
To begin with, the backward and forward links creates a demand effect and an 
assistance effect in the host country, i.e. lead firms to tend to require more or better inputs from 
local suppliers and can assist local suppliers through knowledge and technology sharing, 
advance payments, and others forms of assistance. Both backward and forward links also 
generate technology spillovers, improving the production of local firms through two 
mechanisms: diffusion effect (diffusion of knowledge and technology) and availability and 
quality effects (GVC participation increases the availability and quality of inputs in the buyer’s 
industry). In addition, GVC participation can result in pro-competitive market-restructuring 
effects that extend to nonparticipants of the GVC. Put it simply, the pro-competition effect 
occurs when GVC participation increases competition for the limited resources in the country, 
resulting in an overall increased average of productivity. There is also a demonstration effect, 
which reveals that knowledge and technology spillovers can upsurge from direct imitation or 
reverse engineering by the local participant or non-participant firms. The minimum scale 
achievements also amplify pro-competition effects, by stimulating investment in infrastructure 
and backbone services that would not be realized if it was not for the scale generated by GVCs. 
This created infrastructure also spurs local production in other sectors. Furthermore, the 
minimum scale achievements have also a sustainability effect, i.e. it reinforces the ability of the 
country to sustain GVC participation over time (TAGLIONI, WINKLER, 2016). Following 
Taglioni and Winkler’s (2016) argument, the last mechanisms analyzed are related to how 
GVCs benefit labor markets. The authors highlighted three effects: i) demand effect, i.e. GVC 
participation involved higher demand for skilled labor; ii) training effect, i.e. the local firms 
engaged in GVCs are more likely to receive training; and finally, iii) labor turnover effect, 
                                                        
40 See Figure 1.2 (Annex 1.2). 
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which shows that the knowledge embedded in the workforce of participating firms may move 
to other local firms.  
Taglioni and Winkler (2016) use the case of Bulgaria to illustrate the impacts of 
countries’ GVCs participation on the productivity of firms, more specifically on how a firm’s 
absorptive capacity and a country’s institutional variables affect the firm productivity from 
structural integration41 in GVCs in manufacturing industries. Their estimations for the full 
country sample confirm that GVC participation increases the productivity of firms in a country, 
both domestic and foreign firms. In the one hand, several characteristics at the firm level can 
increase the productivity spillovers from a sector’s structural integration in GVCs. Among the 
factors that affect positively the productivity gains from GVC participation on both buying and 
selling sides, the authors highlight a lower technology gap of a firm (related to the median 
productivity level of foreign firms in the same sector), the firm’s technology level, size, export 
share, and FDI status. On the other hand, many national and institutional characteristics are 
associated with the productivity spillovers from structural integration in GVCs. In a general 
sense, productivity spillovers from structural integration in GVCs are lower in countries with 
higher education, less trade protectionism, higher GDP. On the contrary, they are higher in 
countries with high innovation capacity.   
However, learning in GVCs is not automatic, nor all countries can benefit from 
technology and skills dissemination within GVCs (UNCTAD, 2013a; UNESCAP, 2015). 
According to the report, GVCs can also act as barriers to learning for local firms, limiting 
learning opportunities to few firms and locking firms into low technology and low value added 
activities. Shepherd (2015) suggests that GVC participation may support technology upgrading 
in developing countries under proper circumstances, depending on several factors, such as 
social structure, policy environment, and most importantly, the domestic governance 
institutions (especially the rule of law and contract enforcement). UNIDO (2015) reveals that 
the positive effects of GVC participation regarding technological learning and innovation 
depend on governance patterns and power relationships that characterize the GVC, as well as 
on the domestic capabilities of the firm. Nathan and Sarkar (2013) argue that the role of 
developing country firms as suppliers is not restricted to receiving technology and learning how 
to use it. Beyond knowledge using, there is also the possibility of knowledge-changing 
capabilities, which would enable both catch-up through reverse engineering and innovation. 
This possibility is determined not only by the firm- or industry-level capabilities, but also by 
                                                        
41 The authors use network analysis and metrics to measure Bulgaria’s structural integration in GVCs in terms of 
buyer-related and seller-related measures. See Santoni and Taglioni (2015). 
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national scientific and innovation capabilities and incentives. Thereby, without sufficient 
investment in skills, technological progress and GVC participation will not be translated into 
productivity growth (OECD; WTO; UNCTAD, 2013).  
 
1.4.2. Measuring economic upgrading  
No single measure can be used to determine the benefits and risks usually associated 
with GVC integration. Hence, it is usual to assess the concept of economic upgrading by using 
different measures under distinguished levels. These various measures are applied to several 
case studies, challenging the possibility of extracting general conclusions about economic 
upgrading. This sub-section assesses a set of different metrics on how GVC participation may 
impact the economic performance of producers.  
According to Milberg and Winkler (2011), economic upgrading has been measured 
mostly through notions of productivity growth, international competitiveness, and unit prices42. 
This reveals that economic upgrading is mostly seen in terms of efficiency of the production 
process and the peculiarities of the product and tasks developed by producers. According to the 
authors, by taking productivity growth (i.e. increasing output per worker43) as a proxy for 
economic upgrading, it is common to use output and value added mutually when measuring at 
the national level. As the authors present accounting as the basis of a recent set of measures of 
economic upgrading, and following their argument, international competitiveness is usually 
measured by relative unit labor costs44, with greater competitiveness when unit labor costs are 
lower. Although, from the total differential of the equation of unit labor costs45, it becomes 
clear that a decline in the growth rate of relative unit labor costs (i.e. improvements in 
international competitiveness) can be the result of several events, such as a decline in wage 
growth, an increase in productivity growth, or from currency devaluation. Hence, in the 
presence of these different factors of competitiveness, it would be a difficult task to associate a 
better trade performance with economic upgrading. Therefore, looking for a measure of 
upgrading in accordance with the previously discussed concept of upgrading, Milberg and 
                                                        
42 According to the authors, a closer look at the precise definitions of these concepts may reveal some dichotomy 
in relating them to social upgrading. 
43 By measuring labor productivity (π) as output (Q) per worker (L), we have the growth in labor productivity (πˆ) 
as the growth in output (Qˆ) surplus the growth in employment (Lˆ) (MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011). 
44By the equation:  R= W (1/ π)E, where R is unit labor costs in foreign currency terms, W is wages, π is labor 
productivity and E is the nominal exchange rate (MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011). 
45 R^= W^- π^+ Eˆ, where R^ is the growth rate of relative unit labor costs, W^ is the growth rate of wages, π^ the 
growth rate of labor productivity, and E^ the growth rate of the exchange rate (MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011). 
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Winkler (2011) consider one of the first studies that measured economic upgrading by using 
unit prices and market share, Kaplinsky and Readman (2005).  
Some studies emphasize the producer’s ability to learn. Kaplinsky and Readman 
(2005) consider the relative innovative performance as a reflection of upgrading, which is 
measured in terms of unit-prices in accordance with data on market shares. As a first step, the 
authors distinguished the capacity to innovate (to produce something new or with increased 
efficiency) from the capacity to upgrade, i.e. to innovate faster or better than rivals. Therefore, 
their measure of upgrading focuses on outcomes rather than processes and inputs, using unit 
prices and market share as an indicator of competitiveness. Put it simply, a producer has 
experienced economic upgrading when it shows that it: i) increased its export unit values46 
relative to the industry average, and ii) increased its world export market share. On the other 
hand, a combination of falling unit prices and falling market share within the respective GVC 
is taken as downgrading process. Other combinations would end up in ambiguous results47. 
This metric of upgrading was applied by Kaplinsky and Readman (2005) to a particular 
economic activity – wooden furniture, during the 1990s, given their methodological purpose of 
capturing upgrading in a specific sector in different countries using trade statistics in general.  
Following Kaplinsky and Readman’s (2005) definition, Bernhardt and Pollak 
(2015) consider the growth differential between a country’s export unit values and the global 
industry average as one indicator48, and also complement their analysis by adding the change 
in world export market shares. These two indicators can show evidence of different paths of 
upgrading, e.g. product, functional and process upgrading (BERNHARDT, 2013). However, 
using these indicators may not allow distinguishing which type of upgrading is associated with 
the competitiveness performance, nor capturing directly the inter-sectoral upgrading49. Their 
analysis of upgrading dynamics was applied to four manufacturing GVCs (Apparel, Wood 
furniture, Automotive, and Mobile phones), ranging different degrees of technological 
                                                        
46 Export unit values are seen as proxies for product quality and “are calculated by dividing the total value of a 
country’s exports (of a certain commodity or product group) in a given period by the quantity or volume of these 
exports” (BERNHARDT; POLLAK, 2015, p. 9). 
47 According to Kaplinsky and Readman (2005), when market share decreases (increases) and unit value rises 
(falls) relative to industry average, the result depends on the degree of price increase (falling), on the degree of 
falling (rising) market share and the opportunity cost of the resources invested in exports.   
48 The growth differential is used in order to avoid a measurement bias and to adjust for sector-wide inflation. The 
authors consider that because export unit values are a nominal concept, it can be driven by increases in input factor 
and other productions costs (reflecting, for example, an increase in the technology gap relative to the frontier), 
what would lead to misunderstanding increases as economic upgrading. 
49 According to Bernhardt and Pollak (2015, p. 10), economic downgrading within a sector may not be an 
undesirable outcome, “but may be a manifestation of the country’s economy undergoing a process of structural 
change, i.e. a shift in the composition of economic activities towards sectors with higher value-addition”. 
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sophistications, as well as different governance structures, and a sample size of around 35 
countries. Their results indicate a notable variation across the four GVCs, with economic 
upgrading revealing to be more common in complex sectors with a higher degree of 
technological sophistication, and conversely, economic downgrading in low-tech sectors. In 
addition, developing countries, which have been gaining importance as producers and 
exporters, have been more likely to experience economic upgrading50. To sum up, the authors 
conclude that “the promise of economic upgrading through participation in GVCs does not 
materialize for everyone”, as they find that only a quarter of the cases in their sample had 
experienced economic upgrading (BERNHARDT; POLLAK, 2015, p. 31). 
Similarly, Bernhardt and Milberg (2011) present economic upgrading as a 
combination of growth in world export market-shares and export unit values. When taken them 
separately, an increase in the world export market-shares shows that a country’s exports are 
internationally competitive and an increase in the export unit value indicates the production of 
higher-value products. However, an increasing export unit value may also reflect rising 
production costs, which would lead to a loss of international competitiveness (BERNHARDT, 
2013). Thus, upgrading in a given sector takes place when both conditions are experienced 
simultaneously. The authors focused on four sectors (Apparel, Horticulture, Mobile phones, 
and Tourism), varying in terms of technological intensity, and for each sector they analyzed a 
set of eight to ten developing countries for the period 1990-2009. In respect to the economic 
upgrading, their findings show that multiple patterns can be traced across sectors, although two 
parallel can be extracted: first, an association between economic upgrading and growth in world 
export market share in all sectors, except apparel; second, export market share was generally 
associated with declines in export unit values. The authors also found that economic 
downgrading does occur, but social downgrading would be more common. Following the 
approach used by Bernhardt and Milberg (2011), Salido and Bellhouse (2016) recently focused 
in the case of Mexico, analyzing four aggregated sectors (Agriculture, Manufacturing, Mining, 
and Tourism). The authors slightly modify the Bernhardt and Milberg analysis, by adding the 
measurement of the national productivity to capture data on labor and production, regardless 
the external sector performance. According to the authors, this approach that includes 
productivity data would provide a more dynamic view of the changes in the Mexican economy.  
Another set of measures of economic upgrading is used by Taglioni and Winkler 
(2016): i) growth of domestic value added embodied in gross exports; ii) level of domestic value 
                                                        
50 Bernhardt and Pollak (2015) suggest that advanced economies are less likely to undergo economic upgrading 
than developing countries because of their loss of world market share to dynamic emerging market economies. 
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added; iii) productivity (labor or total factor productivity). Even though the first variable is only 
available at the sector level, the others can be measured at the firm level. All three measures of 
economic upgrading were used as dependent variables, and then related to various measures of 
GVC integration at the sector level (the “GVC links”). By using statistical methods or 
econometric analysis, the authors aim to explain the impacts of GVC participation, more 
specifically: i) if the intensity and nature of GVC links51 are important aspects of growth in 
domestic value added that is exported; ii) the effects of GVC integration, as buyer or seller, on 
domestic value added, considering the mediating role of national policy52; iii) the effects of 
GVC participation of an industry on a firm’s productivity53.  
On the other hand, Kowalski et al (2015) are critical to analysis that simply defines 
upgrading as increasing the domestic value added share of a product54. Thereby, claiming for 
more rigorous empirical works on how GVC participation may impact the economic 
performance of countries, the authors use three different forms of measuring the outcomes of 
GVC participation: i) the overall per capita domestic value added embodied in a country’s 
exports; ii) the sophistication of export bundles; and iii) the diversification of exported products. 
Their empirical analysis is mostly based on OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA) data, but 
EORA database is also used to maximize the covered countries, as well as the BACI dataset 
(based on UN Comtrade and the World Bank Development Indicator databases) for non-value 
added-based measures and controls. The entire sample is composed of 152 countries and 15 
years.  
The first measure captures the benefits related to exporting that spread to domestic 
labor and capital. In other words, it would be a value added measure of productivity changes 
                                                        
51 Different metrics were used to measure GVC links, such as “GVC measures of structural integration as buyers 
and sellers in networks, foreign value added embodied in gross exports, domestic value added embodied in exports 
of third countries, GVC participation index, position in GVCs (upstreamness), domestic length of sourcing chains, 
and share of foreign output in a sector” (TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016, p. 121) 
52 The policy variables used in their analysis were able to assess a country’s ability to join GVCs and its ability to 
upgrade, e.g. a country’s infrastructure, foreign presence, legal institutions, and innovation capabilities.   
53 The authors merged the Farole and Winkler (2014) data set with two sector measures of structural integration 
in GVCs, i.e. BONwin (i.e. buyer’s perspective) and BONwout (i.e. seller’s perspective). Farole and Winkler 
(2014) investigate “how foreign investor characteristics, domestic firm’s absorptive capacity, and a country’s 
institutional variables influence intra-industry productivity spillovers to domestic firms from FDI” (TAGLIONI; 
WINKLER, 2016, p. 124). The description of these variables (chapter 6), the baseline of the estimation equation 
(annex 7B), and an application of this model to Bulgaria (annex 7C), see Taglioni and Winkler (2016).  
54 They illustrate their questioning with the case of China’s electrical and optical equipment: with a domestic 
content of exports falling from 87% to 57% between 1995 and 2009, and the volume of domestic value added 
embodied in exports increasing more than tenfold, China had grown its domestic share of global value added in 
exports of electrical and optical equipment (from 3% to 22%). These developments show that profit-maximizing 
firms operating in China had increased the foreign content of their products meanwhile increasing their production. 
Therefore, the authors suggest that product or functional paths of upgrading are scarcely possible if not followed 
by higher productivity. 
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associated with GVC participation (similar to process upgrading). With the aim of testing 
econometrically for complementarity/substitution between domestic and foreign value added 
in imported inputs, and to better understand the relationship between GVC performance and 
access to more sophisticated intermediate inputs, Kowalski et al (2015) estimate the correlation 
of this first variable with: i) changes in the use of foreign value added in exports; and ii) changes 
in measures of sophistication of imported manufacturing intermediate inputs and primary 
intermediates. They find evidence that foreign value added is complementary to increasing per 
capita domestic value added in exports; changes in the sophistication of imported non-primary 
sector intermediates have a positive impact (though it decreases at higher levels of 
sophistication), as well as positive changes in per capita GDP; and, on the other hand, a growing 
distance from economic activity have a negative impact. The second variable is based on the 
methodology of Hausmann et al (2007) and is considered a proxy for product upgrading. By 
measuring its changes, becomes possible to identify the path of increasing (or decreasing) 
sophistication of exported products. Empirical evidence suggests that growing backward 
participation (i.e. a bigger share of foreign value added in exports), using more sophisticated 
inputs and higher per capita GDP are positively associated with producing more sophisticated 
export products; however, positive changes in FDI inflows are not. The third measure, which 
is based on the presumption that lower degree of export concentration has a positive correlation 
with a diversified exporting structure, is considered a proxy for functional upgrading. By 
measuring the diversification of exported products, it is possible to assess a country’s 
competitiveness and quality of integration with international markets. The empirical evidence 
on the third measure shows that diversification can be associated with positive changes in 
backward participation and the use of more sophisticated non-primary imported intermediaries, 
meanwhile, concentration is associated with growing per capita GDP (KOWALSKI et al., 
2015). 
Furthermore, Kowalski et al. (2015) have found different paths of process, product 
and functional upgrading across income groups, respectively: i) most of the gains in per capita 
domestic value added embodied in exports from high-income countries are driven by a growing 
use of more sophisticated primary and non-primary intermediates, while it is the sophistication 
of non-primary intermediates that matters the most for low-income countries and the growing 
flows of inward FDI in the case of middle income countries; ii) engaging in wider fragmentation 
as the basis of most of the product upgrading in high/middle-income countries; and iii) high-
income countries importing more sophisticated non-primary intermediates results in more 
diversified exports, whilst middle/low countries shows a wider engagement in backward 
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participation. Put it simply, their results show no regularity when it comes to the spread of gains 
associated with value chain trade. However, a wider GVC participation, e.g. by using the more 
foreign content of intermediates imports or importing more sophisticated intermediates, is 
assumed to correlate with positive outcomes. Thereby, the possibility of gaining from GVC 
participation appears to be highly associated with the structure of specialization and level of 
development (KOWALSKI et al., 2015). 
The literature presents several challenges for measuring and analyzing economic 
upgrading, such as the quality of the data available, the level of analysis and its comparability, 
and the fact that most of the case studies suffers from a bias towards examples of successful 
upgrading (BERNHARDT; MILBERG, 2011; SALIDO; BELLHOUSE, 2016). Beyond those 
limitations, the analysis of upgrading focused on value added does not address the question of 
distribution of value added among profits, wages, and taxes, or even different types of labor 
(MILBERG; WINKLER, 2013). In addition to the problems related to which variable to 
choose, the authors highlighted the issue of magnitude. In this sense, to address how much 
change in a given variable is enough to constitute upgrading or downgrading, they used a cross-
national evidence to measure “absolute” and “relative” upgrading55 (MILBERG; WINKLER, 
2011). According to them, this distribution is essential to the analysis of the relationship 
between economic and social upgrading. To sum up the measures of economic upgrading and 
complement Milberg and Winkler’s (2011) analysis, Table 1 (annex 1.2) shows a list of 
measures of economic upgrading that have been discussed in this section at different levels of 
analysis (country, sector or GVC, and the firm level).  
While missing how the gains from upgrading are distributed to workers and 
improved working conditions, the view of upgrading restricted on firm-level competitiveness 
was soon criticized for its narrow view of development (WERNER; BAIR; FERNÁNDEZ, 
2014). Thus, GVC scholars started to distinguish between two different dimensions of 
upgrading: economic and social upgrading. According to the authors, the relationship between 
both dimensions of upgrading is the main study subject of the current research frontier of GVC 
studies, overcoming the first generation of studies focused on the relationship between 
governance and upgrading. The next section discusses the social dimension of upgrading. 
 
                                                        
55 “We calculate an “upgrading ratio”, z, as the ratio of the growth in value added per person engaged to the growth 
in exports and define three measures of upgrading, as follows: if z > 1, it indicates “strong absolute upgrading”; if 
z > 1/3, it indicates “weak absolute upgrading”; if z > 1/ β (where β is the slope coefficient in the regression), it 
indicates “relative upgrading”” (MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011, p. 350) 
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1.5.Social upgrading: definitions and measures 
The effects of GVC participation on living standards and conditions of employment 
are commonly referred to as “social upgrading”. By emphasizing the role of workers as social 
actors, several authors define social upgrading in terms of the quality of employment, and also 
in multiple aspects of economic and social life, such as working conditions, remuneration, 
gender quality, labor regulation, workforce development, the greening of value chains, social 
protection and entitlements (BARRIENTOS; GEREFFI; ROSSI, 2010; FERNANDEZ-
STARK; BAMBER; GEREFFI, 2014; GEREFFI; LUO, 2015; MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011; 
ROSSI, 2013; SEN, 1999). In a general sense, social upgrading can be understood as the portion 
of gains from economic upgrading captured by workers, which may be translated in terms of 
wages or improved social wellbeing (SALIDO; BELLHOUSE, 2016). Put it simply, social 
upgrading is considered the social impact perceived by the workers involved in a GVC.  
The concept of social upgrading can be analyzed in terms of the notion of “decent 
work” framed by the ILO over the past ten years, which is based on four pillars56: employment, 
standards and rights at works, social protection and social dialogue (BARRIENTOS; 
GEREFFI; ROSSI, 2010; MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011). Apart from the labor dimension of 
economic upgrading related to skills development and the productivity of workers, social 
upgrading does not consider labor simply as a productive factor complementary to capital. 
Social upgrading, as the quantitative and qualitative improvements within a specific enterprise, 
may help to reduce the risks for worker households and remove some of the volatility that they 
otherwise would have to confront (GEREFFI; LUO, 2015). Thereby, the main focus of social 
upgrading analysis is workers as social actors.  
The impacts of GVC integration on employment are highly complex. Farole (2016) 
assesses the impact of GVC integration on jobs in developing countries in four dimensions: i) 
the number of jobs; ii) the return to jobs (job-specific wages and upgrading potential); iii) the 
distributional impacts of jobs and wage effects; and iv) the working conditions present in GVC-
linked jobs. Hence, the GVC integration impacts on labor market go beyond jobs, including 
changes in relative payoffs to skills, levels of inclusion, and skill developing (upgrading) 
potential. Their main findings are complex and multi-faceted. In respect to jobs, in general 
terms, the scale and nature of job impacts depend on comparative advantages for hosting labor-
intensive stages of production. Apparently, countries with large labor surpluses and low wages 
presented strong jobs growth. Moreover, those countries that successfully attract GVC 
                                                        
56 See Ghai (2003) and ILO (2008) for an explanation of this four elements.  
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investment usually also experienced a significant increase in formal manufacturing jobs, which 
may not result in an increase in “labor intensity”57 (i.e. a larger spending of labor relative to 
capital). When it comes to wages, large-scale job creation in GVCs usually requires sustained 
low wages (countries may be trapped in a “race to the bottom” on costs), and consequently, in 
terms of development requires, what matters are unit labor costs and not wages per se. But 
overall, wages rise and net employment falls, with more skilled workers gaining most. In terms 
of inclusion, as the demand is higher for lower-skilled labor-intensive activities, the GVC-
investment contributes to more “inclusive” job creation, i.e. access to jobs for youth, women, 
and lower-skilled workers. Finally, as GVC participation imposes higher labor standards, the 
outcome appears to be a win-win situation, where workers benefit from better working 
conditions and firms benefit from productivity gains (FAROLE, 2016). 
On the other hand, several studies by OECD find evidence that economic 
globalization has little, or none, impact on aggregate employment in OECD countries, showing 
that the shift from manufacturing has been compensated by considerable job growth in services 
and that there is no systematic association between cross-country differences in trade openness 
and unemployment rates (OECD, 2013). Furthermore, the composition of employment may 
have been affected in terms of activities and skill categories. The general idea is that those 
labor-intensive production stages are more likely to be offshored, and then their corresponding 
employment will decline, meanwhile, these job losses may be compensated by the upsurge of 
productivity and competitiveness of the remaining activities, which may lead to employment 
growth (OECD, 2013). De Backer (2011) describes the losses in labor market as visible and 
concentrated, while the gains appear to be more hidden and diffused. Moreover, despite the 
small impact on the aggregate level of employment, the effects on composition (“winners and 
losers”) are wide larger. Low (2013) considers that the job consequences of moving into higher 
value-added activities on a GVC will depend on the structure of the entire economy. This means 
that while upgrading apparently can imply fewer employment opportunities on that GVC, other 
factors, such as skills levels and the functioning of the labor market, may have an important 
role in the employment consequences of upgrading.  
The characteristics of the actors involved in the process of social upgrading may 
play an important role. Barrientos et al (2010) illustrate58 three possible trajectories: i) small-
                                                        
57In fact, GVC participation will usually result in fewer jobs relative to a given volume of output (in part, because 
firms are gaining productivity from scale economies). 
58 By using a diagram with the horizontal axis representing different types of work (from small scale household-
based work; through low- and moderate-skilled labor-intensive work; to high skilled technology-intensive work 
and knowledge-intensive work) and the vertical axis indicating social upgrading (by measurable standards). 
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scale worker upgrading: workers keep within home based production (agriculture or 
manufacture), but are still able to enjoy improvements in their work conditions (e.g. more 
secure contracts, better wages and safety in the workplace); ii) labor intensive upgrading: 
workers more to better labor intensive types of work that provide better working conditions; 
and iii) higher skill upgrading: workers move towards better paid jobs combined with 
progressive social upgrading (e.g. workers from India that gain sufficient education and training 
and were able to more from lower-paid and low skilled work into the IT sector). The authors 
indicate that moving from lower to the higher skilled type of work may lead to social upgrading, 
but this is not an automatic or homogenous process59.  
Several authors analyze the impact of GVCs on jobs and inequality. If upgrading 
may lower total employment (by increasing demand for more skilled labor and reducing even 
more demand for low-skill labor), it may also act in the opposite way (by raising demand for 
high-skill labor and for home-based or informal workers even more) (MILBERG; WINKLER, 
2013). Apparently, the emergence of GVCs increased aggregate employment through the 
reallocation of tasks across and within countries. Following Görg (2012)’s argument, GVCs 
impact on employment through a number of channels. The productivity of the offshoring firm 
becomes higher with trade in tasks, leading to an upsurge of sales that creates employment. 
Meanwhile, offshoring also results in firms offering intermediate and final goods at lower 
prices. This means that other businesses that now will obtain cheaper inputs will expand, 
resulting in growing employment. Employment may grow also through an increase in demand 
of final consumers, which are experiencing their real incomes surge (IMF, 2013). But GVCs 
have also contributed to a global reallocation of jobs, with developing countries, in particular 
East Asia, attracting labor-intensive manufacturing jobs given their lower labor costs, among 
others (WORLD BANK, 2013).  
It is important to highlight that GVCs can be associated with short-term 
unemployment for specific types of workers. Low-skilled workers, workers specialized in less 
complex tasks and workers with industry or occupation specific skills are more likely to suffer 
the adjustment costs in the short-term, even if aggregate unemployment is not reduced (IMF, 
2013). Hence, “results show that an increase in offshoring to low-income countries can increase 
short-term unemployment for certain occupations in advanced economies, but this effect (when 
positive) is economically very small” (2013, p.13). Nadvi (2004) analyzes the link between 
GVC participation and local employment and poverty impacts by focusing on the export-
                                                        
59  Evidences suggest that regular workers are the main beneficiaries from GVC participation in terms of 
measurable standards and enabling rights (BARRIENTOS; GEREFFI; ROSSI, 2010). 
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oriented horticulture, garments and textiles industries in four countries (Bangladesh, Vietnam, 
Kenya and South Africa). Their broad findings are consistent with significant employment and 
income gains to workers, especially women workers, depending on where workers are engaged 
in higher value-added GVCs that shows greater income gains and better working conditions. 
However, workers are increasingly vulnerable to changing employment contracts and 
increasing casualization of work. 
The impact of GVCs on the recent raising inequality shows that “offshoring can 
affect inequality by increasing relative demand for high-skilled workers both in developed and 
in developing countries (HANSON; FEENSTRA, 1996, 1997, 1999), by reducing job 
opportunities for workers in advanced economies whose occupations are more easily offshored 
to low-wage countries (EBESTAIN et al, 2009), and by increasing wages of workers in firms 
that offshore relatively to workers in firms that source domestically (AMITI; DAVIS, 2012; 
HUMMELS et al, 2011)” (IMF, 2013, p.13). Gonzalez et al (2015) also find evidence of the 
relationship between GVC participation and wage inequality, showing that countries with a 
higher degree of backward participation in GVCs have lower levels of wage inequality. The 
authors also suggest that the type of offshoring matters. In the one hand, countries with a higher 
degree of low-skilled task offshoring are associated with lower wage inequality, as the result of 
a productivity boost of the remaining low-skilled workers (what would increase their wage and 
reduce the gap between high and low skilled wages). On the other hand, offshoring high-skilled 
tasks would also result in a productivity boost (and higher high-skilled wages, deepening the 
gap between high and low-skilled wages). Considering that low-skill offshoring is more 
expressive than high-skill offshoring, the result on aggregate is lower wage inequality 
(GONZALEZ; KOWALSKI; ACHARD, 2015).  
Similar to the case of economic upgrading, the extent of social upgrading will be 
influenced by several factors, such as governance structure, labor regulations and labor unions, 
and opportunities for acquiring new skills relevant to employment (BERNHARDT; POLLAK, 
2015). Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) provide a resume of the main commercial and social 
drivers of social upgrading: i) commercial drivers: cost (wages, transportation, inputs), time to 
market, volume and quality, end-market demand/preference, technology and skills, the nature 
and location of GVC lead firms, social (ethical) standards and certifications, and corporate 
social responsibility; and ii) social drivers: effectiveness of labor law, policies and regulations 
(education/skills, health/safety, gender, and environment), degree of activation of NGOs, 
existence and power of trade unions, and nature of industrial relations (e.g., tripartite 
cooperation). Shingal’s (2015) review suggests that even though GVC integration has been 
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associated with greater employment opportunities, income gains for workers and better working 
conditions, the position of the firm in the GVC is a key determinant factor and may have also 
contributed to the skilled-unskilled labor division. Taglioni and Winkler (2016) consider that 
social upgrading can derive from labor regulation and monitoring (e.g. occupational safety, 
health, and environmental standards in GVCs), besides the role of well-functioning labor 
markets, given the reallocating resources within becoming integrated into GVCs.  Although, 
the authors emphasize that for social upgrading being translated into social cohesion through 
better living standards, it is necessary to ensure “equal opportunities to strengthen social 
cohesion by: i) creating a sense of belonging and active participation, ii) promoting trust, iii) 
offering upward social mobility, and iv) fighting inequality and exclusion” (TAGLIONI, 
WINKLER, 2016, p. 30).  The authors thus conclude: “equal access to jobs (including for 
women and minorities) is the most important opportunity in GVCs” (2016, p.30).  
Gender equality is also an important dimension of the impacts of GVC 
participation. As GVCs are gendered structures, with men and women playing different roles 
in households, working in different sectors and stages of GVCs, with different occupations, and 
with different access to resources and basic services 60 , GVC participation and upgrading 
strategies may affect men and women differently (STARITZ, 2013). Tejani and Milberg (2010) 
find that different paths of upgrading are closely related to different patterns of female labor 
force participation relative to male participation, as is the case of East Asian firms that were 
moving into higher-technology industries and showed decreases in the incidence of female 
employment. At the same time, gender inequality may also have implications for upgrading 
processes in GVCs and its outcomes. Women are usually exposed to occupational segregation, 
what tends to maintain women’s wages artificially low and may act as a twisted source of export 
competitiveness, especially in labor-intensive exports sectors (BUSSE; SPIELMANN, 2006; 
STARITZ, 2013). On the other hand, gender inequality can affect negatively the gains from 
GVC participation, such as skill development and innovation, constraining the possibility of 
moving into higher and more complex value added stages within GVCs (FONTANA, 2009; 
HAGEN, 2014). Salido and Bellhouse (2016) find evidence that women experienced greater 
increases in wages and employment in the case of Mexico for all analyzed sectors, with the 
exception of agriculture. Undoubtedly, this is a fruitful field of research in GVC literature. 
Finally, it is possible to say that the concept of social upgrading is broader than the previously 
                                                        
60 Usually the reasons for gender inequality are not related to their capacities and economic potential but to social 
norms (STARITZ, 2013). 
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discussed concept of economic upgrading, resulting in several local case studies and a great 
challenge to link the mixed findings.  
 
1.5.1. Measuring social upgrading  
The measurement of social upgrading varies according to how the concept is 
understood. In general lines, social upgrading encompasses both quantitative and qualitative 
variables, distinguished by their difficulty to measure and quantify. The first element is 
composed of measurable standards, which are easy to quantify through factory visits and to 
modify through policy interventions, such as total and type of employment (formal and 
informal), wage level, physical wellbeing (e.g. health and safety, working environment, and 
working hours), and employment security (e.g. social protection, type of contract). The second 
component, less easily quantifiable variables, is related to labor conditions and enabling rights, 
which would be the full expression of the rights and entitlements of workers as social actors, 
including freedom of association and collective bargaining, the right to freely chose 
employment, non-discrimination, voice and empowerment (BARRIENTOS; GEREFFI; 
ROSSI, 2010; BARRIENTOS; SMITH, 2007; MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011; SALIDO; 
BELLHOUSE, 2016). It is thus quite difficult to measure social upgrading by using one single 
indicator. 
Social upgrading is usually measured by changes in employment and wages 
(MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011). Social upgrading occurs when both conditions are satisfied: i) 
increased (or at least no decrease) in sectoral employment, and ii) increased in sectoral real 
wages61 (BERNHARDT, 2013; BERNHARDT; MILBERG, 2011; BERNHARDT; POLLAK, 
2015). Their option for these indicators suggests a simple logic: by creating jobs, labor 
encompasses the chance of earning income, and then moving away from poverty and an overall 
increased social well-being. Whether formal jobs, it may provide social insurance and certain 
workers benefits (BERNHARDT; POLLAK, 2015). At the same time, real wages are a measure 
of how much workers benefit from the value created by production in their country. In other 
words, it would be an indicator of labor’ bargaining power and of the distribution of value 
among production factors (labor and capital). Taglioni and Winkler (2016) consider wage 
growth as a reasonable representation of social upgrading. Wide apart from fully capturing the 
qualitative features of social upgrading, real wages are seen as a proxy for the quality of 
                                                        
61 Bernhardt (2013) applied this metrics to analyze the developments of the apparel sector during the 2000s in 18 
selected developing countries. Bernhardt and Milberg (2011) focused on four sectors (apparel, horticulture, mobile 
phones and tourism) of ten developing countries.  
68 
 
 
employment, however, it may not always be translated as better working conditions 
(BERNHARDT, 2013). Bernhardt and Pollak (2015) findings suggest that the patterns of social 
upgrading are quite varied across all four62 GVCs analyzed, but the overall number of social 
downgraders countries is lower than the number of social upgraders in every GVCs. According 
to the authors, with the exception of the automotive GVC, job cuts and increases in real wages 
have been very common across GVCs and this combination has been even more common in 
developed countries, reflecting a structural transformation in these economies. Bernhardt and 
Milberg (2011) findings show a general pattern of employment growth and considerably less 
growth of real wages, but a considerable variation in outcomes across different GVCs.  
According to Milberg and Winkler (2011), there are several qualitative aspects of 
social upgrading that may not be extracted from a value added analysis, e.g. the incidence of 
informality in labor markets, features of worker rights and labor standards. To overcome the 
problems of using qualitative aspects of social upgrading, the authors used the concept of social 
upgrading in accordance with the notion of “decent work” developed over the past ten years by 
the ILO (i.e. employment, social protection, workers’ rights, and social dialogue) and each 
category can be measured by a set of variables.  
Taglioni and Winkler (2016) analyze the impact on labor and wages by 
distinguishing two groups of measures: indirect and direct measures of social upgrading. The 
first group is composed mainly by descriptive statistics that can be used to assess which sectors 
are associated with better labor market outcomes, namely: the averages of the number of 
employees, wages and salaries, wage rate (wages and salaries divided by the number of 
employees), or labor share (wages and salaries as a percentage of value added). According to 
the authors, these labor market indicators may be regressed on indicators of GVC participation 
by running cross-country “controlled correlations” at the sector level. Furthermore, the authors 
provide a more direct way to measure the link between GVC participation and labor market 
outcomes, by constructing several indicators already developed in literature that are based on 
international input-output data.  
The first indicator of the group of direct measures of social upgrading is labor 
content of gross exports. By computing a dataset based on matrix data available in the Global 
Trade Analysis Project for more than 100 countries, 24 or 57 sectors, and covering the period 
of 1995-2011, their findings shows that there are two cases of successful GVC insertion: the 
Chinese machinery and equipment, and the Indian private services. The second indicator 
                                                        
62 Apparel, wood furniture, automotive, mobile phone manufacturing sectors.  
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pointed by Taglioni and Winkler (2016) is labor component of domestic value added in exports, 
which was developed by the UNCTAD and is a proxy for the employment-generating potential 
of exports. By using UNCTAD EORA GVC database it is possible to see the positive 
correlation between GVC participation and labor component of domestic value added in 
exports, and even more, those countries with faster growth in GVC participation have also faster 
growth in the labor component of domestic value added in exports, even if the country depend 
on higher foreign value added share.  
The third indicator is jobs sustained by foreign final demand and was developed by 
the OECD-WTO as part of the TiVA database. This indicator goes one step further by 
considering the domestic value added in foreign final demand and not the domestic value added 
in total exports, which could be used as intermediates in third countries and be exported as final 
goods. In other words, it calculates how the domestic employment is affected by changes in the 
final demand in foreign markets (“upstream impact”). Their analysis considering the period of 
1995-2008 shows a general higher share of jobs sustained by foreign final demand, even though 
it appears to vary in accordance with countries’ size and specialization. The fourth indicator is 
the number of jobs generated (domestically and abroad) by a country’s involvement in GVCs 
(TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016). Jiang and Milberg (2013) decomposed the employment 
effects of a country’s trade in five detailed components: i) labor content in exports; ii) labor 
content in imports; iii) labor content in the import content of exports; iv) labor content in the 
export content of imports; and v) labor content in intermediates contained in imports. The last 
three components reflect trade in intermediates, and the general idea is to assess the different 
channels through country’s trade, especially in GVCs, can result in creating jobs. Hence, a 
country’s exports create jobs and incomes in foreign countries because of the import content of 
exports, meanwhile, a country’s imports may contain its own exports in the form of 
intermediate inputs that were exported to foreign countries. In other words, a country’s imports 
generate jobs domestically because of the export content of imports (TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 
2016).  
The fifth, and last, the indicator is jobs in GVC manufacturing, which was applied 
for selected countries between 1995 and 2008, using WIOD. It shows a broader picture of the 
employment structure in GVCs within a country by measuring (directly and indirectly) the 
number of GVC jobs involved in the production of final manufacturing goods (TAGLIONI; 
WINKLER, 2016). Their findings shows: i) with the exception of China and Turkey, the share 
of manufacturing GVC jobs in overall employment has declined; ii) only about one-half of the 
workers in manufacturing GVCs are employed in manufacturing (the other half is employed in 
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non-manufacturing industries that deliver intermediates); iii) employment in manufacturing 
GVCs increased in the services sector (for Germany, Italy, and Spain, the job creation in 
services were higher than the losses in manufacturing and agriculture). To sum up the measures 
of social upgrading and complement Milberg and Winkler’s (2011) analysis, Table 1 (annex 
1.2) shows a list of measures of social upgrading that have been discussed in this section at 
different levels of analysis (country, sector or GVC, and firm-level). The next section outlines 
the relationship between economic and social upgrading. 
 
1.6.The relationship between economic and social upgrading 
Several studies have analyzed the relationship between economic and social 
upgrading, investigating whether social upgrading is endogenous to economic upgrading or not. 
While the traditional presumption in the literature is that economic upgrading brings social 
upgrading, there has been an increasing concern that this may not be an automatic process. 
Beyond different findings, there are distinguished theoretical explanations for the connection 
between economic upgrading and the social impacts of GVC participation, as it is revealed by 
the debate between neoclassical and institutionalist theories.  
The neoclassical theory, mainly based on the tradition of marginalist analysis, 
understands that wage growth is closely attached to productivity growth. This traditional 
microeconomic view understands that the marginal product of labor determines wages, with 
firms continuing to employ until market wage equals labor’s value of marginal product 
(𝑉𝑀𝑃𝐿) and marginal revenue product (𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐿)63. This relation implies a series of assumptions, 
such as economic agents (workers and firms) are “wage-takers”, given the prevalence of perfect 
competition in labor market; firms are profit-maximizing; labor is mobile and substitutable to 
other production factors (e.g. capital), among others. This said, the wage rate will be determined 
by the interaction of demand and supply curves of a competitive labor market, with higher 
productivity leading to higher remuneration (given constant prices of the good produced). For 
our purpose, this economic theory (marginal productivity theory of wages) gives a potential 
explanation for the relationship between economic and social upgrading, whether the first is 
measured by productivity growth and the second is measured by wage growth, respectively. 
Put it simply, in accordance with the marginal productivity theory of wages, social upgrading 
would be the automatic outcome of economic upgrading (BERNHARDT, 2013; MILBERG; 
WINKLER, 2011). 
                                                        
63 This relation can be seen in most of the microeconomic textbooks, such as Mankiw (2006).  
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Alternatively, the institutionalist view considers the influence on wages of other 
factors that are time and local-specific. In this sense, wages are the result of a bargaining power, 
in which social norms, and the strength and credibility of social institutions play an important 
role (MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011; SALIDO; BELLHOUSE, 2016). Thereby, differently 
from the neoclassical perspective where labor market regulation would cause a distortion in 
ideal competitive markets, the institutionalist view highlights the existence of labor market 
imperfections and the role of labor regulatory interventions to improve the outcomes 64 . 
According to Milberg and Winkler (2011, p.358), “union density, bargaining rights, minimum 
wages and active labor market policies have been found to be significant determinants of labor 
market outcomes in developed and developing economies”. Thereby, Gereffi and Luo (2015) 
understand that economic upgrading is related to, but it may not determine, the extent and type 
of social upgrading, since other institutional factors and actors also influence this possibility, 
such as the extent and nature of worker organization, civil society actions, and government 
legislation and its enforcement.  
Several case studies have shed light on the relationship between economic and 
social upgrading, supporting that the link between both is not automatic. In order to do so, some 
studies created a single (composite) index of economic upgrading and a single (composite) 
index of social upgrading, and thus plot them together (BERNHARDT, 2013; BERNHARDT; 
MILBERG, 2011; BERNHARDT; POLLAK, 2015). A 2x2 matrix of possible combinations of 
economic and social up/downgrading is used to analyze the four different scenarios: overall 
upgrading (i.e. economic and social upgrading) versus overall downgrading (i.e. economic and 
social downgrading), and a mixed combination of both (economic upgrading and social 
downgrading, and economic downgrading and social upgrading). Following it, it is necessary 
to reduce these four outcomes to just two dimensions. Beyond several possibilities to create 
these indexes, the authors’ first option is a simple method of giving equal weight to each 
component of both indicators (Method 1), composing a symmetrical composite index65. But 
what if a country has experienced an increase in export market shares and a decrease in export 
unit values, or when employment grows but real wages are falling? 
                                                        
64 For this conflicting views, Quibria (2002) argues that excessive regulations have worked against workers interest 
by creating an inflexible market, reducing the profitability of investments (as a reflection of the redistribution of 
economic rent from capital to labor), and creating economic rigidities. In other words, excessive labor regulations 
may hurt wage and employment growth. For a recent analysis of the influence of globalization on labor market 
institutions, see Potrafke (2013). 
65 Economic upgrading (or downgrading) = 0,5*(%-change in market share) + 0,5* (%-change in export unit 
value); and social upgrading (or downgrading)= 0,5*(%-change in employment) + 0,5*(%-change in real wages). 
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Undoubtedly, there are several ways to create these composite indexes. In the face 
of a certain pro-upgrading bias of the first method, the authors follow checking for robustness66. 
In this sense, to address the problem of the existence of a lower bound in the absence of an 
upper bound, they introduce Method 267. This method is considered stricter than Method 1 
because when one of the two indicators has declined, a country would have to show a bigger 
increase in the second indicator to still record an economic or social upgrading in the composite 
index. But following Kaplinsky and Readman (2005), an even stricter method is suggested: 
Method 3 considers that “a country can be said to have experienced economic or social 
upgrading if and only if both underlying indicators have positive signs” (BERNHARDT, 2013, 
p. 25). 
Bernhardt and Milberg (2011) find evidence that social upgrading occurs generally 
in the presence of economic upgrading68, but economic upgrading does not guarantee social 
upgrading. Besides a considerable variation across sectors69, social downgrading appears to be 
more common than economic downgrading. Bernhardt (2013) investigates whether an overall 
upgrading has occurred among the apparel-exporting of developing countries. Bernhardt’s 
(2013) findings are consistent with a positive correlation between economic and social 
upgrading in the apparel sector, although no clear pattern has emerged. It is important to 
highlight that they found no single case in their sample of social upgrading occurring without 
economic upgrading70, even though not every country that experienced economic upgrading 
also experienced social upgrading. These findings lead them to conclude that whether economic 
upgrading does not automatically translate into social upgrading, it is at least a conducive 
condition.  Bernhardt and Pollak (2015) applied the same indicators of social and economic 
upgrading of Bernhardt (2013) in four selected GVCs - apparel, wood furniture, automotive, 
and mobile phones manufacturing – and found a considerable variation across the four GVCs. 
In general lines, there are more cases of overall upgrading than overall downgrading or 
                                                        
66 “A drawback of this first method (…) is that the underlying indicators have a lower bound of -100 percent but 
an upper bound of infinity. To be sure, none of the indicators can fall below zero – which would correspond to a 
decrease of -100% from any initial level. On the other hand, countries can in principle register increases on any of 
the indicators that go (far) beyond +100 percent” (BERNHARDT, 2013, p. 24).  
67 Economic upgrading (or downgrading)= [(1+Δmarket share) *(1+ Δ unit value)]-1; and social upgrading (or 
downgrading) = [(1+Δemployment) *(1+ Δ real wage)]-1. 
68 To recall, social and economic upgrading are proxied by increasing employment and real wages, and rising 
export market shares and unit export prices, respectively.  
69 Their analysis is applied for four sectors (apparel, horticulture, mobile phones and tourism). In apparel and 
horticulture there is a positive correlation between economic and social upgrading, however, in mobile phones 
there is considerable economic upgrading without social upgrading, and finally the opposite is seen in the tourism 
value chain, i.e. social upgrading without signs of economic upgrading (BERNHARDT; MILBERG, 2011). 
70 With the exception of Jordan (by using Method 1 and 2) and Nicaragua (Method 3).  
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intermediate cases71. Expanding the 2x2 matrix into 3x3 in order to include intermediate cases, 
the situations where economic upgrading is associated with social upgrading correspond to the 
cells in the diagonal from the bottom-left to the top-right. Among their sample of countries, 
Bernhardt and Pollak (2015) found that the direction of economic and social upgrading run at 
the same time in more than half of the countries, and more specifically, the automotive GVC 
presents the strongest relationship while the wood furniture shows the weakest. There are only 
a few cases of economic upgrading without social upgrading and of countries that have 
achieved social upgrading without economic upgrading (with the wood furniture sector as an 
exception).  
Rossi (2013) analyzes under which conditions economic upgrading is translated as 
social upgrading by using the Moroccan garment sector as an empirical case study. The 
evidence shows that different paths of upgrading result in mixed outcomes for workers, with 
process upgrading leading to reductions in excessive overtime worked, improved the working 
environment, and regulated contracts; and product upgrading related to skill upgrading for 
regular workers, if the product involves a more sophisticated production. When it is about 
functional upgrading, becomes clear that different types of workers may have different 
experiences: for regular workers, moving into new activities can imply training, skill upgrading, 
better measurable standards and enabling rights, but functional upgrading may pressure for 
reducing costs with more flexibility and speed of delivery, resulting in social downgrading for 
less skilled irregular workers (employed in packaging, storage, and loading, for example), both 
in terms of measurable standards (irregular contracts, poor wages, and long working hours) and 
of enabling rights (discrimination at the workplace) (ROSSI, 2013).  
Barrientos et al. (2010) suggest that economic and social upgrading are often 
interweaved, but one does not necessarily lead to the other. The authors suggest that economic 
upgrading can lead to social upgrading or downgrading, depending on how local-suppliers 
manage lead-firms’ pressure for higher quality with lower costs’ pressure to remain 
competitive. These suppliers may take a “low road” involving economic and social 
downgrading or a “high road” involving economic and social upgrading, or even, as most of 
them, a mixed approach, reflected in the use of regular and irregular workers together. While 
producers undertaking a low road strategy based on worsening labor conditions are risking 
losing out on quality, those on the high road are risking losing out on price competitiveness for 
improving wages and labor conditions (BARRIENTOS; GEREFFI; ROSSI, 2010). But may 
                                                        
71  In other words, “social upgrading without economic upgrading” or “economic upgrading without social 
upgrading”. 
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not be possible to ensure that the high road will be followed by wage growth, meanwhile, it is 
possible to say that the low road strategy of lowering wages has limits, which are posed by 
human subsistence and political stability (MILBERG; WINKLER, 2011; TAGLIONI; 
WINKLER, 2016). Salido and Bellhouse (2016) argument that a view based strictly on the 
performance of external sectors would give the wrong impression. In the specific study case of 
Mexico, following Bernhardt and Milberg’s (2012) approach, the authors find social upgrading 
being achieved in a context of economic downgrading. However, the authors provide more 
specific information about the Mexican case by adding measures of national productivity, 
besides wage and employment, and thus finding different outcomes: an overall upgrading.  
The relationship between social and economic upgrading is not clearly and 
unambiguously identified yet, varying in accordance with the context. The research available 
confirms that economic upgrading can result in social upgrading, but this may not always be 
the case. The connection between improvements in firm efficiency, productive capacity and 
functional capabilities is not inherent to poverty reduction and better living standards 
(WERNER; BAIR; FERNÁNDEZ, 2014). Whilst it is important to highlight that the impacts 
of economic and social upgrading are not homogeneous, affecting firms and producers 
according to several features, such as their size, position in the GVC, formality, skills, income, 
or gender (GEREFFI; FERNANDEZ-STARK, 2011). After all, developing strategies that 
combine social and economic upgrading requires further analysis of the new features of the 
global economy, so policymakers can improve their ability to define goals and capture greater 
benefits from GVC participation.  
 
1.7.Partial concluding remarks: some policy implications 
This chapter has critically documented a vast literature addressing the multi-layered 
outcomes associated with participating in GVCs, contributing to the organization of a formal 
theoretical apparatus within the GVC literature. From the firm to the macro-level, for instance, 
some of the outcomes considered within the GVC literature are: increased productivity, greater 
access to new markets and technologies, diffusion of technology and knowledge, higher skilled 
and better paid jobs (direct and indirect) creation, enhanced economic growth and higher per 
capita income, political and economic stability, better living standards and working conditions, 
and better and more sustainable use of resources (CATTANEO et al., 2013; TAGLIONI; 
WINKLER, 2016; UNESCAP, 2015). While participating in GVCs can accelerate the catch-up 
of developing countries’ economic growth rates and income levels at the global level, leading 
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to a greater convergence between economies, the effects of GVC participation may be much 
more heterogeneous at the level of individual developing economies (UNCTAD, 2013b). In 
fact, this different potential impact of GVC participation becomes clear when we consider the 
distinguished activities that lead firms and other firms are engaged, with the former controlling 
higher value added activities (e.g. innovation activities, branding and new product 
development) and the later engaged in assembly activities that earn less, have fewer 
opportunities to growth and are more vulnerable to business cycles shocks (UNCTAD, 2013b).  
GVC participation is not all about benefits. It is the possibility of downgrading what 
makes some authors wonder that rather than questioning if producers – firms, regions or 
countries – should participate in GVCs, the key issue in GVC literature is how they should do 
so (KAPLINSKY; MORRIS, 2003; KAPLINSKY; READMAN, 2001). While the literature 
has recognized its mixed impacts, GVC participation alone may not ensure development 
benefits and, as a matter of fact, it may entail a number of potential downsides. Beyond the 
several obstacles to access GVCs, producers are exposed to several risks once they are actively 
participating in GVCs. From greater interdependencies across economies that reveal greater 
exposure to external shocks and supply disruptions, through exacerbated inequalities and 
environmental degradation, to labor markets deterioration and narrow learning capacities, GVC 
participation can lead to multiple negative impacts (STURGEON; MEMEDOVIC, 2011; 
UNESCAP, 2015; WTO, 2014b). More importantly, governments are unable to control these 
risks directly, because GVC participation is the outcome of firm’s choices. However, this does 
not imply that policymakers cannot influence firm’s judgment and strategies. Thereby, these 
risks need to be appropriately taken into account. 
Firms, and not countries, are the main actors in GVCs, and when it comes to GVCs 
participation, one may say that firms have three general objectives regarding GVCs: i) entry to 
GVCs, ii) expand their presence and deepen it, and iii) upgrade to higher value-added positions 
within the GVC (ILIUTEANU, 2016). As is discussed by Kowalski et al. (2015), firms’ 
engagement is associated with the possibility of making profit, and there are at least two 
considerable differences in terms of a country or policymaker’s perspective on GVC 
participation and the firm perspective. First, a country perspective on GVCs participation 
considers gains not only to capital but also to labor or, in general terms, other social outcomes. 
Second, it considers that the policy environment can influence firm’s choices and then the 
several dimensions of the outcomes of GVC participation at the country level. While the 
rationale of firms’ decisions to participate in GVCs is related to economic efficiency and 
competitive advantage, policymakers are expected to analyze GVCs from a different 
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perspective that considers economic, political and strategic factors (BHATIA, 2013). As is 
added by the author, policymakers also have a different perspective from that of firms on the 
issue of upgrading, which usually involves higher technology that is labor saving. It is seen 
from an economic logic by the firms, and a part of having positive implications, yet there can 
be some situations where firms may use economic downgrading as a business strategy. 
Meanwhile, the viewpoint of policymakers is broader and involves generating the most jobs 
and capturing the maximum value within the country. 
Finally, there are some strategic questions that policymakers should formulate 
when it comes to upgrading. By facing the challenge of maximizing the benefits from GVCs 
participation and choosing which type of economic upgrading they want to pursue, 
policymakers should focus on strengthening existing GVC-domestic economy links, which 
usually are associated with greater diffusion of knowledge, technology, and know-how from 
foreign investors or trade partners abroad, along with strengthening domestic firms’ absorptive 
capacity (TAGLIONI; WINKLER, 2016). In that sense, both economic upgrading and GVC 
densification are key-factors to transform GVC participation into sustainable development. 
This means that the effort is not only about becoming more competitive in higher value-added 
activities, but also about engaging more local actors, both firms and workers, in the GVCs. 
Thereby, this may suggest that moving into higher value-added activities may not always result 
in large value addition for a country, and more importantly, in some cases this may come from 
performing in lower value-added activities on a large scale.  
This chapter has discussed several studies on economic upgrading have recently 
emphasized its connection to social upgrading. Understanding how economic and social 
upgrading are related is a necessary step forward in the direction of more suitable industrial and 
commercial policies in agreement with the sustainable development goals (SALIDO; 
BELLHOUSE, 2016). To economic upgrading translates as sustainable development, 
policymakers should be concerned with the distribution of the opportunities and outcomes for 
GVC participation among all segments of society, and this means formulating social policies 
to create a balanced distribution of the gains that leads to social cohesion (TAGLIONI; 
WINKLER, 2016). For that reason, considering the absence of a single measure, this chapter 
has systematically analyzed the different measures applied to several case studies concerning 
both economic and social upgrading. Thus, the existence of several measures at different levels 
reflects, to a certain extent, the absence of a formal theoretical apparatus in the GVC literature. 
Considering that economic upgrading may drive to social upgrading, but not automatically, the 
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role of policymakers in promoting social upgrading is an important topic in the GVC research 
agenda.  
 
Annex 1.1 
 
Box 1.1 - Distinguishing related concepts 
The use of multiple terms may require a more precise analysis of its 
meanings, especially if we are looking for evidences of a new paradigm of 
globalization. A first step is to distinguish between final and intermediate products. 
Final products are goods and services consumed (including private and public 
consumption) or invested as capital goods, in contrast to intermediate products that 
continue on in the production process of downstream products (HOROWITZ; 
RIKER, 2014; TIMMER et al., 2014). Capital goods are used but not used up in the 
production process, in other words, this means that capital goods enter as a fixed 
asset in the production process, while intermediate goods are used and incorporated 
in the final output (MIROUDOT; LANZ; RAGOUSSIS, 2009). This distinction is 
especially important for explaining and assessing trade on its contemporary 
dimension, considering the increased trade in parts and components as a share of 
total trade in recent years.  
Fragmentation, whether domestic or international, is a term originally 
proposed by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) to describe the organization of 
production processes. On their research, the authors define fragmentation as the 
decomposition of production into separable component blocks connected by service 
links. Needless to say, not all production processes have various phases that are 
physically separable, and in this sense, intra-product specialization can only take 
place where the manufacture of a product is amenable to fragmentation (ARNDT; 
KIERZKOWSKI, 2001). The fragmentation of a production process can take the 
form of sequential chains (or “snakes”, where intermediate goods are sent and 
incorporate sequentially from one country to another, until delivery the final stage 
of production) or complex networks (or “spiders”, where the intermediate parts 
come from a multiple number of destinations to a single location in no particular 
order) (BALDWIN; VENABLES, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013a). Despite these extreme 
cases, production processes normally are a complex combination of both forms 
(TIMMER et al., 2014). 
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Fragmentation and offshoring, which involves only a change in the 
geographic location but not in the firm’s ownership (MIROUDOT; LANZ; 
RAGOUSSIS, 2009), may occur within a given firm, insourcing (vertical 
integration), or in separated ownership, outsourcing, i.e. “buying inputs from 
outside sources rather than producing them internally” (INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, 2013). This means that production stages may be spatially 
apart, but close or apart in ownership, or spatially close but organizationally 
separated or integrated by ownership (ARNDT; KIERZKOWSKI, 2001; 
CATTANEO et al., 2013; MIROUDOT; LANZ; RAGOUSSIS, 2009)72. 
Several studies have argued that international fragmentation of 
production creates a strong trade-investment nexus (IMF, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013a). 
It is also possible to say that this nexus has another important determinant, 
ownership. According to Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001), in cross-border production 
structures where separate ownership is not feasible, multinational corporations and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) are more likely to play a dominant role, meanwhile 
where is feasible, arm’s-length relationships are possible and FDI is less relevant.  
There is another conceptual difference between terms commonly taken 
as synonymous: global sourcing and international outsourcing. What distinct both 
terms is the initial organization structure of the enterprise. In the first case, the 
product or service is supplied by an external supplier in the domestic market, while, 
in the second case, was the firm within its own boundaries that was producing in 
the domestic market; and both moved from domestic supplier to abroad 
(MIROUDOT; LANZ; RAGOUSSIS, 2009). Meanwhile, offshore sourcing and 
production, i.e. foreign outsourcing and FDI, has become a common practice for 
several industries, including automotive and electronics, where final products can 
be broken down into discrete components separately produced, easily transported 
and assembled in low-cost locations (UNCTAD, 2013a). As a result, when 
production processes are split into subsequent phases and spatially separated, they 
may now be undertaken where are the lowest trade costs of each component.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
                                                        
72 For a general framework about firms new sourcing strategies according to geographical and organization 
parameters see Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Miroudot, Lanz and Ragoussis (2009).  
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Annex 1.2  
 
Table 1.1 - Synthesis of the measures of economic and social upgrading 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Milberg and Winkler (2011). 
 
Measures of economic upgrading Measures of social upgrading
Productivity growth (labor or total factor) Wage growth
Value added growth Employment/popultion growth
Profits growth Formal employment
Incresead capital intensity Decline in youth unemployment
Export growth Gender equality in employment and wages
Growth in export market share Poverty reduction
Unit value growth of output Share of wage employment in non-agricultural employment
Unit value growth of exports Improved labor standards (including the right to freely choose employment, freedom of 
association, and collective bargaining, job safety, child labor, forced labor, employment 
discrimination, voice and empowerement)
Unit cost growth of labour Regulation of monitoring
Per capita domestic value added embodied in a country’s exports Improved political rights (freedom house index)
Sophistication of export bundles Human Development Index (HDI)
Diversification of exported products Employment security (e.g. social protection, type of contract)
Labor share (wages and salaries as a percentage of value added)
Labor content of gross exports
Labor component of domestic value added in exports
Jobs sustained by foreign final demand
Jobs generated domestically and abroad by a country's involvement in GVCs
Jobs in GVC manufacturing
Productivity growth (labor or total factor) Wage growth 
Value added growth Employment growth
Profits growth Labor share (wages and salaries as a percentage of value added)
Export growth Jobs sustained by foreign final demand
Growth in export market share Jobs generated domestically and abroad by a country's involvement in GVCs
Growth of domestic value added embodied in gross exports Jobs in GVC manufacturing
Unit value growth of output
Unit value growth of exports
Incresead capital intensity
Increased skill intensity of functions 
(assembly/OEM/ODM/OBM/full package)
Incresead skill intensity of employment
Incresead skill intensity of exports
Level of domestic value added
Increased skill intensity of functions 
(assembly/OEM/ODM/OBM/full package)
Number of workers per job
Developing skills to manage the supply chain Type of contract
Composition of jobs
Incresead capital intensity/mechanization
Product, process, functional, chain upgrading
Level of domestic value added
Productivity growth (labor or total factor)
Country-level
Sector or GVC-level
Firm-level
Improved labor standards (including the right to freely choose employment, freedom of 
association, and collective bargaining, job safety, child labor, forced labor, employment 
discrimination, voice and empowerement)
Improved standards in plant monitoring (e.g. management and working conditions audit (M-
audit) criteria)
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Figure 1.2 - The main transmission channels for economic and social upgrading 
 
Source: Taglioni and Winkler (2016). 
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SECTION II. METRICS 
Chapter 2. Mapping Global Value Chains: patterns of value added 
trade in the global economy 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The labels of “Made in” have become obsolete symbols of a different era of 
international trade flows. Over the last decades, countries have specialized in specific stages of 
production networks rather than in final products. As a result, final products are now considered 
“packages” of several nations’ productive factors (BALDWIN, 2011b), turning the fact of a 
product being “completed” in a particular country into a narrow story about its specialization 
patterns. World production is now vertically fragmented across different countries, with 
intermediate products and services crossing borders multiple times and exports being produced 
using foreign inputs from several countries. This new scenario has posed significant challenges 
to the use of traditional measures based on gross trade and has called for new metrics. Thus, 
several measures derived from the input-output approach have been developed to investigate to 
what extent a country is involved in vertically integrated production connected by international 
trade. 
The interdependencies between industries in fragmented and internationally 
dispersed production networks have become a crucial aspect of nowadays trade analysis. 
Before the emergence of GVCs, it was possible to compare gross-trade data to data on value-
added without overstating the amount of domestic value-added in exports. However, the 
use of traditional global trade statistics may lead to a significant amount of “double 
counting” in gross exports, since exports increasingly rely on (direct and indirect) 
intermediate imports. When based on gross concepts, the analyses may present a misleading 
portrait of which country ultimately benefits from bilateral trade flows by exaggerating the 
importance of producing countries at the end of value chains, and even more importantly, 
it may lead to misunderstanding in regard to the relationship between trade and 
macroeconomic variables. In this sense, most recent analyses are based on “factor content” 
or “value-added” trade that rely on international (or inter-country) input-output (IIO) data 
(HUMMELS; ISHII; YI, 2001a; JOHNSON, 2014b; LOS; TIMMER; DE VRIES, 2015a; 
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TIMMER et al., 2014).  
Differently from other approaches, such as firm-level analysis that use 
individual firms’ micro-level data and are limited to the structure of a particular product 
network, input-output analysis covers all set of industries that compose an economy system. 
IIO tables turned possible to identify the vertical structure of international production 
sharing (BULLÓN et al., 2014). How each country specializes in specific stages of a 
production sequence is a particular dimension of inter-country production linkages, which 
is commonly presented as vertical specialization in trade. This notion emphasizes the 
sequential, multiple-border crossing and the back-and-forth aspects of production processes 
that are increasingly fragmented geographically. But how vertical specialization can be 
measured? If the production process is split into phases that can occur globally, regionally or 
be restricted to only two countries, then how to assess “who produces for whom”? What are the 
new metrics for measuring how globally or regionally integrated is a country or economic bloc? 
Some of those questions have been the object of several recent studies and the recent availability 
of international input-output tables has turned possible to expand the concept of vertical 
specialization and capture different characteristics of value added embedded in trade 
(AMADOR; MAURO, 2015; DAUDIN; RIFFLART; SCHWEISGUTH, 2011; DI 
GIOVANNI; LEVCHENKO, 2010; HUMMELS; ISHII; YI, 2001b; JOHNSON; NOGUERA, 
2012; LOS; TIMMER; DE VRIES, 2015b; STEHRER, 2013).  
There are many different ways to capture the degree and nature of trade interactions 
along GVCs. For instance, the import content of exports (HUMMELS; ISHII; YI, 2001), the 
method of disaggregation of gross exports (KOOPMAN; WANG, 2012; KOOPMAN; WANG; 
WEI, 2014), the value added exports (JOHNSON; NOGUERA, 2012), the “import to export” 
(I2E) and “import to produce” (I2P) (BALDWIN; LOPEZ-GONZALEZ, 2013), and the 
vertical specialization of (value-added) trade (DAUDIN; RIFFLART; SCHWEISGUTH, 
2011). The recursive concepts used in this chapter are strongly based on the macro level of this 
literature, which is set apart from case studies for single products or specific firms, and is 
concerned with a broad view of countries engagement in GVCs. 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide for more and better evidence 
regarding the degree and nature of countries’ interaction within GVCs. For that purpose, it 
integrates the most widely accepted metrics based on the concept of trade in value added that 
give a more precise picture of the changing nature of international trade. Firstly, the chapter 
provides a more detailed vision of a set of indicators based on value-added terms, presenting 
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its techniques and how they relate to each other. Further on, it describes the specificities of the 
most used international input-output tables. The empirical exercise that follows is based on two 
of the main IIO databases, OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) and World Input-
Output Database (WIOD). TiVA database provide a set of ready-to-use GVC indicators and 
trade in value added decompositions, which are calculated by their own methodology based on 
OECD’s Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) system. This means that the indicators present 
differences in terms of decomposition level and nomenclature. For our purpose, whenever it is 
possible, we will indicate the compatibility of the indicators provided by the TiVA database 
with the measures based on WIOD data, which are calculated using the method of 
decomposition of gross exports by Koopman et al. (2010, 2014). 
Even though the value-added measures are less up-to-date and require simplifying 
assumptions in their construction if compared to gross trade, value-added analysis provide a 
more revealing perspective on how countries are integrated into GVCs and how they are 
interacting with its trade partners. Understanding these metrics is crucial for building 
development strategies consistent with the current global trade dynamics, allowing the 
identification of sources of competitiveness and the challenges regarding developing new 
competitive areas. Besides that, it also adds new perspectives on complex issues with political 
consequences, such as the discussions about environmental protection and “job content” of 
trade. Thus, it is not possible to assume which are the potential trajectories to follow without 
having a reliable map in hands, which clearly could not be build based on traditional gross trade 
in the current phase of globalization.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the main indicators based 
on trade in value-added, emphasizing the most recent contributions to measure value-added 
trade. Section 2 describes the main international input-output databases. Section 3 documents 
a series of stylized facts based on TiVA and WIOD databases applied to selected countries and 
industries. Section 4 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 Measuring GVCs: main indicators based on trade in value-added 
This section introduces the main indicators used to provide some evidence on the 
importance, intensity and length of GVCs, as well as the position of countries in specific 
production lines.  
There are two main strands of literature to analyzing global value chains. Several 
studies measure the foreign content of domestic production by considering only the share of 
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directly imported inputs in production. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) were the first to formulate 
and calculate this measure, which since then has been built in different forms. This first strand, 
named “global value chain” approach, describes a more general picture of how the value added 
is distributed across all countries, regardless if the final product is sold domestically or 
exported. The second strand is the vertical specialization (VS) rooted in the seminal work by 
Hummels et al. (2001), which emphasizes both the direct and indirect import content of 
exports. In this second approach, the major concern is to estimate the domestic and foreign 
value-added in a country’s exports. At the same time the VS approach is narrower, because it 
considers only the resulting output that was exported, it is considered more complete since it 
also includes the imported inputs that have been used indirectly in the production of exports, 
which is crucial when goods and services are crossing borders multiple times73. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996)’s indicator for outsourcing is presented as the share of 
imported intermediate inputs in the total purchase of non-energy materials of individual 
industries. Much of its relevance in the literature is explained by its simplicity in reflecting the 
international production fragmentation at the industry level. A few years later, the same concept 
was used with a general proposal to develop a new methodology to estimate the impact of trade 
and technology on wages, specifically for the United States (FEENSTRA, R.C.; HANSON, 
1999). The extent of international outsourcing of intermediate input production is portrayed as 
“structural changes”, which was measured as “the share of imported intermediate inputs in total 
costs and the share of high-technology capital in the total capital stock” (FEENSTRA, R.C.; 
HANSON, 1999, p. 924). Their measure of international outsourcing combined data on U.S. 
imports and exports of final goods by four-digit SIC manufacturing industry with data on total 
input purchases from the Census of Manufactures74.  
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) then proposed two indicators: a broad and a narrow 
measure of international outsourcing. The broad measure is presented by the imported 
intermediate inputs relative to total expenditure on intermediate inputs in a specific industry. 
The narrow measure is obtained by restricting to the import share of intermediate inputs from 
the same two-digit SIC industry and, as they argued it, it would best capture the idea of 
outsourcing. Put it simply, the difference between both perspectives is represented by the 
intermediate inputs from outside the two-digit purchasing industry that are sourced from 
                                                        
73 Further explanations about the differences between both approaches are illustrated in Los and Timmer (2015) 
and discussed by Amador and Mauro (2015).  
74 Used as raw data to construct input-output tables, the Census data present the value of intermediate inputs of 
each four-digit manufacturing industry purchased from other manufacturing industries. 
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abroad. This means that imports of steel by German car manufacturers would be considered a 
form of international outsourcing in a broad measure, but it would not be seen as such rather a 
narrow measure is considered (LOS; TIMMER; VRIES, 2013).  
However, one would say that Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999)’s indicators are 
actually proxies of offshoring (DE BACKER; YAMANO, 2007), which generally involves 
firms’ purchases of intermediate goods and services from foreign firms at arm’s length or to 
foreign affiliates (i.e. changes in the geographic location). Another critical aspect is that, even 
though being simple to calculate, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999)’s measures are considered 
too wide75. Hence, other narrower measures have been proposed, for instance, restricting 
outsourcing to outward processing (EGGER; EGGER, 2001) and computing the level of 
offshoring as the share of non-energy imported intermediate inputs in total non-energy 
intermediate inputs (BACKER; YAMANO, 2007).  
The second strand of measures of value-added trade is based on the concept of 
vertical specialization. Vertical specialization occurs when the production of goods is 
fragmented in multiple stages and takes place across countries, with each country 
specializing in certain stages of the sequence of production (DIETZENBACHER, 2010). The 
primary measure of vertical specialization was developed by Hummels et al. (2001), and it 
is essentially the (direct and indirect) import content of a country’s exports, i.e. the domestic 
and foreign value added embodied in exports. Put it simply, it would be measured by “the 
export weighted average direct import coefficient or by the export weighted average import 
multiplier (including also the indirect import requirements)” (DIETZENBACHER, 2010, p. 
2).   
The empirical results of implementing the VS measure rely primarily on IIO 
tables, which turned possible to calculate the value of imported inputs used indirectly in 
the production of an exported good. In general terms, a country may participate in GVCs 
in two distinct ways: i) using imported intermediate inputs to produce exports; and ii) 
exporting intermediate goods that are used as inputs by another country to produce goods 
for exports. In this sense, there are two broad measures of GVC participation: i) VS: 
                                                        
75 Others would say that they still suffer from a series of shortcomings. Los, Timmer and Vries (2013) indicate 
that some of the main faults are: a country-size bias, once larger countries would have lower import shares 
reflecting a wider variety of domestic input producers; and double-counting of imports, disregarding the back and 
forth trade across borders and the country of origin, since it only considers the total value of imports. Those faults 
are exactly what Los, Timmer and Vries (2013) tried to overcome years later. 
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measures the value of imported contents embodied in a country’s exports, and ii) VS1: 
measures the value of intermediate exports sent indirectly through other countries to final 
destinations, i.e. the percentage of exported intermediate goods and services that are used 
as inputs to produce other countries’ exports (HUMMELS; ISHII; YI, 2001). On the one 
hand, the VS share estimate the importance of upstream links, providing a metric of the 
involvement of a country or industry as a user of foreign inputs (i.e. backward 
participation). On the other hand, the VS1 share estimate the importance of downstream 
links, measuring the involvement in GVCs from a supplier perspective (i.e. forward 
participation) (BACKER; MIROUDOT, 2013; CADESTIN; GOURDON; KOWALSKI, 
2016).  
Despite the existence of both types of GVC participation, the VS is commonly 
used as an acronym for vertical trade. This is justified by the perception that it is more 
difficult to compute VS1 than it is to estimate VS76. However, when analyzing the vertical 
specialization of trade (in short, vertical trade), one may also have to consider the domestic-
produced exports that are used by another country as inputs in its own exports (i.e. the VS1 
side).  
Both primary measures proposed by Hummels et al. (2001) are based on two key 
assumptions: i) all imported intermediate inputs are 100% foreign value added, what would 
tend to over-estimate foreign value-added share and underestimate domestic value-added 
share in exports – this is particularly important for developed countries since their imports 
often embodied a large share of its own value-added; and ii) both goods that are produced 
for export and for domestic final demand have the same intensity in the use of imported 
inputs – this is a restricted hypothesis especially for developing countries, which turn to 
have a significant portion of processing goods as a portion of exports (KOOPMAN; WANG; 
WEI, 2014). That is relevant, because these simplifications turned Hummels et al. (2001)’s 
                                                        
76 Hummels et al. (2001) did not construct the mathematical formulation for the VS1 indicator, basing their 
empirical study in the gross exports of intermediate goods. According to Daudin et al. (2011), computing the 
VS1 is more difficult because it requires matching bilateral trade flow data with intermediate delivery matrices 
for all trading partners, while the VS can be measured using only the delivery matrix of the reporting country.  
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measures useful only in a special case, which is when only one country’s intermediate goods 
are used abroad.  
 In recent years, new measures in value-added trade have been formulated 
attempting to overcome these restricted assumptions and to explore other characteristics of 
value added embedded in trade. 
Daudin et al. (2010, 2011) composed a set of studies that builds newer measures 
in value-added trade from a global input-output framework. Considering the challenge of 
computing the VS1 perspective of vertical trade, Daudin et al. (2010, 2011) created a 
different measure (named VS1*) to further distinguish the part of VS1 that is re-
incorporated to the country of origin, i.e. the domestic value-added in intermediates first 
exported then returned home in final goods imports. In general terms, the VS1* would be 
the domestic content of invested or consumed imports. Hence, the total value of value-
added trade would be equal to standard trade minus “VS + VS1*”, which is equal to total 
world vertical exports.  
Johnson and Noguera (2012) introduced the concept of value-added exports 
(VAX) that indicates the value-added produced in a source country s and incorporated in 
destination country r. The authors proposed a measure, named “VAX ratio”, that allows 
estimating the two-way trade in intermediates, i.e. both import and export intermediate 
goods of each country. Their measure is defined as the ratio of value added to gross exports 
and can be thought as a metric of the domestic content of exports. Based on GTAP 6 
database, their analysis showed a profound variation between metrics based on gross value 
and in value-added trade across countries and sectors. Antràs (2013, p. 6) calls the VAX 
ratio “an appealing inverse measure of the importance of vertical specialization in (…) 
world production”. In a more recent study, the VAX ratio is presented as a useful measure 
for tracing the effects of final demand shocks (JOHNSON, 2014a). However, both measures 
by Daudin et al. (2010, 2011) and Johnson and Noguera (2012) were not able to identify all 
value-added components in gross exports. 
It was only recently that a comprehensive conceptual framework was 
developed, with a unified accounting and a better understanding of the relationship 
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between the measures proposed so far. Expanding the original metrics by Hummels et al. 
(2001), and adding two new measures of value-added trade, Koopman et al. (2010, 2014) 
provided a mathematical framework to decompose a country’s exports into broad value 
added components. In that regard, not only Koopman et al. (2010, 2014) presented a 
mathematical formulation for the VS1 share that was not formulated before, but also turned 
it possible to derive all existing measures in the VS approach from a unified mathematical 
framework. The authors consider that to better understand the relation between the two 
types of measures (VS and VS1), it is necessary to define both measures in mathematical 
terms and derive them from a common framework. In that spirit, their work turned possible 
to decompose gross exports into a set of components that can be estimated independently.  
Figure 2.177  depicts these components, for instance, export of value added, 
domestic value added that returns home, foreign value added, and properly including 
various double-counted terms. It is important to note that Koopman et al. (2010, 2014) 
formulated an accounting exercise, without investigating the causes or consequences of 
GVCs. In addition, this decomposition exercise is only done at the aggregate level. In that 
sense, Wang et al. (2014) provided a methodological framework to decompose bilateral 
sector level gross exports into 16 items (see Annex 2.1 and 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.1 - Method of decomposition of gross exports 
 
Source: Koopman et al. (2014). 
                                                        
77 See Annex 2.1 for Koopman et al. (2010, 2014)’s mathematical formulation.  
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It is necessary to determine how to allocate the pure double-counted terms to 
overcome the “no two-way trade in intermediate goods” restriction of the primary measures 
of VS (KOOPMAN; WANG; WEI, 2014). In that sense, the authors allocated the double-
counted intermediate exports according to where they are originally produced. In terms of the 
components presented in Figure 2.23 (Annex 2.3), the VS1 measure by Hummels et al. (2001) 
is equal to (3) + (4) + (5) + (6), and their VS is equal to (7) + (8) + (9). The VS1* by Daudin et 
al. (2011) is equal to (4). Moreover, lastly, the VAX ratio by Johnson and Noguera (2012) is 
equal to (1) + (2) + (3) divided by gross exports. It is important to phrase that Koopman et 
al. (2014)’s measure of forward participation (i.e., VS1) is similar to Daudin et al. (2011), but 
includes not only domestic value added returned home in final goods imports but also the 
domestic content returned home by being embodied in imports of intermediate goods. As 
argued by Koopman et al. (2014), the exclusion of this second part would consistently 
under-estimate actual vertical specialization. 
Further on, Koopman et al. (2010, 2014) proposed two original measures to 
address the involvement of a country or industry in a particular GVC. The first, GVC 
participation, summarizes the importance of a GVC for a specific country-sector and it is 
defined as the sum of the indirect value-added (IVA) exports (i.e. the value of inputs 
produced domestically that are used in other countries’ exports) and the foreign value added 
(FVA) embodied in a country’s exports78. Combining both the VS and VS1 shares, it is 
possible to have a general picture of to what extent a country is engaged in vertically 
fragmented production processes, both as a user of imported inputs (“import content of 
exports”) and as a supplier of intermediate parts and components used in other countries’ 
exports, respectively. In other words, the GVC participation index captures both backward 
(VS share) and forward participation (VS1 share), and it excludes exports of final goods that 
have no foreign input content.  
                                                        
78 See Annex 2.1.  
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In general, all the measures mentioned so far showed the importance of a 
country’s participation in GVCs, rather than its position in a GVC or the complexity of the 
production system.  
The second measure proposed by Koopman et al. (2010), GVC position, captures 
whether a country is positioned upstream or downstream in the GVC, depending on its 
specialization. For that purpose, it compares the amount of indirect value added exports 
(IVA) with the amount of value added imported to produce exports (FVA), both as shares 
of total exports. A country lies upstream in a GVC whether it tends to participate more as a 
provider of value added than as a recipient of foreign value added, presenting a positive 
value of GVC position index79. While countries upstream are engaged in activities at the 
beginning of the GVC ranging from raw materials to intangibles, countries downstream 
specialize in activities such as assembly or costumer services. Thereby, if a country is 
specialized in the last stages of the production process, it is likely that it has a high value of 
backward participation relative to forward. It is important to note that countries with very 
different engagement in GVCs can exhibit similar GVC position indexes. In that sense, the 
authors highlight that it is necessary to analyze the GVC position index along with the GVC 
participation index.  
In fact, investigating a country’s relative production-line position (upstream 
versus downstream) is related to a primary feature that reflects the complexity of 
production systems: the length of GVCs. Dietzenbacher and Romero (2007) investigated 
the fragmentation of production systems from a spatial-functional perspective, using an 
input-output conceptual framework to propose a new concept, the average propagation 
length (APL). The APL provides an estimate of the number of production stages in GVCs. 
Multiple indicators have been proposed based on the number and size of the internal 
linkages, understanding the complexity of the production system as the degree of sectoral 
intermediate production interaction (ROMERO; DIETZENBACHER; HEWINGS, 2009). 
But differently from analyzing the size of the effects between sectors, the APL emphasizes 
the distance between any two sectors. Thus, it is assumed that the greater the distance of a 
                                                        
79 See Annex 2.1.  
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production system, the greater the number of steps it takes for a stimulus in one sector to affect 
another sector.  
To quantify the length of production networks, Fally (2012) proposed a first 
measure that reflects the number of stages required for production. Namely, the relative location 
of an industry along the production process, which has been named “downstreamness” and is 
further explored in Antràs and Chor (2012). In addition, Fally (2012) proposed an index on the 
number of stages between production and final consumption, i.e. “distance to final demand”. 
This measure is also referred to as “upstreamness” and is further explored by Antràs et al. 
(2012).  
More recently, Los, Timmer and Vries (2013) created an index of international 
production fragmentation, named IPF index, which considers the full distribution of value 
added in all stages of production. The IPF index measures “the distance between the actual 
cross-country distribution of value directly and indirectly added in the production of a particular 
good and the cross-country distribution of world GDP” (LOS; TIMMER; VRIES, 2013, p. 2). 
By using global input-output tables, it considers the value-added generated by not only the 
immediate but also the second-tier and further upstream suppliers of parts and components. 
Thus, their research works at a more aggregate level and focuses on sets of narrow classes of 
final products, which are identified by the industry and country where the last production stage 
takes place (“the country-industry-of-completion”). In contrast with the previous measures of 
“length” and “distance” that focused on physical aspects of production processes, their 
emphasis is to measure the distribution of value added along the value chain.  Put it simply, the 
IPF index indicates the level of fragmentation of the GVC, which is considered low whether 
most value is added in a downstream position country. In their work, they provided empirical 
evidence to support the idea of an increasingly fragmentation of most production processes 
across several countries. 
Another application of the decomposition of gross exports proposed by Koopman 
et al. (2014) is the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index based on value-added trade. 
Primarily based on the Ricardian comparative advantage theory, and originally proposed in 
gross terms by Balassa (1965), this indicator provides additional evidence of a country’s 
specialization patterns and its export performance. In that sense, as one of the key features 
behind GVC trade is that it allows the denationalizing of comparative advantage, since 
countries could join GVCs rather than building the whole value chain (BALDWIN; LOPEZ-
GONZALEZ, 2015), the RCA in value-added terms gives a more accurate picture of the 
patterns of comparative advantage.  The adapted version of this index is defined as the share of 
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domestic VA of industry i in a specific country’s total domestic VA relative to the share of 
domestic VA of industry i of the world (the sum of all countries) in world’s total domestic 
VA80. When the RCA is greater than 1, it indicates a revealed advantage for that sector.  
A set of other indicators can be constructed from the IIO tables, such as bilateral 
trade balance in value-added terms and the sectoral contributions to value-added exports, which 
is particularly important in the case of services. Therefore, some of the key indicators based on 
value-added terms will be used to build a set of stylized facts in section 2.4.  
 
2.3 Available IIO databases 
The IIO tables depicts the international sources of value added incorporated in 
goods and services produced throughout the world. An IIO table is derived from: i) national IO 
tables, ii) bilateral trade data, and iii) additional information or assumptions about the use of 
imported inputs by using industries (JONES, LIN; POWERS; UBEE, 2013; POWERS, 2012). 
Put it simply, the main techniques that have been applied to national accounts, developed by 
Leontief in the 1940s, are now analogously been applied to an international setting, where 
inputs can be sourced from multiple countries and may cross national borders multiple times 
before being consumed81.  
The greatest challenge in constructing an IIO table is that only a few countries 
register how imported inputs from each country are allocated to each domestic industry 
(POWERS, 2012). Hence, most IIO tables have to suppose as fact that the proportion of 
imported inputs by country-source in every industry is equivalent to the proportion in aggregate 
imports, what is known as the proportionality assumption. For instance, if 30 percent of Brazil 
imported intermediate electronics comes from China, the IIO table assumes that 30% of 
imported electronics inputs in each industry come from China. In other words, considering an 
IIO table, it is a common import proportion for all cells in a use row. 
The proportionality assumption adds critical limitations to value-added measures. 
As it does not capture the cross-sectoral variation in domestic input demand, Winkler and 
Milberg (2009) argue that this assumption minimize the foreign inputs used in some key sectors 
and can lead to significant errors in terms of the effects of offshoring on domestic employment. 
This aggregation bias may be especially problematic whether one is measuring trade flows for 
export-processing zones, which are very intensive in the use of imports and are commonly 
                                                        
80 See Annex 2.1.  
81 See Powers (2012) for a general structure of an IIO table with two countries and n sectors.  
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found in developing countries (ESCAITH; TIMMER, 2012). As argued by the authors, trade 
in value-added are an “estimate” rather than a “measurement”, given that most trade data are 
not based on direct observations and considering that the construction of an IIO table is a 
statistical estimate in itself 82 . However, some improvements can be seen over standard 
proportionality, as well as best techniques to decompose intermediate exports since new IIO 
datasets have been launched. 
Overall, the number of GVCs analysis with IIO tables has grown notably as IIO 
tables have become more widely available. Currently, the main sources of IIO tables are: i) the 
WIOD; ii) the OECD-WTO TiVA database; iii) the Eora Multi-Region IO database; iv) the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data; v) the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-
JETRO) Asian International Input-Output Tables (AIIOTs); vi) the Asian Development Bank 
Multi-Regional Input-Output tables (ADB-MRIO); and vii) the EXIOBASE. These databases 
differ in their method of construction and data sources83, as well as their coverage of countries, 
regions, sectors, and time spans. Table 2.1 presents some general distinctions.  
 
                                                        
82 Another assumption is the production assumption, which assumes that all firms allocated in a given industry use 
the same goods and services to produce the same outputs. See Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) Indicators (Guide to 
Country Notes) available at: http://oe.cd/tiva. 
83 Timmer et al. (2015) compared the value added exports derived from different databases and the correlations 
were between 0.93 and 0.98. 
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Table 2.1 - International Input-Output Databases 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the OECD-WTO Trade in Value-
Added (TiVA) database are two of the most recent and advanced releases of IIO tables and are 
the main data sources used in this chapter for the construction of the stylized facts. That is 
because both constitute the maximal time and country coverage, as well as more elaborated 
methodologies regarding the issue of proportionality assumptions compared to previous data 
sources, increasing these database’s reliability (KUMMRITZ; KUMMRITZ, 2015).  
 
2.3.1 WIOD 
The World Input-Output Tables (WIOTs) constitute the core product of the WIOD. 
Funded by the European Commission, the WIOD is the outcome of a joint initiative constructed 
within the WIOD Project that involved 11 European research institutions. Differently from 
other databases, all the data used in the WIOD are obtained from official national statistics and 
Database Producing organization
Reference 
years
Number of 
countries
Number of 
industries
Data source
WIOD (release 2013) European Commission
1995-2011 
(yearly)
40 +RoW
35 industries, 59 
products
http://www.wiod.org/database/wiots13
WIOD (release 2016) European Commission
2000-2014 
(yearly)
43 + RoW 56 industries http://www.wiod.org/database/wiots16
TiVA OECD-WTO
1995-2011 
(yearly)
63 34 industries
https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid
=75537
TiVA Nowcast 
Estimates
OECD-WTO 2012-2014 63 34 industries
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSe
tCode=TIVA_NOWCAST
EORA University of Sidney
1990-2012 
(yearly)
187 20-500 http://www.worldmrio.com
GTAP-MRIO
Center for Global Trade 
Analysis in Purdue University
1990, 1992, 
1995, 1997, 
2001, 2004, 
2007, and 2011
129 57 industries https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu
AIIOT IDE-JETRO
1975, 1985, 
1990, 1995, 
2000, 2005
10
78 (1985-95), 76 
(2000-05)
http://www.ide.go.jp
ADB-MRIO Asian Development Bank
2000, 2005-
2008, and 2011
11 35 industries
https://www.adb.org/data/icp/input-
output-tables
EXIOPOL European Commission 2000 and 2007 43 +RoW
129 industries 
(base-year: 2000) 
and 163 industries 
(base-year: 2007)
http://www.exiobase.eu/
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are consistent with the original national accounts (DIETZENBACHER et al., 2013)84. This 
avoids discrepancies due to different methods of IO construction across countries. To obtain a 
consistent time series, the WIOTs are benchmarked against output and final consumption series 
provided by national accounts, since supply and use tables are not available on an annual basis 
(KUMMRITZ, 2015). Linking a set of harmonized supply and use tables with bilateral data on 
international trade in goods and services, the database constructed intercountry (world) input-
output tables that were launched in two releases.  
The first one, release 201385, covers a set of 40 countries (27 European Union (EU) 
countries86 and 13 major other countries87), plus a model for the remaining noncovered part of 
the world economy, rest of the world (RoW), for the time period 1995-2011, in current basic 
prices and in basic prices of the previous year. All 40 countries together account for more than 
85 percent of world GDP (TIMMER, MARCEL P et al., 2014). The tables contain data for 35 
industries (14 manufacturing industries and 17 services industries), reflecting how much of 
each of 59 products is produced and used by each industry. This high level of precision is 
resulted from an extended classification scheme of the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) to 
separate imports into intermediate and final goods, and then it considers proportionality 
assumptions to better allocate the products within the WIOTs’ cells.  
The second release, release 2016, provides WIOTs only in current prices 88 , 
covering 43 countries89 (28 EU countries and 15 major countries in the world) by 56 industries, 
for the period from 2000 to 2014. The full database is freely available at: 
http://www.wiod.org/database/index.htm. 
 
                                                        
84 See Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) for more details on the construction of WIOTs.  
85 As part of the WIOD (release 2013), the Socio-Economic Accounts include industry-level data on capital stock, 
investment, wages, and employment (number of workers and educational attainment). In addition, the 
Environmental Accounts include industry-level data on gross and emission-relevant energy use, other air 
pollutants, as well as land, materials and water uses. The Socio-Economic Accounts, release 2016, are expected to 
be launched in December 2017.  
86 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and UK.  
87 Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and 
the United States.  
88 The year-per-year tables still do not have an expected launching period.  
89 Adding Switzerland, Croatia and Norway.  It is important to highlight that, as in the previous release, the 
selection of countries reflects data availability and their relative importance in the world economy.   
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2.3.2 OECD-WTO TiVA 
The TiVA database was jointly developed by the OECD and WTO with the aim to 
better address the global production networks than is possible with conventional measures of 
international trade. Derived from the 2016 version of OECD’s Inter-country Input-Output 
(ICIO) database, the latest version was released in December 2016 and includes two more 
countries (Morocco and Peru) compared to the previous version, covering a total of 63 
economies and 34 industrial sectors (16 manufacturing and 14 services industries), for all years 
from 1995 to 2011. The TiVA database contains a list of indicators measuring the value added 
content of international trade and final demand, which are derived from the 2016 version of 
OECD’s Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) Database.  
In June 2017, the OECD-WTO initiative extended TiVA indicators to more recent 
years for 2012-2014 by using now-casting estimation techniques, named the TiVA Nowcast 
Estimates. Essentially, the approach estimates national IO tables by projecting relationships 
presented in the latest TiVA benchmark year (2011) into nowcast years (2012-2014) but 
constrained to official estimated of gross output and value-added and national accounts main 
aggregates of demand and trade, as well as supplemented by bilateral trade statistics90. 
 
2.3.3 Other IIO sources 
The Eora Multi-Region IO Database (Eora MRIO) is compiled by the University 
of Sydney and provides a time series of IO tables with environmental and social satellite 
accounts for 187 countries. This database covers the period 1990 to 2012 and its raw data source 
is the UN’s System of National Accounts, COMTRADE, Eurostat, IDE-Jetro, and various 
national agencies. This is the database with the most extensive country coverage of any IIO 
table; however, IO tables for many of these countries are not available and had to be estimated 
from the raw data sources. Besides the individual country IO tables for each country, this 
database provides the simplified Eora26 model, which is a complete global MRIO table, plus 
environmental satellite account, in a harmonized 26-sector classification for 1990-2013, in 
basic prices and in purchaser’s prices. The Eora26 is recommended for analysis requiring 
comparisons across countries and is easier to work, compared with the Full Eora, which is the 
complete Eora MRIO table91.  
                                                        
90 For more details, see: http://www.oecd.org/std/its/tiva-nowcast-methodology.pdf. 
91 For more details about the construction of Eora, see Lenzen et al. (2013). 
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The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) is a global network that performs 
quantitative analysis of international policy issues and is coordinated by the Center for Global 
Trade Analysis in Purdue University’s Department of Agricultural Economics. This database 
predates the other IIO tables and is updated every 2 to 4 years (from its first release in 1993 to 
the last on in May 2015, there were 9 releases in total), describing bilateral trade patterns, 
production, consumption and intermediate use of commodities and services. GTAP database 
main sources of raw data are: i) World Bank and IMF macroeconomic and Balance of Payment 
statistics; ii) United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (Comtrade) database; and iii) IO tables 
based on national statistical sources. Its last release, the GTAP 9 Database, features 2004, 2007 
and 2011 reference years, as well as 140 regions for all 57 GTAP commodities, and is 
commonly used into applied general equilibrium analysis of global economic issues (AGUIAR; 
NARAYANAN; MCDOUGALL, 2016). In that sense, it is important to highlight that the 
purpose of GTAP is not to provide IIO tables, but to facilitate the operation of economic 
simulation models. It is important to phrase that it is not a simple task to compile the IIO tables, 
since it requires a complex statistical work. However, several GVC studies used GTAP data in 
their own analysis, such as Johnson and Noguera (2012), and Koopman et al. (2010).  
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) compiles the foremost Multiregional IO tables and the 2005 Asian International 
Input-Output Tables (AIIOTs) is their latest freely available IIO that covers the industrial 
network extended over ten countries92 and 76 sectors. This AIIOT was already available for the 
years of 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000, and partially available for the year of 1975 (except for 
China and Taiwan). Beyond the AIIOTs, the IDE-JETRO also provides the 2005 BRICs 
International IIO table and the Transnational Interregional IO table for China, Japan and Korea. 
However, the IDE-JETRO AIIOTs are not appropriate to address global production 
fragmentation, because its coverage of countries is too restricted to Asian economies. 
Alongside, the Asian Development Bank Multi-Regional Input-Output tables (ADB-MRIO) is 
complementary to the WIOD (release 2013), which covers only 6 Asian economies, including 
5 additional countries, i.e. Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam, 
maintaining the same sector classification and available for the years of 2000, 2005-2008, and 
2011 93 . Finally, the EXIOPOL (A New Environmental Accounting Framework using 
Externality Data and Input-Output Tools for Policy Analysis) is a project funded by the 
                                                        
92 Namely, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, and the 
United States of America.  
93 For more details, see: http://www.wiod.org/otherdata/ADB/ADB_MRIO_SM.pdf. 
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European Commission that produces a Multi-Regional Environmentally Extended Supply and 
Use Table (MR EE SUT). The EXIOPOL database (EXIOBASE) covers 43 countries, and a 
“Rest of World” (the other countries in the world combined), distinguishing 129 industry 
sectors (base-year 2000) and 163 industry sectors for the reference year of 2007. By using this 
database, for instance, it is possible to analyze the amount of carbon emissions and resources 
embodied in trade94.  
It is worth mentioning a secondary database that has been recently developed and 
is processed on the basis of original IIO tables, the UIBE GVC Index. As the underlying IIO 
tables differ in countries, regions, sectors, and periods, and considering that the GVC 
accounting methods are fundamental for using these IIO tables, the Research Institute for 
Global Value Chains (RIGVC) at University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) 
developed an index system that integrates all previous measures of vertical specialization in the 
literature, such as VS, VS1, RCA, and VAX, into a unified framework. Their main idea is to 
facilitate the use of accounting results and to provide convenience for researchers, promoting 
studies on GVCs. For that purpose, they consider the accounting approaches developed by 
Koopman et al. (2014), Wang et al. (2013) and Wang et al. (2016).  
At the moment, UIBE GVC Index includes five categories of indexes that one can 
choose after selecting your preferred IIO table. These indexes are as follows: i) Index 1: a series 
of indexes based on decomposition of sector value added (GDP by industry, forward linkage); 
ii) Index 2: a series of indexes based on decomposition of sector final product production 
(backward linkage); iii) Index 3: gross trade decomposition indexes, including gross exports, 
exports of intermediate goods and services, exports of final goods and services, gross imports, 
imports of intermediate goods and services, imports of final goods and services, and balance of 
trade at country and country-sector levels; iv) Index 4: a series of indexes based on 
decomposition of bilateral gross trade flows; v) Index 5: indexes proposed by Wang et al. 
(2016), including length and position of GVCs. 95 All the indicators can be derived from the 
underlying databases: i) WIOD 2013; ii) WIOD 2016; iii) OECD-ICIO; iv) GTAP; v) ADB-
MRIO; and vi) EORA. The UIBE GVC Index is free to download96. 
 
                                                        
94 For more information, see: http://www.feem-project.net/exiopol/. Or:  http://www.exiobase.eu. 
95 RIGVC UIBE, 2016, UIBE GVC Index: http://rigvc.uibe.edu.cn/english/D_E/database_database/index.htm. 
96 Download link: http://139.129.209.66:8000/d/daedafb854/. 
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2.4 Stylized facts 
This section presents some stylized facts about the changing nature of international 
trade and the patterns of countries’ integration into GVCs. For that purpose, it explores how 
OECD-WTO TiVA and WIOD databases can be used for measuring flows related to the value 
that is added by a country in the production of any good or service that is exported. As 
discussed, trade in value-added allows distinguishing between foreign and domestic value-
added exports, addressing the multiple counting implicit in current gross flows of trade. Hence, 
this section uses some of the indicators previously discussed97, as well as some TiVA ready-to-
use indicators and an analysis of the value-added components of gross exports. Each stylized 
fact seeks to highlight a point of analysis, and in turn brings with it several other relevant 
features, not aiming to summarize the discussion but rather to bring light to certain aspects of 
the GVC analysis.  
 
Fact 1. Analysis of gross export flows can be misleading in a vertical specialization scenario.  
 
Traditional statistics based on gross exports tend to “double count” trade flows, as 
gross exports include the value of imported intermediates that are used in production, blurring 
the real distribution of value created within countries. In the absence of trade in intermediate 
inputs, this difference between gross and value added analyses would not be that relevant. 
Nevertheless, this statistical problem is represented in Figure 2.2, which shows the extent of 
the difference between gross exports and domestic value added for selected countries and the 
world98 over 1995-2011.  
The gap between measuring in gross terms and value-added trade continually 
increased over the period for all countries from the sample, with the exception of 2009, when 
the worldwide trade collapsed at the height of the recent global recession, as well as the import 
content of exports. However, this increase was more significant for China, Germany, United 
States, and Korea, respectively. This overall picture is a reflection of vertically fragmented 
production into international dispersed networks with countries focusing on specific activities 
and tasks, but the extent of the difference varies across countries depending on the extent of a 
country’s involvement in GVCs.  
 
                                                        
97 It is important to keep in mind that the same indicator, in theoretical terms, can show different empirical results 
whether based on the TiVA or WIOD database. This is a reflection of different approximations that are used to 
construct these IIO tables, as well as different data sources as discussed in the previous section.  
98 The average of the sum of all TiVA countries, including the proxy “ROW: rest of the World”. 
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Figure 2.2 - Difference between Gross Exports and Domestic Value Added, selected countries 
(thousands US$) and world (millions US$), 1995-2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
Related to gross exports, the average difference was around 20% and it has 
increased over 1995 to 2011 (Figure 2.3). In that sense, Germany has a relative amount and 
behavior very similar to the world average. Luxembourg illustrated that this difference as a 
share of gross exports is more important the more integrated the country in GVCs. Although 
this difference was small in nominal terms, in proportion to the total value exported it is not 
negligible. In contrast, this gap was lower for those countries that are more intensive in 
commodities, such as Brazil and Argentina. In addition to the United States, these three 
countries showed that the extent of their differences related to gross exports are less prominent 
than the world average.  
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Figure 2.3 - Difference between Gross Exports and Domestic Value Added (% of gross 
exports), selected countries and world, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
It is worth noting how the Chinese contribution to international trade flows is 
heavily overestimated when analyzed in gross terms. However, this difference as a share of 
gross exports has narrowed since 2003 (Figure 2.3). While most countries are relying less on 
domestic inputs for production, China is against this trend and is rising its ratio of domestic 
value added in exports to gross exports (DVAR). This intriguing exception has been showed 
by other studies (KEE; TANG, 2015; KOOPMAN; WANG; WEI, 2012). Investigating its 
potential causes, Kee and Tang (2015) 99 found that the rising in Chinese DVAR is due to 
individual processing exporters substituting domestic for imported materials in terms of volume 
and varieties100, and this would mean that China became more competitive, especially in the 
intermediate input sectors.  
 
Fact 2. Small open economies, in general, show higher participation in GVCs than larger 
countries, reflecting their lower domestic production of inputs. 
 
                                                        
99 The authors did not use IIO tables in their analysis but customs transaction-level data and firm survey data, 
measuring DVARs as the weighted averages of the firms’ DVARs. This empirical strategy allowed them to 
embrace firm heterogeneity and overcome significant aggregation biases.  
100 According to Kee and Tang (2015), other potential causes are: i) a changing composition of Chinese exports, 
which would indicate that the Chinese comparative advantage is moving towards industries with high domestic 
content; and ii) an upsurge of Chinese domestic production costs. But following their model, both causes cannot 
explain this rising trend. 
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Countries increasingly rely on foreign value added for their own exports, which 
may then be further processed in partner countries. Figure 2.4 presents the magnitude of 
GVC participation across countries in 1995 and 2011 as proposed by Koopman et al. (2010, 
2014). The GVC participation index combines both backward (the share of foreign inputs) 
and forward (domestically produced inputs that are used in third countries’ exports) 
participation in GVCs, and is expressed as a percentage of gross exports. Looking at the 
change across time, all countries apart from Malta and Croatia increased their participation in 
GVCs. Iceland, Korea, Hungary, Chinese Taipei, and India increased their participation the 
most. A cross-country comparison reveals that the East-Asian economies as Korea, Singapore, 
and Malaysia showed relatively high GVC participation indexes. In that sense, although 
China’s participation grew significantly over the period, it is relatively lower than the average 
of its Asian partners.  
In 2011, the top positions with respect to GVC participation were held by small 
open economies, such as Luxembourg (71%), Taiwan (67.6%), the Slovak Republic (67.4%), 
Hungary (65.2%), Czech Republic (64.8%), and Korea (62.2%). All those countries 
increased their overall GVC participation mostly based on the expansion of the foreign 
value added share of their gross exports, i.e. reinforcing their role as buyers of foreign inputs 
(backward linkages). Compared to large economies, such as United States, India, and Brazil, 
these small countries have lower availability of domestically sourced intermediates, 
resulting in higher imports of intermediates. The data for Luxembourg and Hungary depicts 
that small countries can depend heavily on international trade whilst relying more on 
buying goods and services needed for production on the international market.  
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Figure 2.4 - The GVC Participation index101 (% share in total gross exports), 1995 and 2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
In contrast, large markets show lower rates of participation in GVCs mostly 
because of lower backward participation, given its higher domestic production of inputs 
and thus relatively small need to seek for intermediate inputs from abroad. But this is only 
a partial view of GVCs, as the GVC participation index also takes into account their 
prominence as sellers of inputs into value chains (forward linkages). For example, the 
foreign content of Brazilian exports is 10.7% while Brazilian participation in GVCs 
increases to almost 36% when Brazilian intermediates in third countries’ exports are 
considered. Among others, because raw materials are a relatively great part of its exports, 
Brazil tends to show a large share of domestic value added both sent to consumer economy 
(direct domestic value-added, “direct DVA”) and sent to third countries (indirect domestic 
value-added, “indirect DVA”) (Figure 2.5). Further on, the bottom positions in the overall 
GVC participation were occupied by Argentina (30.8%), New Zealand (33.4%), Croatia 
(34.1%), and Brazil (35.6%) in 2011.  
To enrich this analysis, Figure 2.5 decomposes the sources of value-added in gross 
exports into four components by their destination: 1) domestic VA sent to consumer economy, 
                                                        
101Considering TiVA’s nomenclature, the “forward participation in GVCs” is measured by the EXGR_DVAFXSH 
(c,i) presents country c, industry i, domestic value added content of gross exports by foreign countries as a 
percentage of total gross exports by country c, and the “backward participation in GVCs” is measured by the 
foreign value added share of gross exports, for domestic industry i in country c, EXGR_FVASH (c,i), defined as 
foreign value added embodied in gross exports EXGR_FVA (c,i), as a percentage of total gross exports, EXGR 
(c,i), which is a 'FVA intensity measure' often referred to as “import content of exports”. Thus, the GVC 
participation index is the sum of both forward and backward participation in GVCs.  
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2) domestic VA sent to third countries, 3) domestic VA re-imported in the economy; and 4) 
foreign VA content of exports. Components (1) through (3) depict the value of gross exports 
that is created domestically and component (4) indicates the value of exports that is created 
abroad. Component (1) is not considered as value-added generated by supply chains, indicating 
how much of a country’s exports are created as stand-alone exports, i.e. outside any supply 
chain (RAHMAN; ZHAO, 2013). Hence, it is important to note that, given the definition of the 
GVC participation index, only components (2) and (3), as upstream linkages, and component 
(4), as downstream linkages, are taken into consideration as value-added in exports generated 
by supply chains.  
Overall, the role of supply chain linkages (components 2-4) increased over time. 
This was heavily driven by an increase in the domestic VA sent to third countries in the case of 
China (32.5% to 37%), but also for Russia and Brazil. While Japan, Germany, and Mexico 
showed larger decreases in that indicator, these countries most expanded the share of foreign 
VA in exports. Overall, foreign value added in exports is higher in countries where processing 
industries account for a significant part of exports, such as Mexico. Further on, the domestic 
VA re-imported in the economy as a share of gross exports increased for almost all countries, 
with the exception of the United States. This indicator reflects the value-added created in 
upstream domestic industries providing indirect intermediate inputs via international value-
chains102. The United States are also an exception regarding the decreasing trend in domestic 
VA sent to consumer economy, showing a slight increase from 1995 to 2011. 
 
                                                        
102 This indicator, by industry, provides a measure of how protectionist measures may affect domestic industries 
that provide inputs to imports. See Background Notes at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/TIVA_FAQ_Final.pdf. 
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Figure 2.5 - The VA components of gross exports, selected countries, 1995 and 2011 (% share 
in total gross exports) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
Considering the top 25 exporting economies in 2011, Figure 2.6 shows the 
decomposition of gross exports in domestic and foreign value added and its share of domestic 
value added in exports, i.e. the VAX ratio103 (on the right side of the Figure). On the one hand, 
Saudi Arabia (97%), Brazil (89%), Russia (86%), Australia (86%), United States (85%), and 
Japan (85%) are the countries with the largest ratios of value added to gross exports (i.e. 
domestic content of exports).  On the other hand, Taiwan (56%), Singapore (58%), and Korea 
(58%) are the top bottom countries regarding the shares of domestic value-added trade, showing 
that East and Southeast Asian countries have the highest shares of foreign value-added trade.  
 
                                                        
103 Following the measure proposed by Johnson and Noguera (2012). 
106 
 
 
Figure 2.6 - Domestic value-added trade shares of the top 25 exporting economies, 2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
The involvement of countries as users of foreign inputs to produce exports varies 
across countries and regions. In part, this heterogeneity reflects differences in several factors104, 
such as geographical location (i.e. proximity to neighboring markets), economic size (i.e. the 
ability to source intermediates from domestic suppliers and the ability to draw on larger 
domestic markets for their intermediates and final goods and services), infrastructure 
aspects and domestic policies in the countries (such as how open and liberal is the trade 
policy regime), as well as different patterns of specialization (countries that export a lot of 
raw materials commonly have a high degree of domestic value added, since they specialize 
in upstream activities (e.g. mining and agriculture) that are in the beginning of GVCs) 
                                                        
104 See Kowalski et al. (2015) to an empirical analysis on the relationship between the characteristics of GVC 
participation and different factors, such as market size, level of development, openness to trade, and 
investment performance.  
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(CHENG; SENEVIRATNE; ZHANG, 2013; KOWALSKI et al., 2015; UNCTAD, 2013b; 
WORLD BANK, 2014). However, this complex mix of determinants of a country’s 
engagement in GVCs is not reflected in the GVC participation index, as one may find 
countries with structural differences regarding these features and similar degrees of 
participation.  
Thus, one may ask whether countries are better off having a bigger share of 
domestic value added in their exports. However, there is no simple answer. The share of 
domestic value added in exports gives an indication of how a country is integrated into 
GVCs, but the goods and services that are being exported can be completely different, and 
so can be the benefits associated to them. In other words, increasing the portion of domestic 
value added in exports is not the same as upgrading. A country can present decreasing shares 
of domestic value added in exports and still be on an upgrading path, whether it participates 
in GVCs that create higher overall value, with higher levels of technological sophistication 
or higher wages and better labor conditions, even though it depends on increasing shares 
of foreign value added in exports.  
 
Fact 3. Upstreamness versus downstreamness: great changes in relative GVC position are 
unusual across time.  
 
Upstreamness (or downstreamness) refers to where a country is located in a GVC. 
One measure, developed by Koopman et al. (2010), is the GVC position index. Countries with 
high forward relative to backward participation present a positive GVC position index, 
suggesting a country that lies upstream in a supply chain. Figure 2.7 illustrates whether a 
country remained specialized in the first (i.e. upstream stages) or last stages of production 
relative to the rest of the world.  
Overall, there are no substantial changes among countries regarding their relative 
position on GVCs between 1995 and 2011. The Saudi Arabia, Brunei Darussalam, and 
Colombia, are the countries that lie relatively more upstream in 2011. As expected, other natural 
resource-abundant economies, such as Peru, Russia, Indonesia, Norway, and Brazil also lie 
upstream. On the other hand, Luxembourg, Cambodia, and Hungary are the most downstream. 
As it was expected, Asian emerging market economies, such as India, China, and Vietnam, are 
generally located downstream. Looking at the trajectories across time, only a few countries, 
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such as Turkey, Poland, India, and Cambodia, were able to move from being relatively 
upstream to downstream. 
 
Figure 2.7 - GVC position index105, 1995 and 2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
However, a few words need to be said about the limitations of this analysis. As 
already addressed in section 2.2, two countries can have identical GVC participation indexes 
but their position along the GVC may vary significantly, reflecting different patterns of 
specialization, i.e. more activities upstream or downstream in the production network. At the 
same time, two countries may clearly present similar GVC position indexes but very different 
degrees of participation in GVCs (KOOPMAN et al., 2010). Brazil and Japan, for example, 
present very similar GVC position indexes and considerably different degrees of participation 
in GVCs. Furthermore, considering countries with similar forward participation index that are 
located upstream in the chain, one may observe that they can be specialized in completely 
different activities. For instance, the USA is upstream in the chain due to activities such as 
design, R&D, and branding, while countries like Brazil and Russia are also considered upstream 
but are exporting mostly primary sector commodities.  
Figure 2.8 shows the GVC participation index on the x-axis and the GVC position 
index on the y-axis for all countries in OECD-WTO TiVA dataset from 1995 to 2011 (each dot 
represents a specific country in a specific year). The negative correlation between the two 
measures indicates that the countries specialized in downstream activities saw an increase in 
their participation rate. In other words, most countries are taking a deeper part in GVCs by 
                                                        
105 Koopman et al. (2010) define the GVC position index as the log ratio of a country’s supply of intermediates 
used in other countries’ exports to the use of imported intermediate goods in its own production. See section 2.2.  
-1	
-0,8	
-0,6	
-0,4	
-0,2	
0	
0,2	
0,4	
0,6	
0,8	
1	
1,2	
LU
X
:	L
u
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
	
K
H
M
:	C
am
b
o
d
ia
	
H
U
N
:	H
u
n
ga
ry
	
IR
L:
	Ir
el
an
d
	
TH
A
:	T
h
ai
la
n
d
	
B
G
R
:	B
u
lg
ar
ia
	
C
ZE
:	C
ze
ch
	R
e
p
	
SV
K
:	S
lo
va
k	
R
ep
	
V
N
M
:	V
ie
t	
N
am
	
M
LT
:	M
al
ta
	
SG
P
:	S
in
ga
p
o
re
	
M
EX
:	M
e
xi
co
	
M
YS
:	M
al
ay
si
a	
C
H
N
:	C
h
in
a	
K
O
R
:	K
o
re
a	
P
R
T:
	P
o
rt
u
ga
l	
TW
N
:	C
h
in
e
se
	T
ai
p
e
i	
TU
N
:	T
u
n
is
ia
	
ES
T:
	E
st
o
n
ia
	
TU
R
:	T
u
rk
e
y	
C
R
I:
	C
o
st
a	
R
ic
a	
SV
N
:	S
lo
ve
n
ia
	
M
A
R
:	M
o
ro
cc
o
	
FI
N
:	F
in
la
n
d
	
H
R
V
:	C
ro
a
a	
B
EL
:	B
el
gi
u
m
	
P
O
L:
	P
o
la
n
d
	
D
N
K
:	D
en
m
ar
k	
G
R
C
:	G
re
e
ce
	
ES
P
:	S
p
ai
n
	
IS
R
:	I
sr
ae
l	
IN
D
:	I
n
d
ia
	
C
YP
:	C
yp
ru
s	
IT
A
:	I
ta
ly
	
IS
L:
	Ic
el
an
d
	
C
A
N
:	C
an
ad
a	
LV
A
:	L
at
vi
a	
N
LD
:	N
e
th
er
la
n
d
s	
SW
E:
	S
w
ed
e
n
	
FR
A
:	F
ra
n
ce
	
A
U
T:
	A
u
st
ri
a	
D
EU
:	G
er
m
an
y	
N
ZL
:	N
ew
	Z
e
al
an
d
	
LT
U
:	L
it
h
u
an
ia
	
R
O
U
:	R
o
m
an
ia
	
G
B
R
:	U
n
it
e
d
	K
in
gd
o
m
	
H
K
G
:	H
o
n
g	
K
o
n
g,
	C
h
in
a	
P
H
L:
	P
h
ili
p
p
in
e
s	
A
R
G
:	A
rg
en
n
a	
C
H
E:
	S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
	
ZA
F:
	S
o
u
th
	A
fr
ic
a	
C
H
L:
	C
h
ile
	
U
SA
:	U
n
it
e
d
	S
ta
te
s	
A
U
S:
	A
u
st
ra
lia
	
JP
N
:	J
ap
an
	
B
R
A
:	B
ra
zi
l	
N
O
R
:	N
o
rw
ay
	
ID
N
:	I
n
d
o
n
es
ia
	
R
U
S:
	R
u
ss
ia
	
P
ER
:	P
er
u
	
C
O
L:
	C
o
lo
m
b
ia
	
B
R
N
:	B
ru
n
e
i	D
ar
u
ss
al
am
	
SA
U
:	S
au
d
i	A
ra
b
ia
	
2011	 1995	
109 
 
 
trading inputs that are imported from abroad (backward linkages) rather than producing 
domestically goods and services that are being exported by third countries (forward linkages).  
 
Figure 2.8 - GVC participation index and GVC position index, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
Fact 4. The overall increase in the total foreign content was mainly driven by an increase of 
the double counted intermediate exports produced abroad. 
 
Following Figure 2.1, there are three different components within the total foreign 
content (VS)106, which are: i) foreign value in final goods exports (FVA_FIN); ii) foreign value 
in intermediate goods exports (FVA_INT); and iii) double counted intermediate exports 
produced abroad (FDC) 107 ; each one with different economic meanings and illustrating 
different arrangements of cross-country production sharing (WANG; WEI; ZHU, 2014). 
According to the authors, a country with a large share of FVA_FIN may be engaged in final 
                                                        
106 It worth noting that “the difference between foreign value-added (FVA) and VS share is the share of pure 
double counting due to the back and forth intermediate goods trade originated from foreign countries” (WANG; 
WEI; ZHU, 2014, p. 34).  
107 FDC indicates the “pure double counting from foreign sources”, which can be divided in MDC (“due to the 
direct importer exports production”) and ODC (“due to other countries exports production”). See Box 2.2 (Annex 
2.3).  
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assembling activities based on imported inputs, participating in cross-country production 
sharing mostly on the low end of a GVC, while an increasing FVA_INT may be a sign that the 
country is no longer at the beginning of the GVC. 
To understand what is behind the general increase of VS in a country’s gross 
exports, Figures 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11 show the relevance of each component and their trajectory 
over time. Figure 2.9 shows the share of FVA_FIN in VS for nine selected economies from 
1995 to 2009. At the beginning of the series, China held the largest portion of FVA_FIN in VS 
relative to other countries. Since then, this indicator has been losing importance, in what can be 
understood as the advance of China’s production to other stages located more at the beginning 
of the CGV. Meanwhile, Mexico has occupied a space previously occupied by China, 
increasing its presence at the low end of GVCs. Except for Brazil, all countries saw a decline 
of about 5% between 1995 and 2009, with China showing the largest decrease (8%).  
Figure 2.10 shows the share of foreign value in intermediate goods exports in VS, 
and it suggests that only Mexico showed signs of being no longer at the bottom of the GVCs 
between 1995 and 2009. During that period, this indicator was almost constant for all selected 
countries, and considering the last two years of the series, all countries showed signs of 
upgrading its industries to start producing intermediate goods for other countries.  
 
Figure 2.9 - Foreign value in final goods exports (FVA_FIN) as % of VS, selected major 
economies, 1995-2009 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on WIOD (release 2013) data. 
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Note: We use Koopman et al. (2014) method of decomposition of gross exports, and decompr algorithm 
(QUAST; KUMMRITZ, 2015) applied in software R.  
 
 
Figure 2.10 - Foreign value in intermediate goods exports (FVA_INT) as % of VS, selected 
major economies, 1995-2009 
 
Source: own elaboration based on WIOD (release 2013) data. 
Note: We use Koopman et al. (2014) method of decomposition of gross exports, and decompr algorithm 
(QUAST; KUMMRITZ, 2015) applied in software R.  
 
Further on, a larger share of FDC in VS suggests that the country is deepening its 
importance on the cross-country production sharing, as FDC is a reflection of the back and forth 
trade of intermediate goods (WANG; WEI; ZHU, 2014). Overall, all selected countries 
increased their double counted intermediate exports produced abroad as a share of VS, of which 
Japan and Russia increased by around 10 percentage points between 1995 and 2009, with the 
latter in a considerably higher level than the other countries (Figure 2.11). It is also interesting 
to note that this indicator has showed signs of weakening trade in GVCs prior to the 2009 crisis. 
Therefore, the increase in the share of VS in exports was mainly driven by the increase in FDC 
share. However, this is clearly not a homogeneous process among countries and sectors. For 
China, it was driven by the increasing FDC, while FVA_INT stayed relatively stable and 
FVA_FIN decreased. For Brazil, both FVA_FIN and FDC shares increased during this period, 
while FVA_INT has declined, which may be consistent with moving from the upper stream 
part of the GVC to a downstream position. Finally, analyzing the structure of the VS adds new 
empirical evidence about a country´s position on GVCs.   
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Figure 2.11 - Double counted intermediate exports produced abroad (FDC) as % of VS, 
selected major economies, 1995-2009 
 
Source: own elaboration based on WIOD (release 2013) data. 
Note: We use Koopman et al. (2014) method of decomposition of gross exports, and decompr algorithm 
(QUAST; KUMMRITZ, 2015) applied in software R.  
 
 
Fact 5. The servicification of GVCs is a multifaceted phenomenon that goes beyond the 
increasing reliance of the manufacturing sector on services.  
 
Services in GVCs also reflect data limitations. For a long time, analyses based on 
gross terms have been underestimating the magnitude of cross-border services transactions in 
national economies. According to Ahmad (2013), services constitute about two-thirds of GDP 
in most developed economies, though trade in services is less than one-quarter of total trade in 
most countries, rather based on gross terms. This reflects the fact that some of the services are 
tradable, while others are not. But also indicates that the services sector is responsible for 
providing a considerable amount of intermediate inputs to domestic manufacturers.  
More recently, the availability of IIO tables and the discussions about the impacts 
of services sector liberalization, as well as the negotiations to achieve such liberalization 
through trade agreements, has driven to analysis on measuring trade in services in terms of 
value-added. Figure 2.12 shows that services contribute with more than half of global value-
added exports, though this varies significantly across countries. For instance, the share of 
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services value added in exports is over 50% in most OECD countries, while developing 
countries and large exporters of natural resources-intensive products show the lowest shares of 
services, reflecting its specialization patterns. Saudi Arabia (9%), Brunei (10%), and Colombia 
(26%) have the lowest shares of services. In India, however, the value of gross exports that 
originates in the services sector is about 5 per cent higher than the world average. Figure 2.12 
reveals that most countries that already showed high degrees of service content of its exports 
had deepening their shares from 1995 to 2011, and the opposite pattern can be seen among the 
countries with the lowest shares of services.   
 
Figure 2.12 - Services value-added, % of gross exports, 1995 and 2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
Further on, the services content of gross exports can be decomposed into 
domestic 108  and foreign shares. The difference between OECD countries and emerging 
economies can be partially explained by the relative higher degree of domestic outsourcing of 
services by manufacturers in OECD countries (AHMAD, 2013). However, the contribution of 
foreign service providers is not negligible. In the recent period, the share of foreign services 
                                                        
108 The domestic part can be further decomposed into direct and indirect components, which are related to the 
value added from the exporting services sectors and the part embodied in other exporting industries, respectively.  
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VA in global exports is increasing, reflecting the internationalization of services in GVCs 
(Figure 2.13). Hence, services industries are also changing the way they operate109.  
Figure 2.13 reveals that Mexico and China showed higher foreign services value-
added shares of gross exports, compared to the world average. Over time, the former has shown 
a more stable pattern, while the latter showed a marked fall since 2003. Even though China 
remains at a high level, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 
2001 does not correspond to a deeper Chinese integration into the world economy, at least not 
in terms of the internationalization of its services value-added. Germany shows a trajectory 
very similar to the world average, almost doubling its shares of foreign service VA between 
1995 and 2011. Meanwhile, Japan overlapped among the top-bottom countries, leaving the last 
place in the ranking in 1995 and surpassing Brazil and USA in 2011 (2.6% to 7.2%).  
 
Figure 2.13 - Foreign services value added, % of gross exports, selected countries and world, 
1995-2014 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016) and TiVA Nowcast Estimates.  
 
Services play a crucial role in GVCs, both through the activities needed for the 
development of value chains (services as enablers in value chains) and through the creation of 
their own value chains (services as tasks in value chains) (NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE, 
2013b)110. Communications, insurance, finance, and other business services are some of the 
                                                        
109Miroudot (2017) also pointed that companies have amplified the range of services that they provide and created 
new forms of relationship with customers, especially in the financial, transport, telecommunication, distribution 
and other businesses services sectors.  
110 Other concepts commonly used are “embodied services”, which is defined as services whose product constitutes 
an input into the manufacture of a good (e.g. transport, telecommunications, and business services), and 
“embedded services”, which constitute an input into the sale of a good (e.g. retail and after-sales support) (LOW, 
2013). This is critical for statistical analysis, once the same service can enter value chains at different stages, and 
these categories are not clear distinctions between arm’s length and non-arm’s length transactions. In that sense, 
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enabling services (or facilitators or glue) in GVCs that support the creation of value chains. But 
services are also being unbundled and traded as separate tasks, e.g. data processing services and 
banking, which turned exporting services also susceptible to offshoring and outsourcing. 
Therefore, services are not only “the glue that holds supply chains together and ensures that 
they function in a fluid manner (…), they are also part of many production and sales processes” 
(LOW, 2013, p. 2). See Figure 2.14 for examples of services along the value chains. 
 
Figure 2.14 - Examples of services along the value chain 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on WTO (2014).  
 
The manufacturing sector increasingly uses services as activities needed in 
production processes and sales, in a phenomenon that has been called “servicification” of 
manufacturing (LOW, 2013; WTO, 2014). Considering the interconnection between services 
and manufacturing activities in value chains, this phenomenon is closely related to GVCs. 
Production processes exhibit an increasing need to coordinate multiples stages of a global 
production chain, as GVCs have become more pervasive and intermediate goods are crossing 
borders multiple times. This led to a growing services content of manufactured goods, due to 
the need of linking stages and guarantee increased product diversity and customization of 
products (MAURER; DEGAIN, 2012). Consequently, services can take a much larger share in 
the domestic content of a manufactured product than manufacturing per se, what is more 
commonly seen in advanced countries.  
                                                        
the authors suggest that for statistical purposes is the contractual nature of the supply relationship that should be 
taken into consideration.  
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One way of capturing the increasing importance of services within manufactured 
goods is by measuring the service value added embodied in the exported good. Figure 2.15 
shows the services value-added content of exports of manufacturing industries. On average111, 
services value-added accounts for about one-third of manufacturing exports (32 per cent) in 
1995, and it has increased over time (35 per cent in 2011).  
The results confirm that the most developed countries (especially European 
economies) showed the highest shares of indirect services trade, while developing countries are 
among those with the lowest share of service value-added in manufacturing exports. Over time, 
developed economies have deepening the servicification of manufacturing. However, this trend 
is not verified for all countries. Among those with the lowest services content of manufacturing 
exports, as Saudi Arabia (19.9% in 1995 to 13.8% in 2011), Indonesia (27% to 20.7%), Peru 
(27.9% to 21.4%), and Chile (29.4% to 22.4%), one may observe that the services value-added 
shares of manufacturing exports have decreased.  
 
Figure 2.15 - Services value-added content of manufacturing exports, as % of gross exports, 
1995 and 2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
Another important feature of the servicification of manufacturing is the relocation 
of services activities from a domestic to a foreign economy, i.e. services offshoring. In that 
sense, the changes in the international backward linkages of manufacturing in relation to 
                                                        
111 Beyond the 63 countries in the sample, we included the model for the “Rest of the World” (RoW) in TiVA 
database.  
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services pointed to an increasing share of foreign services value-added in manufacturing 
exports, from 13 to 16.4 per cent between 1995 and 2011.  
There are other important dimensions of servicification. On the one hand, services 
are increasingly being sold bundled with goods (MIROUDOT, 2017). The author argued that 
most of the distinction between firms that are producing goods and firms producing services is 
largely artificial, because manufacturing firms are responsible for a great part of services sales 
and exports. Beyond that, the author considers in-house services within manufacturing firms a 
key feature of servicification (i.e. “servicification inside firms”). Heuser and Mattoo (2017) 
argued that the role of services as inputs in GVCs changed the notion of GVCs centered in 
arm’s length market-based transactions to functions within the firm112. But this is a tricky 
feature, once those activities are difficult to measure and, when taken to the limit, only “can be 
identified as services in the sense that if they were outsourced they would belong to services 
industries” (MIROUDOT, 2017, p. 2).  
Miroudot and Calestin (2017) estimated that about the in-house provision of 
services is about 18% of the value-added in exports. In that sense, the share of services in 
manufacturing exports would increase from one-third to half the value-added exports. 
Therefore, not only services in GVCs are becoming more international, but also there is a 
qualitative change in companies’ behavior with services redefining how manufacturing firms 
produce value (MIROUDOT, 2017). Moreover, Baldwin, Forslid, and Ito (2015) argued that 
some of the potential causes of this phenomenon are: i) reclassification (what was once 
considered manufacturing, as it was produced in-house by manufacturing firms, now is 
classified as services); ii) changes in connecting services and goods, as well as in the nature of 
final manufactured goods; and iii) changes in the relative price of tasks, with some 
manufacturing tasks being offshored driven by lower-cost reasons. However, the causes behind 
servicification are still an open question in the literature. 
 
Fact 6. China and Mexico are crossing roles regarding the use of intermediate imports as 
source of international competitiveness to their exports. 
 
 
The increasing use of intermediate imports embodied in exports is usually posed as 
a source of international competitiveness. To assess the importance of intermediate imports to 
                                                        
112 It is important to note that value-added analysis does not capture the contribution of in-house inputs in GVCs. 
To address this challenge, the authors point to the use of business functions, which have only recently started to 
be collected in national surveys.  
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produce goods and services for export, Figure 2.16 depicts the imported intermediate inputs 
embodied in exports as a share of total intermediate imports for selected countries in the years 
of 1995, 2000, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2014. Among the selected countries, Germany, France, 
Japan, Mexico, India, and Korea showed an upsurge trend over most of the period. However, 
all countries suffered with the global trade shock during the financial crisis, except for UK and 
India that showed a slight increase, and Korea, which maintained a steady upward trend until 
2011. Brazil, United States, and Japan are among the countries with the lowest levels.  
This indicator has an economy size bias, since the smaller the country the larger the 
share of imported intermediates that are used in production as a share of total intermediate 
inputs. But this does not explain completely its magnitude or trend, as changes over time can 
also reflect changes in specialization. China and Mexico are the countries with the largest 
extensions, but they showed distinct behaviors over time, with Mexico becoming more 
dependent of intermediate imports embodied in their exports and China running in the opposite 
direction. The share of re-exported intermediate imports in China fell between 2007 and 2014, 
from 58.8% to 45.4%. Although this pattern differs across industries, overall China has declined 
its role as the final point in Factory Asia. This would be one of the key dimensions of a much 
broader structural transformation in China, which is mostly discussed in terms of its change 
from investment-led growth to consumption-led growth (LEE; PARK; SHIN, 2016). Further 
on, intermediate imports can play a crucial role as a determinant of export diversification, 
especially for producing products located downstream along the GVC (BENGURIA, 2014). 
Thus, the decline in re-exported intermediate imports in China may have impacts not only on 
the exports of Chinese trade partners, especially East and Southeast Asian economies, but on 
the Chinese capacity of producing new products.  
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Figure 2.16 - Re-exported intermediate imports as % of intermediate imports, selected major 
countries, 1995, 2000, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2014 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016) and TiVA Nowcast Estimates. 
 
Fact 7. A limited number of countries had the ability to become more integrated into GVCs 
hand in hand with upgrading in complexity of production. 
 
The rise of measures of “economic complexity” has extended our ability to capture 
the new patterns in the structural transformation of countries. Even though there is a vast 
literature about the relationship between a country’s productive structure and its ability to 
generate economic growth 113 , emphasizing the importance of industrialization in its 
development strategies114, most of the traditional metrics of a country’s productive structure 
fail to capture the sophistication of the products into account. In that sense, the complexity of 
an economy, which is expressed in the composition of a country’s productive output, is related 
to the multiplicity of useful knowledge embedded in it and reflects its capability set 
(HAUSMANN et al., 2011). Put it simply, it is possible to measure a country’s economic 
complexity from the mix of products that it is able to make115.  
                                                        
113 See recent work by Hartmann et al. (2017) on how productive structures of countries can be associated not only 
with economic growth, but also with a country’s average level of income inequality. 
114 See Hirschman (1958), Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Singer (1950), and Prebisch (1949). 
115 As one of the main concerns of the Atlas of Economic Complexity is to understand how complexity evolves 
over time and across countries, it is important to consider the limits of increasing the amount of knowledge 
embedded in an economy. Because this tacit knowledge is difficult to obtain and transfer, it is argued that new 
capabilities are easily accumulated whether they are combined with others that are already available. An intuitive 
implication is that countries tend to diversify towards products that require a similar set of capabilities. Instead of 
identifying the precise technical and institutional requirements of each product, which would require a large 
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Figure 2.17 shows a positive correlation between GVC participation and a country’s 
economic complexity index (ECI)116. Among the selected countries, Japan is the economy with 
the highest level of economic complexity, followed by Germany and the United States, 
respectively. Curiously, Mexico is on a step above China in terms of the complexity of its 
production, which despite being more integrated into CGVs, has an ECI level relatively close 
to the Brazilian one.  
Over time, the measure of economic complexity provides a broad indication of a 
country’s upgrading relative to other countries (HAUSMANN et al., 2011). Figure 2.18 shows 
the changes in ECI ranking (i.e. countries’ relative upgrading in complexity of production) on 
the y-axis and changes in GVC participation index on the x-axis between 1995 and 2011.  
South Korea almost doubled both its ECI and its GVC participation index over the 
period, leaping from 22nd to 7th place in the ECI ranking. Mexico has also climbed the ladder 
of complexity of production (from 25th to 22nd), while becoming more integrated into GVCs. 
Surprisingly, going against what the sixth stylized fact would lead us to believe, China became 
more integrated into world trade while advancing 15 places in the ECI ranking (from 42nd to 
27th). This means that China has achieved a greater diversification of its exports, although 
relying less and less on imported inputs. However, Figure 2.18 shows that a limited number of 
countries had the ability to become more integrated into GVCs hand in hand with scaling them 
up.  
The top-ranked countries invalidate a linear relationship between the two measures. 
Over time, Japan, Germany, and Switzerland saw its ECI fall in absolute terms, while increasing 
its GVC participation, but relative to other countries, they remained ranked as first, second, and 
third most of the period (Figure 2.18 and Figure 2.19). Other countries have experienced a 
similar process in which higher levels of GVC participation were not reflected in relative 
upgrading in complexity of production. For instance, France increased its GVC participation 
index by 12 per cent and fell from ninth to 14th in the ECI ranking, United Kingdom increased 
11% and scaled down three places, and the United States increased 10% and dropped four 
places. Although Brazil and Germany experienced a similar ECI decrease in absolute terms, as 
                                                        
volume of information, the authors measure the proximity between all pairs of products in the dataset. The idea is 
that the probability of a pair of products to be co-exported reveals that they have related characteristics and, more 
importantly, require similar productive knowledge. Hence, the set of all proximities is a network that connects 
pairs of products highly likely to be jointly exported by several countries, which is named product space. A 
country’s position in the product space reveals its current productive knowledge and its ability to learn by moving 
into other bordering products. One can analyze a country’s position in the product space by measuring its 
opportunity value, i.e. the distance to alternative and more complex products. Overall, countries with low levels 
of ECI tend to produce products that are peripheral in the product space, showing a few opportunities available. 
116 See Box 1 for how the ECI is constructed by Hausmann et al. (2011).  
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well as a close increase in the GVC participation index, Brazil plunged 18 positions (from 30th 
to 48th) while Germany fell one place (2nd to 3rd). Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a 
simple positive association between larger GVC participation and upgrading, at least in terms 
of the complexity of production of the top-ranked countries.  
The relationship between economic complexity and the GVC participation index 
has to be interpreted carefully. First, the reader should not confuse such an association with a 
causal relationship. But beyond that, the ECI is based on gross trade statistics, so countries that 
integrate low-value processing tasks at the end of complex products will show higher economic 
complexity measures (AHMAD; PRIMI, 2017).  
 
Figure 2.17 - GVC participation index and Economic Complexity index, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016) and Simoes and Hidalgo (2011). 
Notes: (1) each dot represents a country-year combination. Due to unavailability of ECI data, six countries 
(Taiwan, Malta, Cyprus, Brunei, Luxembourg, and Iceland) were withdrawn from the sample, which was based 
on all other TiVA countries.  
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Figure 2.18 - Change in the GVC participation index and change in economic complexity 
index between 1995 and 2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016) and Simoes and Hidalgo (2011). 
Note: (1) due to unavailability of ECI data, six countries (Taiwan, Malta, Cyprus, Brunei, Luxembourg, and 
Iceland) were withdrawn from the sample, which was based on all other TiVA countries.  
 
 
Figure 2.19 - Economic Complexity rankings, 1995 and 2011 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Simoes and Hidalgo (2011). 
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Box 2.1 - The Economic Complexity Index 
Hausmann et al. (2011) constructed a measure of economic complexity, which turned possible to 
compare the level of productive sophistication across countries. By using computational, network and 
complexity tools, their analysis is built on two simple concepts: the ubiquity of its products and the 
diversity of a country. Ubiquity is defined as the number of countries that make a product, revealing 
how much knowledge is required for its production, i.e. complex products require a large set of 
capabilities and then are less ubiquitous. However, low ubiquity can be originated in scarcity, such as 
rare natural resources like uranium and diamonds. To control for whether the low ubiquity is the result 
of scarcity or complexity of a given country, the authors compare it with its diversity, i.e. the number 
of distinct products that the makers of rare products are able to produce. The intuition behind this 
measure is that complex economies are able to produce a diverse set of products that, on average, have 
low ubiquity, given that these products involve large volumes of knowledge that only a few countries 
have available. For countries, this measure is named Economic Complexity Index (ECI) and the 
corresponding measure for products is the Product Complexity Index (PCI). 
 
Defining Mcp= if country c produces product p, and Mcp=0 otherwise:  
 
Diversity = kc,0 = ∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑝    (1) 
Ubiquity = kp,0 = ∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑐    (2) 
 
Weighted values are generated through an iterative procedure: 
kc,N =
1
𝑘𝑐,0
 ∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑝 .𝑘𝑝,𝑁−1   (3) 
kp,N =
1
𝑘𝑝,0
 ∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑐 .𝑘𝑐,𝑁−1  (4) 
 
Inserting equation (4) into (3) to obtain: 
kc,N =
1
𝑘𝑐,0
 ∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑝 . 
1
𝑘𝑝,0
 ∑ 𝑀𝑐′𝑝𝑐′ .𝑘𝑐′,𝑁−2 (5) 
kc,N =∑ 𝑘𝑐′,𝑁−2𝑐′ .∑
𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑀𝑐′𝑝
𝑘𝑐,0𝑘𝑝,0
   (6) 
 
And it follows that:  
𝑘𝑐,𝑁 =  ∑ ′𝑀𝑐𝑐′  ̃𝑐 𝑘𝑐′,𝑁−2  (7) 
 
Where, 
𝑀𝑐𝑐′̃ = ∑
𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑀𝑐′𝑝
𝑘𝑐,0𝑘𝑝,0
   (8) 
 
Equation (7) is satisfied when kc,N=kc,N-2=1. This is the eigenvector of 𝑀𝑐𝑐′̃  associated with the largest 
eigenvalue. Thereby, they look for the normalized eigenvector associated with the second largest 
eigenvalue, which is the eigenvector that captures the largest amount of variance in the system. The 
economic complexity index (ECIc) for a given country c is then defined as:  
 
ECIc= 
𝜌𝑐−<𝜌>
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣 (𝜌)
  (9) 
 
With < > representing an average and stdev indicating the standard deviation.  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Simoes and Hidalgo (2011). 
 
Fact 8. Trade (im)balances in value-added terms: bilateral trade deficits or surpluses may not 
be exactly what it seems.  
 
Bilateral trade balances between countries may considerably change whether 
measured in value-added terms. That is because it considers the actual origin of the intermediate 
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inputs, re-allocating the value-added of imports and exports. This means that the surpluses and 
deficits with trade partners are redistributed, while the total trade balance with the world does 
not change rather based on value-added or gross terms. Value added trade balance captures the 
difference between any two countries’ domestic value added in foreign final demand and 
foreign value added in domestic final demand, discounting the double-counted part of trade 
flows. This stylized fact was already pronounced in earlier studies (JOHNSON; NOGUERA, 
2012; KOOPMAN; WANG; WEI, 2008; NAGENGAST; STEHRER, 2015; WTO, 2013).  
Figure 2.20 shows eight countries’ bilateral trade balances, measured in gross and 
in value-added terms. Both goods and services are considered, and the trade balances are shown 
with respect to the five main trading partners in gross terms for the year of 2011. For example, 
Mexico’s trade surplus with the United States is reduced by almost half if measured in value 
added terms, while its trade deficit with China is reduced to one third. China’s trade rebalance 
reinforces its importance as a processing hub of imported intermediates from other countries. 
Considering the sum of Brazil’s five main export-markets, the Brazilian trade deficit is reduced 
by almost 30 per cent in value-added terms. A similar change is felt by the US economy, 
considering its five main export markets but mostly driven by the trade rebalance with China. 
Further on, there is a considerable decrease in the trade surplus of East and Southeast Asian 
countries with China in value-added terms. Some countries showed higher balances with their 
trading partners if analyzed in value added terms, as is the case of Germany’s surplus with the 
US and with the UK, as well as Korea and Japan’s surplus with the US.  
The different outcomes of bilateral trade balance in value added and gross terms 
are a reflection of the relative position of countries in GVCs (ANTRÀS et al., 2012). Those 
countries that are most at the final stages of the GVC have their trade balances reshaped by the 
incorporation of foreign inputs, i.e. trade imbalances are created with the countries that act as 
suppliers of intermediate inputs to the final producer.  
Moreover, bilateral trade imbalances illustrate how difficult is to analyze the real 
impact of currency devaluation or appreciation within GVCs117. According to Koopman et al. 
(2008), the lower the domestic value-added share in a country’s gross exports, the smaller the 
effect of that country’s currency appreciation on trade volume, other things being equal. Put it 
simply, having a high foreign value-added share in exports, currency depreciation turns exports 
of final goods cheaper at the same time it makes imported inputs more expensive for domestic 
producers (OECD, 2013). Overall, it is important to highlight that these results have serious 
                                                        
117 Riad et al. (2011) shows that trade balance adjustment in response to exchange rate changes is weaker within 
the supply chain than outside it.  
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policy implications, such as the potentially distorted effects that protectionist measures may 
have in the context of complex interactions between foreign and domestic value added. 
 
Figure 2.20 - Bilateral trade balances measured in value-added and gross terms, 2011 (US$ 
millions) 
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Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
Fact 9. RCA in value added: not all countries that have deepen their domestic value added to 
their exports have gained competitiveness, but at least they remained competitive. 
 
The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) is a widely used measure of sector 
competitiveness and specialization patterns. While the traditional measure of RCA is based on 
gross exports, the RCA in value-added terms nets out foreign value added imported into the 
economy. Based on domestic value added embodied in gross exports, as in Koopman et al. 
(2014), this indicator considers international production sharing and avoids the problems of 
multiple counting. Figure 2.21 computes the RCA index in gross and value-added terms at the 
country-sector level for all TiVA countries and four selected sectors (machinery and equipment, 
nec 118 ; electrical and optical equipment; transport equipment; and total business sector 
services).  
Comparing on a 45-degree diagram gross and value-added RCA indexes for the 
selected sectors, in which each dot represents a country-year combination, the considerable 
difference between such measures becomes perfectly clear. This difference varies according to 
the analyzed sector, being more significant in the sectors most influenced by GVCs, such as 
transport equipment and electrical and optical equipment. It is also true that such difference 
varies according to the country's position in the value chain. Countries located more in the 
downstream part of the value chain (i.e. closest to final demand) show higher values of RCA in 
gross terms than in value-added terms, falling to the bottom of the 45-degree line (ESCAITH, 
2014). This reflects the problem of multiple counting of intermediate inputs, i.e. countries may 
incorporate in their apparent comparative advantage the re-exported value added of upstream 
suppliers (WTO, 2014). This is the case of the United States and Mexico in machinery and 
equipment, and transport equipment and electrical and optical equipment sectors for the latter 
country, and Japan in the total business sector services. On the other hand, countries show 
higher values of RCA in value-added terms whether located more upstream in the value chain 
(R&D; production of components). For instance, Germany and Japan in all selected sectors, 
except for business services for the latter, and Brazil in transport equipment and electrical and 
optical equipment. 
 Given such relationship with a country's position in the GVCs, and considering the 
first stylized fact, one may say that China has become more competitive in the production of 
                                                        
118 Nec = not elsewhere classified.  
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components, since the country had higher RCA indexes in gross terms until 2001 (year that 
marked its entry into the WTO), and since then has had higher RCA indexes in value-added 
terms in all manufactured sectors.  
 
Figure 2.21 - RCA in gross and value-added terms, selected industries, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016). 
Note: RCA indices are calculated for all TiVA countries, each dot represents a country-year combination. 
 
By comparing the share of a given industry in a country´s export to the world share 
of the industry in world exports, a country is considered to have comparative advantage in a 
sector if its RCA is greater than one. Table 2.2 illustrates all TiVA countries that showed 
revealed comparative advantage in each analyzed sector in the year 2011. Among the largest 
countries, Germany, Japan, Korea, and Mexico reveal comparative advantage in all three 
manufacturing sectors. As it was expected, Asian countries stand out among those with 
comparative advantage in electrical and optical equipment. Based on gross exports 119 , 
Germany, Sweden, Romania and Finland´s RCA index is lower than 1, but when domestic 
value-added is used it becomes greater than 1 in electrical and optical equipment, while 
Vietnam has comparative advantage in gross but not in value-added terms, reflecting the 
                                                        
119 To synthesize the results found, table 2.1 presents only the results in value-added. 
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importance of intermediate imports. In the case of transport equipment, when the foreign 
content of exports is disregarded, Italy has comparative advantage, and on the contrary, 
Slovenia and Portugal no longer have RCA larger than 1. In the business sector services, Japan 
and Norway lost their comparative advantage whether it is calculated in value-added, while 
Bulgaria and Thailand show signs of becoming more specialized in that sector, and this latter 
country has also lost its fallacious comparative advantage in machinery and equipment. Further 
on, Table 2.3 reveals a considerably higher number of countries with comparative advantage in 
the case of total business services (34 of 63 countries in the sample).  
 
Table 2.2 - Countries with RCA in value-added terms, 2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016). 
 
The findings outlined in Table 2.3 show that comparative advantages change over 
time. It shows the difference between the RCA (traditional and value-added) in 2011 and 1995. 
Considering both gross and value-added RCA, countries such as Mexico, Indonesia, Germany, 
and India have become more specialized in all manufactured sectors analyzed, with the latter 
two also gaining in the business services sector. On the contrary, Belgium and Hong Kong have 
lost comparative advantage in manufacturing and gained in services sector. More importantly, 
Table 2.3 shows substantial changes in the distribution of RCA across countries and industries 
over time whether calculated based on gross or value-added terms (countries in bold indicate 
Austria, Czeck Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweeden, Switzerland, United States, China, 
Romania
C30T33: Electrical and optical 
equipment
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Slovakia, Sweeden, Switzerland, China, Costa Rica, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia
C34T35: Transport equipment
Canada, Czeck Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweeden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States, Argentina, Romania
C50T74: Total Business Sector 
Services
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweeden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States,Bulgaria, Cambodia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Hong Kong, India, Lithuania, Malta, Morocco, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia
Countries with RCA in value-added terms
(RCA>1)
Industry
C29: Machinery and equipment, 
nec
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variations between gains and losses). For example, according to the traditional measure, France 
lost RCA, however it has gained in value-added terms in machinery and equipment, as well as 
Demark, Finland, and Philippines in the case of electrical and optical equipment.  
 
Table 2.3 - RCA gains and losses in gross and value-added terms, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016). 
Note: (1) countries highlighted in bold indicate alternation of gain or loss depending on whether the RCA measure 
is in gross or value-added terms.  
 
Further on, one of the questions that arises is whether higher levels of domestic 
value-added in gross exports are positively associated with higher levels of RCA. More 
specifically, are the countries that most added domestic value to their exports the ones that have 
made the most gains in sector competitiveness? Or would countries be doomed to gain 
competitiveness from higher imported content? Figure 2.22 shows RCA indexes in value-added 
terms for all TiVA countries and the four selected industries, with the year 1995 on the x-axis 
and 2011 on the y-axis, and the size of the bubble as the difference between domestic value-
added content of sector’s gross exports in 2011 and 1995.  
Countries that gain RCA Countries that gain RCA Countries that lose RCA Countries that lose RCA
 (in gross terms) (in value-added terms) (in gross terms)  (in value-added terms)
C29: Machinery and equipment, 
nec
Austria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico,  Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia,  Turkey, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, China ,  Croatia, India,  
Indonesia, Peru, Philippines, Romania, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Thailand,  Tunisia, Viet Nam
Austria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico,  
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden,  Turkey, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
China ,  Croatia, India,  Indonesia, Malta, 
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Thailand,  Tunisia, 
Viet Nam
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States,  Argentina, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Hong Kong,  Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Russia, 
Taiwan
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, ,  Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States,  Argentina, 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Hong 
Kong,  Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Russia, Taiwan
C30T33: Electrical and optical 
equipment
Austria, Canada, Chile,  Czech Republic, 
Estonia,  Germany, Greece, Hungary,  
Iceland,  Israel,  Italy, Korea, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Romania, 
Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Tunisia, Viet Nam
Austria, Chile,  Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia,  Finland,  Germany, Greece, 
Hungary,  Iceland,  Israel,  Italy, Korea, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, India, 
Indonesia, Morocco, Romania, Saudi 
Arabia, Philippines, Taiwan, Tunisia, Viet 
Nam
Australia, Belgium, Denmark,  Finland, 
France,  Ireland, Japan, Netherlands,  
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States, 
Argentina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Hong Kong,  
Lithuania, Malta, Peru, Philippines, 
Singapore, Russia South Africa, Thailand
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France,  
Ireland, Japan, Netherlands,  New 
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom, United States, Argentina, 
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Colombia, Hong Kong,  Lithuania, Malta, 
Peru, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore,  
South Africa, Thailand, 
C34T35: Transport equipment
Austria, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States, Argentina, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, India, Indonesia, Morocco, 
Philippinnes, Romania, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Viet Nam
Austria, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States, Argentina, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, India, Indonesia, Morocco, 
Philippinnes, Romania, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Viet Nam
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweeden, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cyprus, Hong Kong, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Malta, Peru, Russia, Taiwan
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweeden, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cyprus, Hong Kong, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Malta, Peru, Russia, Taiwan
C50T74: Total Business Sector 
Services
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Sweeden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Hong Kong, India, Malta, Morroco, 
Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Taiwan,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland,  
Portugal, Slovenia, Sweeden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Hong Kong, India, Malta, Morroco, 
Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Taiwan,
Australia, Austria, Chile, Hungary, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Latvia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slokavia, 
Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Brunei, China, 
Colombia, Indonesia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Viet Nam
Australia, Austria, Chile, Hungary, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Latvia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Slokavia, Turkey, 
Argentina, Brazil, Brunei, China, 
Colombia, Indonesia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Viet Nam
Industry
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The first countries in the RCA ranking for 2011, respectively, in the case of 
machinery and equipment, are Italy, Germany, and Japan. These countries are among those that 
added the highest domestic value in the period analyzed, although they already played a 
prominent role in the 1995 ranking. In addition, China has boosted its sector competitiveness, 
showing a considerable RCA gain (0.46 for 1.42) at the same time that it was the country that 
most added domestic value from the sample. It is interesting to note that other countries also 
added a substantial amount of domestic value in their exports, but failed to advance in the gains 
of specialization such as the Chinese example, as is the case of the US economy that remained 
practically with the same RCA index. Despite higher sums of DVA in 2011, most countries 
remained with low RCA indexes. 
In the case of electrical and optical equipment, the countries of Southeast Asia 
occupy the first places of the ranking 1995 (Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, Korea, and 
Malaysia). In 2011, Taiwan becomes the first in the ranking, followed by the one Latin 
American exception, Costa Rica, and other Asian countries - Philippines, Korea, China, 
Singapore, Japan, and Malaysia, respectively. Ireland and the United States are the only two 
countries that have lost RCA between 1995 and 2011. Once again, China becomes 
internationally competitive while adding enormous amounts of domestic value. Different from 
what happens in the sector of transport equipment, in which although the Chinese economy has 
a greater RCA index in 2011 when compared to 1995, it does not yet have an RCA greater than 
one. The United States, while considerably increasing its domestic value-added in exports, 
failed to translate this increase into competitiveness in the case of transport equipment. In that 
sector, Japan, Germany and Mexico are among the top five countries in the ranking of 1995 
and 2011, and the countries with the highest increases in domestic value-added remained at 
RCA levels above one. 
In total business sector services, the top three places are between Hong Kong, 
Luxembourg, and Cyprus, while most Latin American countries are lagging behind in terms of 
competitiveness gains. It also worth noting that this was the only sector in which China has 
dropped its RCA bellow one in 2011. In general, most countries were unable to move towards 
higher levels of RCA, even though there were considerable sums of domestic value being 
added. 
Overall, the countries with the highest domestic value-added increases already had 
comparative advantages in the manufacturing sectors in 1995 and continued to have it in 2011, 
China aside.  Therefore, countries are not doomed to resort to greater imported content to 
leverage their international competitiveness, but the positive relationship between higher levels 
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of domestic value-added and higher levels of RCA is a possibility restricted to a select group 
of countries. 
 
Figure 2.22 - RCA in value-added terms and domestic value-added content of gross exports, 
selected industries, 1995 and 2011 
  
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016). 
Notes: (1) the size of the bubble is the difference between domestic value-added content of sector’s gross exports 
in 2011 and 1995.  
 
2.5 Partial concluding remarks 
This chapter has explored some of the value-added trade measures to provide details 
about countries specialization patterns in vertically integrated production networks connected 
by international trade. It has illustrated the changing nature of international trade within GVCs, 
drawing on selected evidence since 1995 and discussing the degree and nature of countries’ 
interaction within GVCs.  
Firstly, this chapter has introduced a set of indicators based on value-added terms, 
presenting the two main strands in the literature, the GVC and the VS approaches, following 
the later with the calculations performed in this study. As it aimed to provide a comprehensive 
map of international transactions of goods and services based on IIO tables, the following 
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analysis presents the main IIO tables and the dilemmas behind their construction. Our main 
findings are as follows: 
(i) When analyzed in gross terms, the contribution of a specific country to 
international trade flows proved to be heavily overestimated. That is because 
parts and components are crossing borders several times until they compose final 
goods, causing a multiple-counting effect, which clearly will blur the real picture 
of world trade and production to a greater or lesser extent depending on the 
participation and position of a country within GVCs. 
(ii) Looking at the changes across time, countries increasingly relied on foreign 
value added for their own exports, which may then be further processed in 
partner countries. Countries with the largest GVC participation, which are 
mostly small countries and thus have lower availability of domestically sourced 
intermediates, expanded their overall GVC participation underpinning their role 
as buyers of foreign inputs (backward linkages). 
(iii) When the sources of value-added in gross exports are decomposed considering 
their destinations, one may see that a considerable part of international trade has 
been overlooked by GVC metrics. Because the domestic GVC sent to consumer 
economy is not considered as part of GVC trade, it is not included in any 
indicator of participation in GVCs. Further on, the GVC participation index does 
not reflect the complex mix of determinants of a country´s engagement in GVCs, 
as it is possible to find countries with similar degrees of GVC participation and 
completely different geographical locations, economic sizes, infrastructure 
aspects and domestic policies, for instance. Finally, it cannot be assumed that 
the greater the share of domestic value added in exports, the better the country's 
situation in terms of gains from trade integration.  
(iv) Southeast Asian economies have showed relatively high GVC participation 
indexes and are generally located downstream in a supply chain, boosting the 
importance of its backward linkages over time.  
(v) China’s production has advanced to other stages located more at the beginning 
of the GVCs (fact 4), while it has deepening its importance on the cross-country 
production sharing (reflected by FDC) and becoming less dependent of 
intermediate imports embodied in its exports (fact 6). Differently from what 
could be expected, the decline in re-exported intermediate imports in China was 
not translated into a lesser diversification of its exports. On the contrary, China 
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has climbed the ladder of production complexity (fact 7), while becoming more 
integrated into world trade (fact 2) and relying less and less on imported inputs, 
as well as becoming more competitive in the production of components (fact 9). 
(vi) Because it is fundamental to connect internationally dispersed stages of 
production processes, the services content of manufactured goods has increased 
over time. Although, the importance of services is a much broader phenomenon 
and the value-added perspective of trade provides new insights. Thus, services 
are not only enablers in value chains but also operate as their own value chains.  
(vii) There is no linear relationship between a country´s GVC participation and the 
mix of products that it is able to make (i.e. its economic complexity), even 
though there is a positive association between both. Several countries have 
experienced higher levels of GVC participation meanwhile not experiencing any 
relative upgrading in complexity of production. 
(viii) Traditionally, bilateral trade balances and RCA have been calculated in terms of 
final goods. When analyzed in value-added terms, the distorted outcomes are 
considered a reflection of both countries’ relative position in GVCs and how the 
analyzed sector is influenced by GVC trade.  
However, our analysis clearly has a number of limitations. To name a few, first, the 
country-level analysis imposes a number of limitations, since many characteristics are sector-
specific. Therefore, in order to minimize this problem, we opted to analyze four selected sectors 
to measure the gains in competitiveness and specialization patterns. Second, although the 
convenience of operating with the ready-to-use TiVA indicators, the ability to develop a more 
detailed analysis is more limited precisely because they are pre-defined indicators. We seek to 
overcome such limitation using WIOD data decomposed by the method of Koopman et al. 
(2014). However, in order to avoid overlapping the various questions already answered with 
TiVA indicators, we have restricted this incorporation to the analysis of the different 
components within the total foreign content, illustrating different arrangements of cross-
country production sharing. Third, there are several data limitations regarding services in 
GVCs, which limits our analysis of the servicification of GVCs. 
Overall, our set of stylized facts based on domestic value-added exports illustrated 
the importance of the value-added framework to our understanding of global trade. Because a 
country’s exports tend to embody a large share of other countries’ value added, measures 
134 
 
 134 
consistent with the fragmentation of production processes and increasing vertical specialization 
in trade provide more meaningful information about countries' specialization patterns.  
Until recently, evidence on countries specialization patterns has been based on 
gross trade data. As the last decades have witnessed significant changes on how the world 
production and international trade are organized, with countries becoming specialized in 
specific parts and tasks within GVCs, more empirical work is needed to present a 
comprehensive picture of these integrated global production systems. Without being restricted 
to case study works, several international organizations have developed new empirical evidence 
along GVCs primarily based on IIO tables. With this in mind, one can affirm that traditional 
indicators exclusively based on gross trade are becoming less and less informative and 
appropriate to support political discussions.  
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Annex 
Annex 2.1 - Mathematical formulation of selected indicators 
 
(i) Decomposing gross trade into value-added components and selected measures  
 
Koopman et al. (2010, 2014) provide a method for decomposing gross trade into 
its value-added components, both in a simple two-country, one-sector case and in a general case 
with G countries and N sectors. For our purposes, we focus on the generalized case to any 
arbitrary number of countries. Despite recovering the details about how the process of 
decomposing gross exports can be reproduced, we aim to make it easier to understand the 
algebraic formulation behind the main measures in the value-added trade literature. 
With A and B as the GNxGN matrices, where: 𝐴𝑠𝑟 is a NxN block input-output 
coefficient matrix, and 𝐵𝑠𝑟 denotes the NxN block Leontief inverse matrix, (𝐼 − 𝐴)
−1, i.e. the 
total requirement matrix that gives the amount of gross output in producing country s required 
for a one-unit increase in final demand in destination country r. Considering V and VB as 
GxGN matrices, where 𝑉𝑠  represents a 1 by N row vector of direct value-added coefficient. 
Further on, a Nx1 gross output vector, 𝑋𝑠𝑟, denotes the gross output produced in s and absorbed 
in r, where 𝑋𝑠 =  ∑ 𝑋𝑠𝑟
𝐺
𝑟  is also a Nx1 vector that gives country s’ total gross output. And a 
Nx1 vector, 𝑌𝑠𝑟, denotes the final goods produced in s and consumed in r, and 𝑌𝑠=∑ 𝑌𝑠𝑟
𝐺
𝑟   is 
also a Nx1 vector that gives the global use of s’ final goods. Both the gross output 
decomposition and final demand matrix are GNxN matrices. Taking µ as a unit vector 1XN, 
and 𝐸𝑠∗ as a country’s gross exports to the world, Koopman (2014) decompose a country’s 
gross exports to its nine components as follows: 
 
      (1)                            (2)                                       (3) 
𝜇𝐸𝑠∗ = [{𝑉𝑠 ∑ 𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑌𝑠𝑟
𝐺
𝑟≠𝑠 + 𝑉𝑠 ∑ 𝐵𝑠𝑟𝑌𝑟𝑟
𝐺
𝑟≠𝑠 + 𝑉𝑠 ∑ ∑ 𝐵𝑠𝑟
𝐺
𝑡≠𝑠,𝑟 𝑌𝑟𝑡
𝐺
𝑟≠𝑠  } ]        (𝑖) 
          
                 (4)                                         (5) 
+[ {𝑉𝑠 ∑ 𝐵𝑠𝑟𝑌𝑟𝑠 +  𝑉𝑠 ∑ 𝐵𝑠𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑠(𝐼 − 𝐴𝑠𝑠)
−1𝑌𝑠𝑠
𝐺
𝑟≠𝑠
𝐺
𝑟≠𝑠 } 
                          
                             (6) 
+𝑉𝑠 ∑ 𝐵𝑠𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑠
𝐺
𝑟≠𝑠 (𝐼 − 𝐴𝑠𝑠)
−1𝐸𝑠∗ ]                                       (𝑖𝑖) 
                 
                          (7)                                                  (8) 
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+[ {∑ ∑ 𝑉𝑡𝐵𝑡𝑠
𝐺
𝑟≠𝑠 𝑌𝑠𝑟 + ∑ ∑ 𝑉𝑡
𝐺
𝑟≠𝑠 𝐵𝑡𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑟(𝐼 − 𝐴𝑟𝑟)
−1𝑌𝑟𝑟
𝐺
𝑡≠𝑠
𝐺
𝑡≠𝑠 }  
                              (9) 
+ ∑ 𝑉𝑡𝐵𝑡𝑠
𝐺
𝑡≠𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑟 ∑ (𝐼 − 𝐴𝑟𝑟)
−1𝐸𝑟∗
𝐺
𝑟≠𝑠 ]                                                         (𝑖𝑖𝑖)  
 
Therefore, the sum of the first three terms is called value-added exports, or VAX, as 
calculated by Johnson and Noguera (2012), which when divided by gross exports denotes VAX 
ratio. The second group, composed by (4), (5), and (6) represents the domestic content in 
intermediate exports that finally returns home, VS1*. The sum of (3), (4), (5), and (6) is labeled 
as VS1 by Hummels et al. (2001), while only the component (4) is taken as VS1* as proposed 
by Daudin et al. (2011). The sum of (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) is considered the domestic 
content of gross exports. Finally, the sum of the latter three terms, (7), (8), and (9) is labeled as 
VS by Hummels et al. (2001), and represents the foreign value-added in gross exports, which 
when divided by gross exports denotes the VS share120. Both (6) and (9) are considered double 
counted intermediate exports, with (6) being produced at home and (9) abroad.  
Koopman (2010; 2014) added two new indicators that helps to gauge the extent to 
which a country-sector is integrated in the global production chain, the GVC participation 
index, and whether a country is more likely to be in the upstream or downstream of the GVC 
in a particular sector, the GVC position. By taking both the VS1 and the VS shares, these 
indicators for country s and industry r are:  
 
𝐺𝑉𝐶 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
𝐼𝑉𝑠𝑟
𝐸𝑠𝑟
  +  
𝐹𝑉𝑠𝑟
𝐸𝑠𝑟
 
 
𝐺𝑉𝐶 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐿𝑛 (1 +
𝐼𝑉𝑠𝑟
𝐸𝑠𝑟
) − 𝐿𝑛 (1 +  
𝐹𝑉𝑠𝑟
𝐸𝑠𝑟
) 
 
The GVC participation index captures the domestic value added embodied as 
intermediate inputs in third countries’ gross exports (IVA), i.e. the VS1 share, and the import 
content of exports (the foreign VA embodied in gross exports, FVA), i.e. the VS share. Thus, 
this indicator captures both forward and backward participation in GVCs, respectively. 
Considering the GVC position index, a country lies downstream (upstream) in a GVC when it 
uses a larger (smaller) portion of other countries intermediates to produce final goods for 
exports if compared to its exports of intermediates in that sector that are used by other countries.  
 
                                                        
120 The algebraic formulation of the VS share can be reduced to: 𝜇. 𝐴𝑀. (𝐼 − 𝐴
𝐷)−1. 
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(ii) Length of GVCs and Distance to final demand 
 
The index of the length of GVCs and the distance to final demand proposed by 
Fally (2012) are calculated as: 
𝑁 = 𝜇(𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 
 
𝐷 =  𝜇(𝐼 − 𝐺)−1 
 
Where N and D are column vectors with the indexes for all countries i and industries 
k, 𝜇 is a column unit vector, I is an identity matrix, A is the matrix of technical coefficients, G 
is the matrix of output coefficients, (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 is the Leontief inverse, and (𝐼 − 𝐺)−1 as the 
output inverse.  
 
(iii) Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index in gross and value-added terms 
 
The RCA index in gross terms (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑗) is based on Balassa’s (1965) measure, and 
is calculated as:  
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑠𝑗 = ( 𝐸𝑠𝑗 𝐸𝑠)/(𝐸𝑤𝑗 𝐸𝑤)⁄⁄  
 
Where 𝐸𝑠𝑗 is exports of country s of sector j, 𝐸𝑠 is total exports of country s, 𝐸𝑤𝑗 is 
world exports of sector j, and 𝐸𝑤 is total world exports.  
 
The RCA index in value-added terms (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑉𝐴) is calculated as:  
 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑉𝐴 =  
(
𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑠𝑗
𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑠
)
(
𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑤𝑗
𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑤
)
⁄  
 
Where 𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑠𝑗  is the domestic value-added of country s of sector j, 𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑠 is the total 
domestic value-added of country s, 𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑤𝑗  is the domestic value-added of all countries of 
sector j, and 𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑤 is the total domestic value-added of all countries in total gross exports.     
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(iv) Bilateral trade balance in value-added terms 
 
The balance of trade in value-added terms is calculated by taking the values that are 
consumed in the two countries, while the gross version depends on values that are shipped 
between the two countries (JONES; POWERS; UBEE, 2013). Following their example, 
Canada-US trade balance in value-added terms is calculated as: 
𝑇𝐵𝐶𝐴𝑁 𝑈𝑆 = (0 ⋯ 0 𝑉𝐶𝐴𝑁 0 ⋯ 0) (
𝐵11 ⋯ 𝐵1𝐺
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐵𝐺1 ⋯ 𝐵𝐺𝐺
) (
𝐹1 𝑈𝑆
⋮
𝐹𝐺 𝑈𝑆
) – 
(0 ⋯ 0 𝑉𝑈𝑆𝐴 0 ⋯ 0) (
𝐵11 ⋯ 𝐵1𝐺
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐵𝐺1 ⋯ 𝐵𝐺𝐺
) (
𝐹1 𝐶𝐴𝑁
⋮
𝐹𝐺 𝐶𝐴𝑁
)  
 
It estimates the value added by Canada in all final goods consumed in the US, 
including what is produced domestically with Canadian intermediate inputs, and its converse, 
where it uses a 1xGN value-added matrix, the standard GNxGN Leontief inverse matrix, and a 
GNx1 vector of final demand.  
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Annex 2.2 - Technical Annex on TiVA indicators 
Following the GVC literature, a country’s gross trade flow can be decomposed into 
two sources of value added, domestic and foreign. Considering TiVA’s indicators, this means 
that the gross exports of country c, by industry i and by partner country p (𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅𝑐,𝑝,𝑖)121 is 
equal to the sum of the domestic value added content of gross exports (or “domestic value 
added”, 𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑝,𝑖)
122 and the foreign value added in gross exports (𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑝,𝑖).  
The 𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑝,𝑖 represents the value of exports that is created domestically, i.e. 
the value created domestically that is absorbed abroad 123 . It can be split into three 
subcomponents according to where and how the value-added exports are absorbed124. The first 
subcomponent is defined as direct domestic value added (EXGR_DDC(𝑐,𝑖))
125, and reflects the 
direct contribution made by industry i in country c to the production of goods and services for 
export. This measure represents the domestic value added embodied both in final or 
intermediate goods or services that is directly consumed by the importing country126. The 
second component is indirect domestic value added (𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅_𝐼𝐷𝐶(𝑐,𝑖) ), and represents the 
domestic value added originating from other, upstream, industries (different from industry i) in 
country c incorporated in the exports of industry i. In other words, it corresponds to the domestic 
value added embodied in intermediates (goods or services) exported to a partner country that 
re-exports them to another country in the form of other goods or services. This variable 
corresponds to the forward GVC participation127 . Finally, the third component is the re-
                                                        
121 To avoid confusions, the original code used by TiVA is reported in parentheses after the name of the full name 
of the indicator. 
122 When following the method of decomposition of gross exports by Koopman et al. (2012, 2014), this indicator 
is equivalent to “value-added exports” (VT), and is also conceptually equivalent to the concept of value-added 
exports (VAX) developed by Johnson and Noguera (2012), indicating the value-added produced in a source country 
s and incorporated in destination country r. 
123 According to the “TiVA 2016 indicators – definitions”, this measure includes the value added generated by the 
exporting industry during its production processes and also any value added coming from upstream domestic 
suppliers embodied in the exports. 
124 In terms of the method of decomposition of gross exports formulated by Koopman et al. (2012, 2014), the 
domestic value added, in TiVA’s nomenclature, is equivalent to value-added exports (VT), which is also 
subdivided into three components: (1) in terms of the country’s final goods exports; (2) it is value added in terms 
of the country’s intermediate exports absorbed directly by the importing country, i.e. domestic value exported in 
intermediate goods that are used to produce final goods consumed by direct importers; and (3) domestic value 
added in intermediate exports that are used by the importing country to produce final goods to third countries, i.e. 
domestic value in intermediates re-exported to third countries.  Thereby, both provide different, but closely related 
perspectives about the subcomponents of domestic value added.  
125 This indicator is presented as a single indicator of both (2) and (3) parts of value-added exports (VT) presented 
by Koopman et al. (2012, 2014).   
126 See exploratory notes. Available at: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/Explanatory_Notes_e.pdf> . 
127 See exploratory notes. Available at: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/Explanatory_Notes_e.pdf> 
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imported domestic value added content of exports (EXGR_RIM(𝑐,𝑖)), and measures the domestic 
value added content of exported intermediates that is re-imported by the country of origin as 
embodied in other intermediates and used to produce exports 128. Put it simply, these indicators 
represent, respectively: i) the domestic value added (VA) sent to consumer economy; ii) the 
domestic VA sent to third economies; and iii) the domestic VA re-imported in the economy. 
The foreign value added in gross exports (𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑝,𝑖) corresponds to the value 
added of inputs that were imported in order to produce intermediate or final goods and services 
to be exported, and it is also commonly referred to as vertical specialization. This is one of the 
most discussed aspects of GVC participation, and it was essentially considered as the (direct 
and indirect) import content of a country’s exports by Hummels et al. (2001), i.e. the domestic 
or foreign value added embodied in exports. Since then, several different metrics were 
developed in the GVC literature, as it was previously discussed. Following TiVA indicators, 
the foreign value added intensity measure, commonly referred to as “import content of exports”, 
is the foreign value added share of gross exports (𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑐,𝑖)
129. This measure is defined 
as 𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑝,𝑖 divided by the total gross exports, in percentage. According to the OECD-
WTO TiVA database, it is a reliable measure of “backward linkages” in GVCs analyses, 
showing the “buyer” perspective, i.e. the sourcing perspective in GVCs.  
Another TiVA indicator used in this study is the Re-exported intermediate imports 
as a share of intermediate imports (𝐼𝑀𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑖) that shows how much of the imports 
are exported. In addition, the value added trade balance (𝐵𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐹𝐷𝑐,𝑝,𝑖), which is the difference 
between domestic value added in foreign final demand (FFD_DVA) and foreign value added 
in domestic final demand (DFD_FVA), indicates for each country c its value added trade 
balance with country p for industry i.  
 
                                                        
128See exploratory notes. Available in: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/Explanatory_Notes_e.pdf>  
 
129 𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑐,𝑖 =
∑ 𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑐,𝑝,𝑖𝑝
∑ 𝐸𝑋𝐺𝑅𝑐,𝑝,𝑖𝑝
𝑥100. 
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Annex 2.3  
Box 2.2 - Variables correspondence 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
Aggregate	Variables Abbreviation	 Concept
Wang	et	al.	
(2014)
Koopman	et	al.	
(2014)
DVA_FIN
	In	final	goods
exports	 T1* 1
DVA_INT
Intermediates	exports	absorbed	by	direct	
importers T2 2
DVA_INTrexI1
Intermediate	exports	to	third	countries	to	
produce	domestic	final	goods T3 3
DVA_INTrexF Produce	final	goods	exports	to	third	countries T4 3
DVA_INTrexI2
Produce	intermediate	exports	to	third	countries	
to	produce	exports T5 3
RDV_INT
Intermediates	that	return	via	intermediate	
imports T8 5
RDV_FIN Intermediates	that	return	via	final	imports T6 4
RDV_FIN2
Intermediates	that	return	in	final	imports	via	third	
countries T7 4
OVA_FIN Sourced	from	other	countries T14 7
MVA_FIN Sourced	from	the	direct	importer T11 7
OVA_INT Sourced	from	other	countries T15 8
MVA_INT Sourced	from	the	direct	importer T12 8
DDC_FIN Due	to	final	goods	exports	production T9 6
DDC_INT Due	to	intermediate	exports	production T10 6
ODC Due	to	other	countries	exports	Production T16 9
MDC Due	to	the	direct	importer	exports	production T13 9
Domestic	value-added	absorbed	
abroad	(DVA)
Domestic	value-added	returns	
home	(RDV)
Foreign	value-	added	(FVA)
Pure	double	counting	(PDC)
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Figure 2.23 - Gross exports accounting: major categories 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Wang, Wei and Zhu (2014). 
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Chapter 3. Regional dynamics in global production sharing: 
evidence on “Factory South America” 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Since the 1990s, the economic relations between countries has entered a new phase 
called hyperglobalization, which is characterized by rapid growth in cross-border flows of 
goods, services and capital (ECLAC, 2016; SUBRAMANIAN; KESSLER, 2013). Among 
other aspects130, a major trend of this era of hyperglobalization has been the slicing up of the 
value-added chain. The surge of production fragmentation into various stages internationally 
dispersed has opened opportunities for many firms in developing countries to engage in 
activities without having to complete entire production processes. However, there is a general 
perception that this is not a worldwide process that involves every country or region across the 
globe.  
In this chapter, we examine the regional linkages of global production sharing, 
considering value-added trade both inter and intra-regional blocs in the recent phase of 
hyperglobalization. Despite an extensive literature on three main regional blocs, known as 
Factory Asia, Factory North America, and Factory Europe, this chapter aims to contribute to 
this line of research by investigating another regional bloc that is not usually considered in the 
GVC literature, which we have called Factory South America. Our analysis thus proceeds by 
asking two questions: first, how is the pattern of participation of South America in value chains 
compared to other regional blocs? Second, what is the importance of interregional value-added 
trade with Asia for slackening South America intra-linkages? Or, more specifically, a further 
question to be explored is whether the intra-regional links that characterized the South 
American regional bloc have given rise to interregional links, especially with Factory Asia, 
which may culminate strengthening intra-regional bloc value-added linkages in Asia with China 
as hub.  
                                                        
130 Subramanian and Kessler (2013) describe seven features of the most recent wave of globalization, known as 
hyperglobalization, focusing on its trade aspects: i) the rapid rise in trade integration since the 1990s 
(“hyperglobalization”); ii) the importance of services (“dematerialization of globalization); iii) the widespread 
embrace of openness (“democratic globalization”); iv) the similarity of North-to-South trade and investment flows 
with flows in the other direction (“crisscrossing globalization”); v) the rise of China as mega-trader; vi) the 
proliferation of regional trade agreements; and vii) the decline of barriers to trade in goods, although barriers to 
trade in services remain high. More broadly, ECLAC (2016) includes the surge in cross-border data flows since 
the 2000s as an important feature, and as the report investigate the dissatisfaction with hyperglobalization, it also 
relates this concept with the low presence of global public goods and international coordination mechanisms. 
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The motivation behind this chapter is manifold. First, the availability of IIO tables 
made it possible to analyze production fragmentation and specialization patterns in a way that 
was not previously feasible. Second, there is a recent trade literature that recognizes that global 
production networks are marked by regional blocs (BALDWIN, 2012; BALDWIN; FORSLID, 
2014; BALDWIN; LOPEZ-GONZALEZ, 2013; ITO; VÉZINA, 2016; LOS; TIMMER; 
VRIES, 2013). However, despite the spurt of interest in regional value-chains, economists have 
not yet investigated the geographic distribution of South American countries’ final consumption 
and production value added. Third, much is said about the expansion of China within bilateral 
trade of South American countries along the 2000s, although without further considerations 
about how, in the context of fragmented production and internationally dispersed value 
networks, this actually means strengthening other intra- regional bloc trade linkages. Last but 
not least, the GVC literature usually considers that a country participates in GVCs in two 
different ways - using imported intermediate inputs to produce exports and exporting 
intermediate goods that are used by others to produce their own exports -, disregarding the 
exported products that are consumed or processed for consumption in the first country that is 
importing them. Therefore, we aim to contribute to a better understanding of countries and 
regions' integration in the world production system through trade, and the export capacity on 
the supply side, and relative market dependence on the demand side. 
We use newly-released Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) last updated in December 
2016, which is a joint OECD-WTO initiative, to add evidence on regional blocs’ intra and inter-
linkages of value-added from 1995 to 2011. In our study we investigate Factory North America 
(United States, Canada, and Mexico), Factory Asia (Association of South East Asian Nations – 
ASEAN131, and Eastern Asia – EASIA132), Factory Europe (European Union – EU28133) for 
comparisons, and more importantly for our purposes, Factory South America (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Peru)134.  
                                                        
131  Indonesia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (not 
included here Lao PDR and Myanmar). 
132 Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong (China), and Chinese Taipei (Taiwan).  
133 Following TiVA, we considered both EU 15 and EU13 member countries, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, and Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Romania. 
134 The countries that build the South American regional bloc are in agreement with the list of TiVA countries, and 
represent together 350 million of people and about 87% of the GDP of all South American countries for the year 
2016 (excluding Venezuela due to the absence of data for that year) (calculation based on the World Bank national 
accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files). 
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Our analysis focuses on the integration pattern of South American countries, not 
Latin America (which would incorporate both Mexico and Costa Rica135), for some reasons. 
First, Mexico is commonly listed as one of the countries of Factory North America. Second, 
both Mexico and Costa Rica are more connected with North American supply chains in 
downstream stages, reflecting country-specific features that are quite different from South 
American countries. In other words, the regional blocs portrayed by the GVC literature reflect 
a series of region-specific characteristics, ranging from geographic distance, natural barriers, 
and the existence of regional integration agreements. In addition, South America is usually 
considered as a missing region in the era of global value chains, along with Sub-Saharan Africa, 
while several emerging markets are joining and taking advantage of becoming more integrated 
into international production networks. Therefore, considering the proximity and similarity of 
the South American countries’ characteristics and the potential benefits usually associated with 
GVC integration, it seems reasonable to advance in studies about the GVC integration pattern 
of the region and its shifts over time. However, this is the first study based on IIO tables that 
we are aware of which deals specifically with the countries of South America as a regional bloc. 
In our empirical work, we consider a series of measures in value-added terms to 
illustrate intra and inter-linkages of regional blocs. First, we characterize GVC participation of 
Factory South America and compare it with other regional-blocs based on the overall levels of 
participation and their regional, global and sectoral dimensions. Then we investigate the origin 
and destination of value-added trade through backward and forward linkages across different 
countries or regions. Further, we advance the understanding of the interdependence between 
countries and regions through the construction of a new version of the hub-ness indicator 
developed by Baldwin (2004). In this respect, we employ value-added trade data to proxy how 
hub-and-spoke arrangements have changed the degree of each country’s relative market 
dependence on other countries within and across regions.  
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present a brief survey 
of the regional dynamics of global value chains. The third section presents some selected 
evidence on regional-blocs intra and inter linkages. In this section, we outline Factory South 
America and its signs of feebler intra-regional linkages compared to inter-regional, as well as 
how this reinforced the connections especially with Factory Asia and intra-Asia, and the relative 
market interdependence across countries. Section 4 summarizes our discussion and concludes.    
 
                                                        
135 Considering the list of all Latin American countries available in TiVA database. 
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3.2. Related literature 
This section cultivates some common ground for approaching the regionally 
segmentation of global value chains by tracking the development of relevant studies. As it was 
not designed to be an encyclopedic literature survey, it focuses only on studies that consider the 
input-output relations of cross-border production sharing, which is the backbone of GVC 
studies. Faced with the international fragmentation of value chains, a key research question is 
to what extent this process is mainly regional or global.  
Los, Timmer, and de Vries (2015) investigated the contrasting forces toward 
regionalization versus toward globalization in the organization of production networks. To this 
end, they extended the fragmentation measure by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and applied to 
the World Input-Output Database (2013 release) for the years 1995-2011. They found a 
dominant tendency of increasing global fragmentation, instead of more segmentation into 
regional blocs. This means that international fragmentation has occurred mainly within 
countries outside the regional blocs, in what they named “Factory World”.  
However, there is ample evidence from the literature on GVCs indicating strong 
regional dynamics in world production sharing. Baldwin (2006, 2011) suggests that the 
international dispersion of production stages, i.e. the second unbundling of globalization136, is 
a regional process, and not global as it could be expected by taking the concept of “global value 
chains”. It is argued that geography matters for joining a supply chain, which has become more 
complex and interconnected over time, turning it regionalized rather than globalized. Clearly, 
the geographical configuration of the second unbundling is not constant and its spatial scale 
may change over time (GEREFFI, 2014). In this sense, the author points to a possible change 
of orientation from global toward more regionally oriented supply chains since the 2008 global 
economic crisis and the following “great trade collapse”, with emerging economies becoming 
an important end market. Degain, Meng and Wang (2017) calculated the weight of intraregional 
exports and imports in trade in intermediate and final manufactured goods between 1995 and 
2015 for three regional blocs137, and the rest of the world, and also found that GVCs are mainly 
organized at the regional level, despite the upsurge in globalization tendency before the recent 
                                                        
136 Baldwin (2006) characterizes globalization as two great unbundlings. The first one occurs up to the mid or late 
1980s and is considered a linear process driven by lower trade costs, in which consumption and production can be 
separated by great distances. The second unbundling is driven by the ICT revolution, which turned economically 
possible to unbundling factories in stages of production that are geographically separated and dispersed to low-
wage economies.  
137 Although not based on IIO tables, it is worth mentioning this study because it is the only one that considers the 
regional bloc "the Americas", including both North and South America. 
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global financial crisis. Johnson and Noguera (2012) also support that geographical distance 
matters for bilateral trade in value added across countries, as well as trade agreements. In further 
studies, Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013, 2015) describe “global value chains” as a 
buzzword that is inaccurate in aggregate and claim that proximity matters enormously even 
within regions.  
By looking closely at the regional blocs, Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) 
found that Factory North America is responsible for the most intensive supply-chain trade 
relationships, as it is mainly a simple hub-spoke structure and the I2P138 is mostly bilateral. In 
contrast, Factory Asia is not taken as a hub-and-spoke but as a network pattern, in which 
processing commonly occurs in multiple nations, generating the so-called “triangle trade”. 
Overall, the US, Germany, and China act as hubs in their respective regions, and even though 
Japan shows a more regionalized supply-trade compared with the US, Germany, and China, it 
is not considered a hub in Factory Asia. When looking at the changes between 1995 and 2009, 
the authors found that supply-chain trade has changed heavily towards Factory Asia and away 
from Factory North America and Europe, with China increasing its role both as seller and 
buyer139.  
Baldwin and Forslid (2014) draw some facts concerning the development of 
Factory Asia. Regardless of whether it is measured in gross or value-added terms, the first 
noteworthy fact is the rapid (and uneven) growth of exports from the emerging East Asian 
countries. Second, most economies in Factory Asia saw their value-added export growth being 
driven by manufactured exports, while only three countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan) 
had services exports and other three countries (Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, and Cambodia) 
had natural resource based export playing an important role in VA export growth. Overall, they 
show that Factory Asia has been deepening its participation in international supply chains, in a 
process that includes new nations such as Vietnam, and changing what was once a simple 
triangle trade (especially between low-wage nations) to a much more complex interconnection 
between Asian economies, where the “factory economies” became both makers and buyers of 
                                                        
138  The authors consider three basic supply-chain trade concepts: i) importing to produce (I2P), which 
encompasses all imported intermediate inputs used in the production of domestic goods; ii) importing to export 
(I2E), which considers the intermediates related to exporting; and iii) value-added trade, which is factor-content 
trade, i.e. the origin of all primary factor inputs in exports is identified as in Koopman et al. (2014), and Johnson 
and Noguera (2012), and differently from the previous concepts, it shows where the value was added along a 
supply-chain.  
139 In another study, Baldwin (2012) analyze the contrasting performance of intra-regional trade within Factory 
Asia and the almost complete absence of formal economic cooperation in the region. The author uses sequencing 
theory to draw the historical narrative of Europe’s and Asia’s sequencing, and extract some lessons from the 
integration sequences.   
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intermediate inputs. Walmsley et al. (2014) illustrated that almost 75 percent of intra-regional 
trade within Asia is composed by intermediate goods, while intermediates constitute almost 
half of Asian exports to outside Asia. This picture is in accordance with the general 
characterization of Factory Asia by Baldwin and Forslid (2014).  
More recently, Ito and Vézina (2016) investigated the geographic extension of the 
value-added fragmentation of Factory Asia by decomposing the value-added content of its 
exports and also dissecting all of its final production, even if the final product is not exported. 
Their results show that the share of foreign value added embedded in Factory Asia’s final 
production rose between 1990 and 2005, and that China’s production of final goods is 
composed by a smaller share of foreign value added than any other Factory Asia country. 
Apparently, China turned to be one of the main sources of value added to other countries’ 
production among Factory Asia countries. They also found that country-industries at the 
upstream and downstream extremities of the value chain actually embed larger shares of value 
added compared to intermediate stages, confirming the smile curve format at multi-sector 
international level. Even without using IIO tables, Zebregs’ (2004) study on the key factors 
behind the rapid growth in intraregional trade is worth mentioning. That is because it found that 
intraregional trade in emerging Asia is mostly the outcome of the ongoing geographical 
dispersion of production processes, in which higher-wage countries are specializing in the 
production of components and low-wage countries become responsible for most of the 
assembly operations. This has risen trade in intermediate goods among emerging Asian 
countries, even though the EU, Japan, and the United States remain as the main export markets 
for final goods. 
Another important lesson extracted from Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) is 
that there are important differences in the global patterns of intermediate industrial goods, raw 
materials, and services. More specifically, there is a greater regionalization of intermediate 
industrial goods’ trade compared to the pattern of intermediate services, which is still more 
regionalized than the global pattern for raw materials. This adds important insights to thinking 
about the specialization pattern of Factory South America.  
Different from our study, Cadestin et al. (2016) analyzed the extent of GVC 
participation of a set of selected Latin American countries, including Mexico and Costa Rica. 
As they aimed to investigate how the GVC integration of the region is affected by some trade 
policy-related measures, the first step was to characterize GVC participation in Latin America 
and compare it with other regions. The authors showed that the nature and degree of GVC 
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participation across the region are quite heterogeneous. That is because the study included the 
two countries that are more specialized in processing and exporting inputs as well as more 
integrated with North American supply chains in their analysis, i.e. Mexico and Costa Rica, 
while the rest of the pool of countries is more specialized in upstream mining and agricultural 
inputs that are mainly exported to Asian markets. The results are in agreement with those of 
other studies that find lower shares of intra-regional GVC participation compared to extra-
regional links and particularly weak intra-regional links when compared to the rest of the 
developing world (BLYDE, 2014). These studies argued that Latin American countries strongly 
rely on natural resource-based inputs to integrate into GVCs, becoming considerable vulnerable 
to external shocks. Overall, Latin American countries seem to be below their potential for GVC 
integration, although it is important to note that measures of GVC participation and 
comparisons with other regions are not enough to conclude whether a country with higher 
participation index is doing better or worse in GVCs.  
 
3.3. Evidence on regional-blocs intra and inter-linkages: “Factory South America”? 
In this section, we present some of the most striking features regarding intra and 
inter-linkages in value-added trade of regional blocs. To characterize the pattern of participation 
of Factory South America in global and regional value chains and compared it with other 
regional blocs, the section draws on the OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database for the 
period 1995-2011, which is the full span of the TiVA database.  
 
3.3.1. Participation in GVCs through backward and forward linkages 
Figure 3.1 shows the overall participation in GVCs through backward and forward 
linkages across regional blocs in 1995 and 2011. Compared to other regional blocs, Factory 
South America is the least integrated to global value chains. In particular, Chile is the country 
with the strongest GVC links in 1995 and 2011 (33.9% and 52.1%), and is followed by Peru 
(48.7% in 2011), Colombia (38.6%), Brazil (35.6%), and Argentina (30.8%). However, Factory 
South America is also the regional bloc that has increased the most its total participation in 
GVCs considering both intra and interregional trade over the analyzed period. While region 
specialization in Factory Europe and Factory Asia is mainly in backward linkages, Factory 
South America acts as a supplier of inputs, especially primary products, to other countries 
exports. Despite the region continues to lag behind in GVC participation, its forward linkages 
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(i.e. the share of domestic value-added embodied in foreign exports) has increased more than 
any other region, and more than its backward linkages. 
Therefore, when we assess the backward and forward linkages of each South 
American country separately (Figure 3.2), there is a great homogeneity across the region. All 
countries had higher forward linkages compared to backward linkages in 1995 and 2011. In 
contrast to the other countries in the region, Argentina presented a higher rate of growth of 
backward than forward linkages, revealing changes in its specialization pattern towards 
downstream activities of GVCs. Chile and Argentina are the countries with the highest GVC 
participation through backward linkages (20.2% and 14.1%, respectively), while Peru and Chile 
showed the highest forward participation ratios (36.9% and 31.9%, respectively) in 2011.  
 
Figure 3.1 - Participation in global value chains through backward and forward linkages, 
regional blocs (in average), 1995 and 2011 (percentage of total gross exports) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
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Figure 3.2 - Backward and forward linkages of Factory South America’s countries, 1995 and 
2011 (percentage of total gross exports) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
3.3.2. Decomposition of value-added export growth by broad sector 
Figure 3.3 depicts the decomposition of value-added export growth from 1995 to 
2011 by broad sector - focusing on primary, manufactured, and service exports. The up-left 
panel shows a wide diversity among the countries of Factory Asia, although manufactured 
exports remain as the main source of the growth for most of them. Broadly speaking, some 
emerging markets expanded their export growth mostly relying on the booming demand for 
commodities, while others accomplished it via manufactured goods (BALDWIN; FORSLID, 
2014). Primary exports account for a large share of the value-added export growth of ASEAN 
countries, with the exception of Singapore, while the Eastern Asian countries - Japan, Korea, 
China, Hong Kong (China), and Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) - have seen their services exports 
playing an important role together with those of manufactured in VA export growth. Compared 
to other regional blocs, Factory South America is the one with the lowest diversity of sources 
of growth. Not only the importance of primary exports is visible, but also with that of 
manufactured, these exports account for about three quarters or more of the growth.  
On average, Factory South America is the regional bloc where services exports are 
less significant to explain VA exports growth. The opposite is true for Factory Europe countries, 
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where services exports account for almost or even all of the growth, as is the case in smaller 
economies such as Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Malta. In the case of Factory North America, the 
contribution of services and manufacturing exports was very similar in the case of the United 
States (almost half and half), while primary and manufacturing together account for more than 
two thirds of the VA exports growth of Mexico and Canada. 
 
Figure 3.3 - Decomposition of value-added export growth by broad sector, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016).  
 
Beyond portray different patterns of specialization across the four regional-blocs, 
Figure 3.3 illustrates a reflection of very different production structures and technological 
capacities. In that sense, as technology and production structures interact, the countries of 
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Factory South America become more vulnerable to falling into a “low-growth trap”. This means 
that the heterogeneity of production structures and building capacities creates imbalances in 
international trade and as deficit countries, particularly of less diversified structures adverse to 
innovation as is the case of South American countries, respond with fiscal austerity and 
lowering real wages, not only aggregate demand collapses but also employment rates, resulting 
in greater inequality, which reinforces the recessionary bias in a vicious circle (ECLAC, 2016). 
 
3.3.3. Regional and global dimensions of backward and forward linkages 
The regional and global dimensions of GVC participation through backward and 
forward linkages are evident when the origin and destination of value-added trade is considered 
(Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4).  
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 presents the GVC participation through backward linkages 
across different countries or regions. Each entry represents the origin of VA embodied in 
column nation’s gross exports – for instance, where row country Brazil meets column (partner) 
country Argentina the 0.9% indicates the share of value-added that Argentina uses from Brazil 
to produce a unit of gross exports and 5.7% is the total foreign value-added embodied in 
Argentina’s gross exports, while 94.3% accounts for its domestic value-added (Table 3.1).  
Overall, South American countries show generally weaker backward linkages 
within the region, mainly from Argentina and Brazil, than with other regional blocs. Most of 
the foreign value-added used by Factory South America countries to produce a gross exports 
unit comes from Factory North America, more specifically the United States, and from Factory 
Europe. In some cases, such as in Argentina and Brazil, the United States represents more than 
85% of the value added from Factory North America. But this picture has changed. Brazil's 
intraregional links as a source of value-added within the region has increased considerably 
during the period analyzed. For example, Brazil provided 0.9% and 0.7% of value-added to 
Argentina and Chile’s exports in 1995, respectively, and these shares have risen to 3.4% and 
2.4% in 2011. In fact, the whole group of South American countries has increased their presence 
as sources of foreign VA within the region, apart Argentina. 
Considering the role of Factory Asia as a supplier of inputs for export processing 
across the South American region, the backward links with the Eastern Asian countries are 
higher compared to ASEAN countries (see the empty quadrant between ASEAN and South 
American countries). Among the Asian countries, Japan is no longer the main supplier of value-
added to Factory South America, a role now occupied by China. As addressed by Cadestin et 
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al. (2016), the rise of China as an input provider is a major development at the global level over 
1995 and 2011, and as we have seen also at the regional level. But the countries of South 
America, on average, still use larger shares of value added from Brazil than from China to 
produce a unit of gross exports. Although all selected South American countries had greater 
backward linkages with Brazil compared to China in 1995, Peru and Colombia started to use 
more Chinese value-added in their exports than from Brazil. 
Considering the role of Factory South America as a supplier of inputs for export 
processing across Factory Asian countries, it is evident that both regions have become more 
interconnected. The role played by Factory South America as a source of foreign value-added 
to Asian gross exports is more relevant than the contrary, which partially reflects the 
composition of production and trade of both regions and their GVC positions.  Furthermore, 
Factory Asia has also showed strong GVC links through backward participation within the 
region. As can be seen by the red highlight140 marked in table 3.1 and 3.2, while Japan was the 
main hub of backward participation for Factory Asia as a whole in 1995, China has become the 
country with the highest GVC participation through backward linkages within Factory Asia’s 
countries in 2011. Thereby, the greater inter-regional linkages with South America were 
followed by stronger intra-regional bloc value-added linkages in Asia with China as hub. 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the GVC participation through forward linkages with 
regional and global partners. Each entry represents the destination of VA embodied in row 
nation’s gross exports – for instance, where row country Brazil meets column (partner) country 
China the 4.8% indicates the share of Brazilian value-added embodied in Brazil’s gross exports 
that is used by China for China’s own exports, and 24.9% for row country Brazil indicates the 
share of Brazilian value added that is used by all its trading partners for their exports, i.e. the 
overall forward linkage, while the 75.1% is Brazil’s value added that is directly exported  (Table 
3.4). Following Cadestin et al. (2016), we also find signs of the continuing expansion of GVC 
trade, as the shares of exports for further processing and export have increased and the share of 
direct exports141 are falling worldwide. Among the regional blocs, this decline was even greater 
within the countries of Factory South America, illustrating the expansion of GVC trade in the 
region. 
The forward linkages within South American countries are weaker than with other 
regional-blocs, of which Factories Europe and North America used to be the main partners 
                                                        
140 Backward linkages ratios larger than 5% are marked by red highlight.  
141 I.e. exported products that are consumed or processed for consumption in the first country that is importing 
them.  
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though Factory Asian countries, mainly China, have taken an increasingly important place. But 
the shares of exporting intermediate goods from Factory South America that are used as inputs 
by South American countries to produce their own exports – intra-regional forward linkages - 
are increasing between 1995 to 2011, on average. By looking by the lenses of forward linkages, 
the only exception is Argentina. This loss of forward and backward linkages of Argentina with 
other countries of its own region-bloc acted as a sign to investigate more deeply the relationship 
between South American and Asian countries and its changes over time. At the same time that 
Argentina became more distant from its South American partners, the country has strengthened 
its forward linkages with the Asian economies, and relatively more than with other regional 
blocs, such as Factory North America and Factory Europe.  
Actually, this re-orientation towards Asia is comparable to all Factory South 
America. Whether we investigate Factory South America as a whole, we find that the regional-
bloc is becoming more engaged in GVCs as suppliers of value-added to Asian countries’ 
exports than for countries within its own region or from the European Union. All South 
American countries showed higher increases in their forward links with Factory Asia as a whole 
(not only China but also East and Southeast Asia), whether compared to the growth with Factory 
Europe and Factory North America, respectively, although Factory Europe remains as an 
important hub of forward participation for the region. For instance, the shares of domestic 
value-added embodied in Peru and Chile's gross exports that is used by China as inputs for 
China's exports is 6.6% and 9.3%, respectively, in 2011 (Table 3.4), while it was 1.0% and 
1.3% in 1995 (Table 3.3).  
Even if compared to the countries within Factory Asia, the growth of the shares of 
South American countries value-added embodied in South American gross exports that are used 
by Asian countries’ exports is higher, on average. Despite this trend, it is not possible to 
overlook the magnitude of the forward linkages between Asian countries and China, as 
highlighted by the red marking in China’s column. Therefore, the Chinese role in shaping the 
GVC participation through forward linkages of not only Asian but also South American 
countries has become more pronounced over time. This means that China has been acting as a 
“headquarter” economy, whereas its influence overcomes regional boundaries (BALDWIN; 
LOPEZ-GONZALEZ, 2013). Korea and Japan have also increased their capacity to coordinate 
regional production of the Asian region – especially of the ASEAN countries – and the South 
American economies. Finally, although it cannot be said that Factory South America is 
becoming less integrated in GVCs through backward and forward linkages within the region, 
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the regional-bloc has become more and more oriented towards Asian countries, especially from 
a supplier perspective (i.e. forward GVC participation). In that sense, the rise of inter-regional 
linkages with Factory Asia, especially China but also with other Asian countries, is an important 
sign of the changing interconnections between regional blocs. 
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Table 3.1 - Backward linkages across countries or regions, 1995 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016). Note: red-marked entries indicate backward linkages higher than 5.0%; and null linkages are 
shown in blank.  
PER CHL COL ARG BRA IDN PHL VNM BRN THA MYS KHM SGP TWN HKG KOR CHN JPN USA DEU
PER 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
CHL 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,1
COL 1,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0
ARG 0,6 1,6 0,1 0,0 0,5 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
BRA 0,5 0,7 0,3 0,9 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1
IDN 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,5 0,2 0,4 0,7 0,4 1,2 0,7 0,2 0,7 0,6 0,2 0,1 0,1
PHL 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0
VNM 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
BRN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
THA 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,5 1,0 0,2 0,0 0,8 1,7 1,1 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,4 0,1 0,1 0,1
MYS 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,6 1,0 0,8 0,0 0,5 2,7 0,6 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,1 0,2 0,1
KHM 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
SGP 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,5 0,9 1,3 0,8 0,9 1,7 0,4 0,0 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,4 0,1 0,2 0,1
TWN 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,5 1,5 2,4 0,2 1,0 1,3 1,2 1,2 0,0 1,4 0,5 2,9 0,2 0,4 0,2
HKG 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,5 0,3 0,1 0,3 0,6 0,5 0,8 0,5 0,0 0,2 1,5 0,1 0,1 0,1
KOR 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,8 1,9 3,2 0,3 1,0 1,3 1,2 1,8 1,5 1,5 0,0 2,7 0,3 0,5 0,2
CHN 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,3 0,4 0,8 0,2 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,7 3,8 0,8 0,0 0,2 0,3 0,1
JPN 0,5 0,8 0,5 0,3 0,4 2,4 8,8 4,6 1,1 6,3 7,5 1,8 9,5 10,0 4,2 5,7 7,4 0,0 2,7 1,0
Factory North 
America
3,0 3,8 3,3 1,5 2,0 1,6 6,1 1,2 0,7 3,4 4,3 1,0 8,3 5,7 3,2 4,5 4,3 1,5 2,1 1,5
USA 2,5 3,0 2,8 1,3 1,7 1,3 5,7 1,1 0,6 3,0 3,7 0,8 7,8 5,1 2,6 4,0 3,7 1,3 0,0 1,3
Factory Europe 1,8 3,5 1,9 1,7 2,2 2,6 4,1 2,8 1,6 4,5 6,1 1,9 6,7 4,7 3,4 3,4 5,3 1,2 2,7 8,7
DEU 0,5 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,7 0,8 1,2 0,7 0,4 1,3 1,6 0,3 1,5 1,6 0,7 1,0 1,6 0,3 0,8 0,0
Domestic 90,2 85,9 91,5 94,3 92,2 88,0 70,2 78,4 92,7 75,8 69,6 87,3 57,9 69,4 78,4 77,7 69,0 94,4 88,6 85,2
Foreign 9,8 14,1 8,5 5,7 7,8 12,0 29,8 21,6 7,3 24,2 30,4 12,7 42,1 30,7 21,6 22,3 31,0 5,6 11,4 14,8
Partner country
From
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Table 3.2 - Backward linkages across countries or regions, 2011 
 
 Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016). Note: red-marked entries indicate backward linkages higher than 5.0%; and null linkages 
are shown in blank. 
PER CHL COL ARG BRA IDN PHL VNM BRN THA MYS KHM SGP TWN HKG KOR CHN JPN USA DEU
PER 0,0 1,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1
CHL 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,4 0,1 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,1 0,1
COL 0,5 1,8 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,3 0,1
ARG 0,4 1,2 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1
BRA 0,9 2,4 0,4 3,4 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,5 0,0 0,5 0,5 0,2 0,6 0,5 0,2 0,6 0,7 0,2 0,3 0,4
IDN 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 1,1 1,2 0,1 1,4 2,4 0,6 1,7 1,5 0,4 1,5 0,7 0,7 0,1 0,1
PHL 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,1
VNM 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,6 1,9 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,0
BRN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0
THA 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,4 0,6 1,5 0,1 0,0 1,4 1,8 0,7 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,5 0,2 0,1 0,1
MYS 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,6 0,6 1,2 0,5 1,4 0,0 1,0 1,3 1,0 0,2 0,6 0,8 0,4 0,1 0,1
KHM 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
SGP 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,5 0,9 0,8 0,5 1,1 2,5 0,7 0,0 0,8 0,9 0,5 0,6 0,2 0,1 0,2
TWN 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,9 1,6 0,1 1,0 1,5 3,6 1,0 0,0 0,7 0,8 1,9 0,3 0,2 0,2
HKG 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,3 0,4 1,0 0,7 0,4 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,1 0,1 0,1
KOR 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,6 1,2 2,9 0,1 1,3 1,4 2,0 1,2 2,0 0,7 0,0 2,7 0,6 0,4 0,3
CHN 1,0 1,3 0,7 0,8 0,8 1,3 2,4 6,3 0,4 4,0 4,5 12,0 3,1 4,9 5,3 4,7 0,0 2,2 1,6 1,3
JPN 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 1,0 2,5 3,7 0,4 6,0 4,8 1,5 3,0 7,3 1,8 5,0 4,7 0,0 1,0 0,8
Factory North 
America
3,2 4,4 2,7 2,4 2,2 0,9 2,6 2,5 0,8 3,2 4,8 2,3 5,8 4,6 2,8 4,5 3,7 1,9 3,5 2,5
USA 2,4 3,5 1,9 1,9 1,9 0,7 2,4 2,1 0,7 2,7 4,2 2,0 5,1 3,8 2,3 3,6 3,0 1,6 0,0 2,1
Factory Europe 1,2 3,1 1,3 2,3 2,2 1,1 1,8 3,8 0,7 4,6 5,5 2,9 8,0 4,3 3,3 4,6 5,5 1,9 3,0 12,4
DEU 0,3 0,6 0,3 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,5 0,9 0,1 1,2 1,6 0,5 1,4 1,3 0,7 1,5 1,8 0,5 0,8 0,0
Domestic 88,2 79,8 92,4 85,9 89,3 88,0 76,5 63,7 95,7 61,1 59,4 63,2 58,3 56,5 79,6 58,4 67,9 85,3 85,0 74,4
Foreign 11,8 20,2 7,7 14,1 10,7 12,0 23,5 36,3 4,3 39,0 40,6 36,8 41,7 43,5 20,4 41,6 32,1 14,7 15,0 25,6
Partner country
From
159 
 
159 
 
Table 3.3 - Forward linkages across countries or regions, 1995 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016). Note: red-marked entries indicate backward linkages higher than 5.0%; and null linkages 
are shown in blank. 
 
 
PER CHL COL ARG BRA IDN PHL VNM BRN THA MYS KHM SGP TWN HKG KOR CHN JPN
Factory 
North 
America
USA
Factory 
Europe
DEU
Total 
forward 
linkages
Direct 
exports
PER 0,0 0,5 0,1 0,1 0,6 0,1 0,6 0,1 0,0 0,1 1,2 0,0 0,2 1,2 0,1 0,7 1,2 1,0 3,0 2,1 8,2 0,9 22,6 77,4
CHL 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,7 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,0 0,4 2,0 0,1 1,5 1,1 1,3 2,5 1,7 7,0 1,5 19,8 80,2
COL 0,6 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,2 4,3 3,3 5,1 1,0 15,3 84,7
ARG 0,2 1,3 0,1 0,0 1,2 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,4 0,3 1,2 0,9 3,8 0,5 12,4 87,6
BRA 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,4 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,4 0,1 0,5 0,5 0,6 2,7 1,8 5,9 1,0 15,3 84,7
IDN 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,4 0,8 0,0 1,8 1,4 0,2 1,8 1,4 1,9 1,7 1,3 3,2 0,6 16,4 83,6
PHL 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,4 0,0 1,2 1,0 0,4 0,8 0,5 0,9 3,1 2,6 3,1 0,7 12,8 87,3
VNM 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,6 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,7 0,1 1,9 0,7 0,2 0,7 0,9 1,4 0,6 0,4 2,3 0,5 12,6 87,4
BRN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0 3,0 0,7 0,0 3,4 1,1 0,5 4,5 0,6 4,3 0,7 0,5 1,0 0,3 20,9 79,1
THA 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,0 1,4 0,7 0,3 0,4 0,8 0,8 2,0 1,5 3,2 0,7 12,0 88,0
MYS 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,8 0,0 0,0 3,4 1,1 0,2 0,8 0,9 0,9 2,5 2,0 3,4 0,6 15,5 84,5
KHM 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,3 0,0 9,2 2,2 0,0 0,5 0,7 0,3 0,2 0,8 0,3 0,5 0,4 1,5 0,3 17,9 82,1
SGP 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,7 1,3 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,3 0,5 0,7 0,6 2,5 2,1 3,1 0,5 12,3 87,7
TWN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,6 0,7 0,0 0,9 0,0 0,6 0,6 3,4 0,8 3,3 2,6 2,8 0,6 15,5 84,5
HKG 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,8 0,0 1,3 1,1 0,0 0,5 4,0 0,6 1,5 1,1 2,9 0,5 15,4 84,6
KOR 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,6 0,0 1,1 1,2 0,5 0,0 2,6 1,0 3,5 2,6 3,2 0,7 16,8 83,2
CHN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,4 0,6 1,4 0,8 0,0 0,8 1,8 1,4 2,4 0,5 9,9 90,1
JPN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,5 0,1 0,0 0,9 1,0 0,0 1,7 2,6 0,5 1,8 2,2 0,0 5,6 4,4 4,9 1,1 23,6 76,4
USA 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,9 0,8 0,2 0,8 0,7 0,8 5,8 0,0 6,3 0,9 19,3 80,7
DEU 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,1 0,3 0,4 0,3 1,6 1,1 14,2 0,0 20,9 79,1
Partner country
From
160 
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Table 3.4 - Forward linkages across countries or regions, 2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016). Note: red-marked entries indicate backward linkages higher than 5.0%; and null linkages are 
shown in blank. 
 
 
PER CHL COL ARG BRA IDN PHL VNM BRN THA MYS KHM SGP TWN HKG KOR CHN JPN
Factory 
North 
America
USA
Factory 
Europe
DEU
Total 
forward 
linkages
Direct 
exports
PER 0,0 2,4 0,2 0,1 0,7 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,0 0,6 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,7 0,1 3,6 6,6 1,3 8,4 2,9 9,2 1,7 36,9 63,1
CHL 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,4 0,9 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,5 0,4 0,0 0,3 1,5 0,1 2,8 9,3 1,5 4,2 2,1 6,7 1,5 31,9 68,1
COL 0,4 2,7 0,0 0,2 0,5 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,3 0,0 0,4 0,4 0,0 0,7 2,6 0,3 9,6 8,0 8,9 1,7 31,0 69,0
ARG 0,2 1,2 0,1 0,0 1,1 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,5 0,0 0,5 0,2 0,0 0,6 2,0 0,2 2,9 1,0 4,1 0,9 16,8 83,2
BRA 0,1 0,8 0,1 1,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,5 0,0 0,6 0,6 0,1 1,2 4,8 0,7 3,2 2,0 6,9 1,8 24,9 75,1
IDN 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,4 0,5 0,0 1,5 2,8 0,0 2,1 2,2 0,2 4,3 5,8 2,6 1,6 1,0 3,5 0,7 31,6 68,4
PHL 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,0 1,4 1,4 0,0 1,4 1,8 0,2 2,1 8,9 1,5 2,1 1,1 3,7 1,1 27,5 72,5
VNM 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,8 1,6 0,1 0,5 0,5 0,1 1,6 3,4 1,0 1,2 0,8 2,6 0,6 16,0 84,0
BRN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 3,7 0,1 1,9 0,0 1,2 0,9 0,0 0,7 0,9 0,1 8,7 4,1 6,6 0,9 0,5 1,8 0,4 42,7 57,3
THA 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,2 0,6 0,0 0,0 1,4 0,1 0,7 0,6 0,1 0,8 4,2 0,8 1,2 0,7 2,3 0,6 15,5 84,6
MYS 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,5 0,2 0,5 0,0 1,3 0,0 0,0 1,4 1,2 0,1 1,5 5,9 1,2 1,3 0,7 2,4 0,6 19,9 80,1
KHM 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 1,4 0,0 1,2 0,6 0,0 0,7 0,2 0,0 0,4 2,0 0,3 1,3 0,8 2,4 0,4 12,0 88,1
SGP 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,0 1,0 2,4 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,4 1,2 4,2 0,6 1,3 0,9 4,3 0,9 20,0 80,1
TWN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,0 0,7 1,2 0,1 0,8 0,0 0,3 1,6 11,3 0,9 2,2 1,3 2,9 0,6 24,1 75,9
HKG 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,7 0,9 0,1 1,6 1,1 0,0 1,2 7,9 0,6 1,6 1,0 4,5 1,0 23,2 76,8
KOR 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,5 0,0 0,5 0,6 0,0 0,5 1,1 0,1 0,0 8,4 0,9 2,2 1,2 3,0 0,8 20,5 79,5
CHN 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,0 0,5 0,6 0,0 0,4 0,8 0,3 1,5 0,0 1,0 2,7 1,6 4,4 1,0 15,7 84,3
JPN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,2 0,4 0,0 1,7 1,4 0,0 0,9 2,7 0,3 3,5 10,4 0,0 3,8 2,2 4,4 1,3 32,8 67,2
USA 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,4 0,6 0,0 0,7 0,7 0,2 1,2 3,1 0,7 4,7 0,0 8,7 1,6 25,2 74,8
DEU 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,6 2,5 0,3 1,8 1,1 14,0 0,0 24,4 75,7
Partner country
From
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3.3.4. Hubness measure from the perspective of value-added trade 
Baldwin (2004) developed a hubness measure to illustrate the degree of relative 
market interdependence between countries from the perspective of international trade, as 
follows: 
𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐵 =  𝐸𝑋𝐴𝐵
∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑀𝐴𝐵
∗ ) 
Where 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐵 is the hubness of nation B from A’s point of view, 𝐸𝑋𝐴𝐵
∗  is the exports from A to 
B as a share of A’s total exports, and 𝐼𝑀𝐴𝐵
∗  is B’s imports from A as a share of its total imports. 
Ranging from 0 to 1, the closer this proxy is to 1, the deeper the dependence of A’s exports on 
B’s market. This measure was used by Chen and De Lombaerde (2014) to compare the hubness 
between the BRICs and their neighbor countries.  
With that in mind, we developed a new version of this proxy to illustrate the degree 
of relative market interdependence between countries within and across Factory Asia, Factory 
Europe, Factory North America, and Factory South America from the perspective of value-
added trade.  
𝐻𝑀_𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐵 =  𝐹𝐹𝐷_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑆𝐻𝐴𝐵,𝑖(1 − 𝐷𝐹𝐷_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑆𝐻𝐵𝐴,𝑖) 
Where 𝐻𝑀_𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐵 is the hubness of nation B from A’s point of view in value-added terms, 
𝐹𝐹𝐷_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑆𝐻𝐴𝐵,𝑖 shows domestic value added generated by industry i in country A embodied 
in final demand of country B as a percentage of total domestic value added from industry i in 
total foreign final demand, i.e. 𝐹𝐹𝐷_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐵,𝑖 𝐹𝐹𝐷_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑖⁄ , and gives a value-added 
perspective of domestic industries’ relative connectedness with other countries and regions, 
independently of whether domestic (upstream) industries are (or not) direct exporters. In 
particular, 𝐹𝐹𝐷_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐵,𝑖 captures the domestic value added of country A embodied in foreign 
(country B) final demand both directly, through exports of final goods or services, and indirectly 
via exports of intermediates that encompass foreign final consumers through other countries, 
and, putting it simply, can be interpreted as “exports of value added”. Compared to B's imports 
from A as a share of its total imports in gross terms, its value-added equivalent, 
𝐷𝐹𝐷_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑆𝐻𝐵𝐴,𝑖, shows foreign value added generated by industry i in country A embodied 
in domestic final demand of country B as a percentage of total foreign value added from industry 
i in B’s domestic final demand, i.e. 𝐷𝐹𝐷_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐵,𝑖 𝐷𝐹𝐷_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑖⁄  , indicating a domestic 
economy’s relative connectedness to production in other countries and regions, whether or not 
there are direct imports  from foreign (upstream) industries. In particular, 𝐷𝐹𝐷_𝐹𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐵,𝑖 can be 
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interpreted as “imports of value-added”, as it shows how industries abroad (upstream in a value-
chain) are connected to consumers at home, even when no direct trade relationship exists.  
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present a matrix with hubness measures between countries based 
on the value-added trade flows of total industries in 1995 and 2011, respectively. We combined 
all economies within Factory South America and with Factory Asia, as well as Factory North 
America’s countries and the main hub-nation of Factory Europe, Germany. 
One of the most striking developments is the emergence of China as a hub-nation. 
In 1995, the Chinese market influence was mostly limited to a single neighbor country, Hong 
Kong (Table 3.5). Over time, China was able to expand its influence across all Factory Asia 
countries, dominating a space that was occupied regionally by Japan and globally by the United 
States during the 1990s.  
Similar to Chen and De Lombaerde (2014)’s results based on gross trade values, 
our findings show that the United States has decreased its influence in the Asian region, in a 
process that has contributed to the two-hub formation of regionalism especially in the Eastern 
Asia. Except for Japan, China has overtaken the United States as their most important trade 
partner. Looking at the regional production sharing network of Factory Asia, Table 3.6 
corroborates Baldwin (2004)'s "bicycle" system of hub-and-spoke arrangements composed by 
a "Chinese wheel" and a "Japanese wheel". However, it looks like the Japanese tire is depleting, 
given the weaker Japanese influence than the trade connections with the Chinese-hub. 
Considering the economic ties between the two hub nations, Japan is no longer a hub-nation 
from China’s perspective, though China became a hub from Japan’s perspective.   
As in Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015), we also found that the supply-chain 
trade relationships across countries of Factory North America are mainly in the form of a hub-
to-spoke structure. The United States acts as the main hub-nation, though its influence has 
slightly diminished over time. Another interesting finding is that China's influence has overflow 
beyond the Asian region, and together with the United States, it has been acting as an important 
hub-nation for Factory South America as a whole.  
In comparison, the hub index is calculated for each pair of South American 
countries. As expected, we find that the intra-regional economic interdependence in Factory 
South America is weaker than in Factory Asia. Brazil is the country with the greatest influence 
within the region, acting as hub for Argentina, i.e. deepening dependence of Argentina’s exports 
on the Brazilian domestic market. In fact, considering the connection between South American 
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and Asian economies, Brazil has shown the highest degrees of relative market interdependence. 
Meanwhile, Argentina has lost influence and Chile gained with Korea and China as partners.  
Overall, most countries worldwide have increased its interdependence on Brazil’s 
domestic final demand. Comparing Brazil’s column with its row, our results indicate that the 
country has greater relative influence in GVCs from the importance of its domestic market than 
from its exports. Tying the hubness findings to our characterization of the pattern of 
participation of Factory South America in global and regional value chains, it seems likely that 
Brazil has become more integrated from the externalization of its final demand and not simply 
through its production that is further exported. Therefore, if we consider this measure of relative 
interdependence between markets, one may say that Brazil's trade integration is greater than is 
usually portrayed by GVC indicators. However, such integration occurs through its domestic 
market and not through its domestic production. 
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Table 3.5 - Hubness index in value-added trade flows between countries, 1995 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016). Note: Red-marked entries indicate 𝐻𝑀_𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐵> 0,1; and values lower than 0,005 are blank.   
 
 
PER CHL COL ARG BRA IDN PHL VNM BRN THA MYS KHM SGP TWN HKG KOR CHN JPN USA CAN MEX DEU
PER 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,08 0,19 0,01 0,01 0,04
CHL 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,05 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,04 0,00 0,05 0,02 0,18 0,15 0,01 0,01 0,06
COL 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,32 0,02 0,01 0,09
ARG 0,01 0,05 0,01 0,00 0,18 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,04 0,13 0,01 0,01 0,05
BRA 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,05 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,07 0,19 0,02 0,01 0,06
IDN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,01 0,06 0,02 0,27 0,16 0,01 0,00 0,05
PHL 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,02 0,04 0,02 0,17 0,33 0,03 0,01 0,06
VNM 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,04 0,04 0,30 0,06 0,01 0,00 0,06
BRN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,11 0,01 0,50 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,02
THA 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,18 0,21 0,02 0,01 0,06
MYS 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,03 0,02 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,18 0,02 0,01 0,05
KHM 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,35 0,05 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,09 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,03
SGP 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,04 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,12 0,21 0,02 0,01 0,05
TWN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,06 0,15 0,27 0,02 0,01 0,05
HKG 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,07 0,00 0,03 0,12 0,13 0,17 0,02 0,00 0,04
KOR 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,04 0,17 0,23 0,03 0,01 0,04
CHN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,08 0,04 0,00 0,20 0,23 0,02 0,00 0,05
JPN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,04 0,02 0,05 0,03 0,00 0,25 0,02 0,01 0,06
USA 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,01 0,11 0,00 0,05 0,02 0,06
CAN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,07 0,55 0,00 0,01 0,03
MEX 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,64 0,04 0,00 0,02
DEU 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,04 0,10 0,01 0,01 0,00
Partner country
From
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Table 3.6 - Hubness index in value-added trade flows between countries, 2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD-WTO TiVA database (December 2016). Note: Red-marked entries indicate 𝐻𝑀_𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐵> 0,1; and values lower than 0,005 are blank.   
The indices in bold indicate values higher than 0.1 in 1995 and which fell in 2011.
PER CHL COL ARG BRA IDN PHL VNM BRN THA MYS KHM SGP TWN HKG KOR CHN JPN USA CAN MEX DEU
PER 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,01 0,04 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,17 0,08 0,19 0,06 0,02 0,03
CHL 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,06 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,15 0,10 0,14 0,02 0,02 0,03
COL 0,02 0,03 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,05 0,03 0,37 0,03 0,02 0,04
ARG 0,01 0,04 0,02 0,00 0,16 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,06 0,02 0,09 0,02 0,01 0,03
BRA 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,05 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,13 0,05 0,15 0,02 0,02 0,04
IDN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,05 0,13 0,15 0,11 0,01 0,01 0,02
PHL 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,05 0,16 0,12 0,17 0,02 0,01 0,03
VNM 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,06 0,12 0,11 0,18 0,02 0,01 0,04
BRN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,08 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,07 0,08 0,35 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01
THA 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,12 0,10 0,11 0,01 0,01 0,02
MYS 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,05 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,16 0,11 0,12 0,01 0,01 0,02
KHM 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,05 0,06 0,28 0,06 0,01 0,05
SGP 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,05 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,10 0,07 0,14 0,01 0,01 0,03
TWN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,24 0,08 0,18 0,02 0,01 0,02
HKG 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,03 0,27 0,06 0,15 0,02 0,00 0,02
KOR 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,18 0,08 0,16 0,02 0,02 0,03
CHN 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,00 0,08 0,19 0,03 0,01 0,04
JPN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,01 0,05 0,16 0,00 0,19 0,02 0,02 0,03
USA 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,06 0,06 0,00 0,07 0,04 0,04
CAN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,05 0,04 0,52 0,00 0,03 0,02
MEX 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,02 0,58 0,06 0,00 0,01
DEU 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,06 0,02 0,10 0,01 0,01 0,00
Partner country
From
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3.4. Partial concluding remarks 
In this chapter we have analyzed the regional dynamics in global production 
sharing, adding evidence on the geography of global value chains and its regionalization. For 
the purposes of this study, we have investigated the different regional patterns in GVCs, 
especially the regional bloc of South America, and its changing structures regarding value-
added exports and relative market dependence.  
Apart from the opportunities for developing countries to participate in global and 
regional systems created by the slicing up of value chains, the degree of trade integration of 
Factory South America is considerable lower compared to the other regional blocs. However, 
we have found that the South American region has diminishing this gap during the late 1990s 
and throughout the 2000s. The degree of participation, of course, varies between sectors and 
between countries. But Factory South America as a whole has been acting mainly as a supplier 
of inputs, especially primary products, to other countries’ exports. Together with poor 
technological capacities, the absence of a diversified production structure has turned the 
regional-bloc more exposed to falling into a “low-growth trap” compared to other regional-
blocs. In summary, we verified the deepening of the pattern of trade integration verified 
historically and traditionally from gross value measures for South American countries.  
GVC trade has taken the place of direct exports, expanding even more considerably 
between South American countries. With respect to the origin and destination of value-added 
trade, most South American countries have been using more and more foreign value-added 
from other South American countries to produce a unit of gross export, i.e. the intra-regional 
trade through backward linkages have grown stronger over time. But compared to the growth 
of inter-regional links, we have found lower levels of intra-regional backward links, except for 
Chile and Argentina that have been using increasingly higher shares of Brazilian value-added 
in their gross exports. Surprisingly, we have found that the inter-regional backward linkages 
between Factories Asia and South America with the former as user of South American value-
added to produce a unit of gross exports has grown stronger than the intra-Factory Asian links. 
One of the most striking feature is the upsurge of China as a source of foreign value-added at 
the global and regional level, becoming the main source of value-added within Factory Asia 
and lagging behind only from the United States in the relationship with Factory South America. 
 Meanwhile, we have also found signs of stronger forward linkages within Factory 
South America, but more importantly the regional-bloc has become more and more oriented 
towards Asian countries. In addition, the Chinese role in shaping the GVC participation through 
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forward linkages of not only Asian but also South American countries has become more 
pronounced over time. Thereby, the stronger inter-regional forward linkages between Factory 
South America and Factory Asian countries were followed by the strengthening of intra-
regional bloc value-added linkages in Asia with China as a main source of inputs. In that sense, 
one of the most striking developments was the increasing Chinese influence on the production 
arrangements within its regional partners and beyond its regional boundaries. The role played 
by China in this changing scenario hides two important movements: the strengthening of intra-
regional trade links among Asian countries, with economic benefits in terms of productivity, 
diversification and sophistication of production; and the rupture of South America intra-
regional interconnections, with the decrease in the densification of its production structure 
without the economic benefits associated with GVCs participation.  
Although we cannot say that there is a tendency of weakening the South American 
back and forward intra-linkages in absolute terms, we have found that the interregional links 
were much stronger, providing insights to a possible change in the regional dynamics of global 
production towards Asia with China as a main hub in the context of vertically fragmented 
production.  
Further, we consider the interconnection through trade linkages across countries 
beyond the traditional indicators of participation in the GVCs. In that sense, we have created a 
proxy of the degree of relative market interdependence from the perspective of value-added 
trade. As we addressed the hierarchical organization of the production network around "hubs", 
we believe that the analysis of global and regional value chains configuration can gain from the 
development of this new hubness measure, given its simplicity compared to applying social 
network analysis. Our findings confirm the rise of China as a hub-nation at the regional and 
global level. In particular, China has deepened its relative market interdependence mainly with 
other Asian economies but also with South American countries. At the same time, the United 
States have lost importance as a hub with both regions.  
A closer look at the South American region shows that the Brazilian economy is 
the only country with potential to become a hub. In fact, when looking at the Brazilian pattern 
of GVC participation and its relative importance in intra-regional trade, we showed that the 
externalization of its domestic demand has played a key role on deepening its integration into 
GVCs and not simply by the forward and backward linkages of its value-added exports. Our 
findings helped to illustrate the complexity behind the political discourse that advocates for 
greater integration into global value chains. Hence, the greater possibilities of gains for 
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countries from regions typically taken as poorly integrated in GVCs may come from the 
creation of regional value chains, which does not appear to be a process that is guided by natural 
forces independent of domestic policies. 
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SECTION III. THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
Chapter 4. The trade-income relationship: the role of Global Value 
Chain participation 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The recent changes in the relationship between external trade and income have 
raised several questions concerning its causes and consequences for the long-term economic 
growth dynamics across countries. The world trade-income elasticity142 increased between the 
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, and then it declined in the 2000s. Hence, several scholars started 
to question whether this change is a result of cyclical or structural factors. This issue has 
received new attention given the recent sluggish performance of world trade. Although some 
authors argue that the signs of a deeper change in the trade-income relationship were already 
posed by the much more pronounced (also sudden and synchronized) drop in world trade than 
the world output collapse in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (BALDWIN, 2009; 
CHEUNG; GUICHARD, 2009; ESCAITH; LINDENBERG; MIROUDOT, 2010a; 
GANGNES; MA; ASSCHE, 2012). 
The historical relationship between growth in imports and global economic activity 
reveals a remarkable anemic phase of trade growth in more recent years (see Figure B1). While 
the reasons for the weakness in global trade growth are still unclear, it is also uncertain what is 
exactly behind the recent changes in the relationship between trade and economic growth. 
Thereby, several explanations concerning the causes of the recent trade slowdown are tied to 
an investigation about the decline in global trade elasticities. The inner feature of this debate is 
usually depicted by the global trade-to-output ratio. In the 1990s, the volume of world 
merchandise trade grew more than three times faster than world output; however, the ratio of 
trade growth to GDP growth has fallen to 1:1 since the financial crisis, and more recently, it 
has dropped below 1 (see Figure B2). Although this ratio is a good indicator of the changing 
economic scenario (i.e. rising economic openness), it is not possible to imply any causality on 
the relationship between trade and income only by taking the apparent trade response (simple 
ratio of growth rates). In order to do so, we have to measure the independent effect of changes 
                                                        
142In a nutshell, the recent literature about the current slowdown in global trade uses the term “trade elasticity” to 
refer to the long-term responsiveness of imports to changes in income or in relative prices. As we are interested in 
the relationship between trade and income, we will use the term “trade elasticity” to refer to the long-term elasticity 
of imports to changes in income. 
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in income on trade after accounting for other explanatory variables, i.e. the estimated income 
elasticity.  
Estimating trade elasticities to changes in income and relative prices is a critical 
issue for several empirical studies in different theoretical approaches. Apart from the potential 
different role of income and prices in the determination of trade, trade elasticity is considered 
crucial for both economic forecasting and policy analysis. For instance, trade elasticity captures 
the extent of the welfare effects of trade liberalization, the impact of real exchange rates changes 
on trade flows143, the fidelity of a country’s consumers to domestic goods and the relative 
resilience of exporters in face of a deterioration in their competitive position (HONG, 1999; 
IMBS; MÉJEAN, 2010; POGANY; DONNELLY, 1998). Beyond the traditional emphasis on 
price elasticity, one of the first econometric studies of international trade to investigate income 
elasticities underline the importance of their estimation especially in the context of a growing 
economy (HOUTHAKKER; MAGEE, 1969). In a considerably different economic context, the 
latest studies have focused on the changing behavior of world trade elasticity to income seeking 
to understand the causes of the current trade slowdown and whether the diminishing trade 
growth constitute a “new normal” for global trade growth patterns.  
This chapter aims to investigate the changes in the trade-income relationship 
between cyclical and structural factors under an import demand function framework, using a 
broad sample of advanced economies (AE) and developing and emerging countries (EME). In 
particular, the focus is on the effects of countries’ participation in global value chains (GVC) 
on the behavior of the long-term trade elasticity. The chapter seeks to answer the following 
questions: are there more structural factors operating in the recent behavior of trade elasticities? 
How has trade elasticity varied over time, and between both groups of AE and EME? How is 
the behavior of trade elasticities associated with countries’ participation in global value chains?  
To address these questions, we estimate a dynamic panel error correction model, 
focusing on two sets of issues. Firstly, we investigate the responsiveness of imports to changes 
in income and whether structural factors have played a leading role in trade elasticities’ 
behavior, using annual data in gross terms from the IMF WEO (2017) over the period 1989-
2014. In this first attempt, we estimate the global trade to income elasticity and, to test whether 
the deeper shift in the trade-income responsiveness in the 2000s is homogeneous between AE 
                                                        
143  Trade elasticity to changes in relative prices is usually used to address countries’ external performance, 
providing some sense of a country’s ability to compete internationally. In this sense, Senhadji and Montenegro 
(1998) argue that the higher the price elasticities of exports, the more competitive country’s exports are in the 
international market.  
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and EME, we run the model separately for these two groups of countries. Secondly, we inquiry 
if the difference found in the first model is associated with countries patterns of GVC 
participation. For that purpose, we advance the import demand function by further accounting 
for the contribution of both backward and forward participation in GVC. 
This disaggregated version of the traditional GVC participation index developed by 
Koopman et al. (2014) is derived from their gross trade accounting framework, using the 
decompr algorithm developed by Quast and Kummritz (2015) based on trade in value added 
data from the WIOD 2013 over the period 1995-2011. We take advantage of this method of 
decomposition but also go beyond considering two versions of forward participation, besides 
the backward participation (i.e. the total foreign value added in gross exports), which we named: 
i) narrow forward participation: measures the domestic value added in intermediates re-
exported to third countries; and ii) broad forward participation: includes the domestic value 
added in final and intermediates goods absorbed by direct importers. 
Our main contributions may be summarized as follows. With regard to the first 
question of interest, whether there are more structural factors operating in the responsiveness 
of imports to income, we find evidence pointing to greater importance of longer-term drivers 
for advanced economies than emerging and developing countries in the recent years of trade 
slowdown. Our findings suggest that the weakness in aggregate demand, most notably in the 
Eurozone but also more recently in China, may explain a larger share of EME’s imports-GDP 
responsiveness, as well as a compositional change in aggregate demand towards the less import-
intensive components, especially given the Chinese expanding in-house production of capital 
and intermediate goods. Regarding our second question, we find that the global trade elasticity 
has decreased in the 2000s, i.e. trade has become less sensitive to changes in income. However, 
when both groups of AE and EME are taken separately, the long-run trade elasticity is slightly 
higher for the former group and lower for the latter in the long 2000s compared to the 1990s. 
In addition, we find lower trade elasticities for EME than AE, and more importantly, this 
difference between both groups’ trade elasticities becomes larger in more recent years. Lastly, 
considering the variables of GVC participation, we find a decrease in the long-term trade 
elasticities of AE and EME over time, suggesting that the lower responsiveness of trade to 
income is associated with the slower pace of global value chains participation. Thereby, we can 
find strong evidences that different patterns of GVC participation are associated with different 
behaviors of trade elasticities in the more recent years.  
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The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we review the related 
literature on the cyclical and structural factors behind the decline in trade elasticities and related 
current trade slowdown, emphasizing the main structural arguments, and more importantly for 
our interests, the apparent slowdown in the pace of international fragmentation of production 
processes. Section 3 discusses the error correction dynamic panel model approach and section 
4 presents our main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
4.2. Related literature 
This section revisits several studies that estimate the changes in the trade-income 
relationship under an import demand function framework. In that regard, we summarize the 
related literature in two strands: i) a set of research that estimates the changes in the long-run 
trade elasticity to income (the “magnitude” of changes), and ii) those studies that investigate 
the cyclical and structural factors behind the current trade slowdown, and related decline in 
global trade elasticities (the “causes” of changes). Undoubtedly, some studies on the stylized 
facts and the determinants of these phenomena have complementary questions and overlapped 
aspects, becoming only a rhetorical resource for our purposes. As we are interested in the role 
of GVC participation in trade elasticities trajectories for both AE and EME, we highlight the 
analysis that focus on the developments of GVC.  
Our work relates to the first set of papers that analyze the behavior of the long-run 
relationship between trade and income. Irwin (2002) examines the behavior of global trade 
elasticity between 1870 and 2000 and indicates that trade has been more responsive to income 
since the mid-1980s144. Later on, Escaith et al. (2010a) evidenced higher long-term trade 
elasticity in the 1990s (from 1.6 to 3.0) followed by a decline (2.3) in the late 2000s, as it 
reached a new (higher level) steady state around 2004145. Similarly, Constantinescu et al. (2015) 
show that the long-term trade elasticity to income was 1.3 (1970-1985), increased to 2.2 in the 
long 1990s (1986-2000) and reverted back to 1.3 in the 2000s. In the post-2008 (2008-2013, 
based on quarterly data), the long-run trade elasticity fell even lower (0.7), i.e. for each 
                                                        
144 Despite pointing to changes in trade policy regimes and in the composition of trade from primary commodity 
to manufactured goods, their findings are inconclusive concerning the causes for the increased trade elasticity. 
145 According to the authors, the 1990-2000 period marked a transaction to a new steady state where the share of 
trade in GDP is higher. After a transition phase where trade elasticity rose, it returned back to the long-term 
equilibrium level. As a matter of fact, they highlight that the concept of steady-state equilibrium implies that the 
causative factor of this change (e.g., vertical integration) do not affect trade elasticity but only the level of trade 
relative to GDP. Furthermore, only for comparison, the estimated world trade elasticity is 2.28 for the whole period 
of 1980 to 2009. 
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percentage growth of world income, imports were growing only 0.7%. Taking a longer 
historical perspective, Freund (2009) estimates what appears to be a monotonic increase in 
world trade elasticity (from 1.94 in the 1960s to 3.69 in the 2000s) and finds that the 
responsiveness of trade to changes in income seems to be higher during recessions. Using 
different measures of global GDP, Ollivaud and Schwellnus (2015)’s findings based on a PPP-
based measure of global GDP are consistent with Constantinescu et al. (2015)’s view that the 
long-run trade elasticity returned to a lower level in the 2000s. However, when the global GDP 
at market exchange rates is considered, the result is a more stable trade elasticity around 2 over 
the recent period.   
Another strand of the literature related to our paper includes the studies that aim to 
explain why the trade-income relationship has changed over time. In that regard, and 
considering that the lower long-term trade elasticity helps explain the current global trade 
slowdown, several studies have identified the determinants behind these changes in terms of 
cyclical and structural factors146.  
 
4.2.1. Cyclical factors 
In a nutshell, cyclical factors would be responsible for changes in trade elasticities 
that would dissipate after the recovery of the weak economic environment. Along these lines, 
in addition to weak demand, the decline in the long-term income elasticity of global trade has 
been attributed to a compositional change in aggregate demand towards the less import-
intensive components.   
Focusing on the demand channel, Bussière et al. (2013) developed an empirical 
model based on an import intensity-adjusted demand (IAD) measure of aggregate demand. The 
authors highlight that each component (consumption, government expenditure, exports, and 
fixed capital investment) has both differences in trade intensity and in the degree of 
procyclicality, which are crucial to understanding the cyclical dynamics of trade flows. Based 
on OECD input-output tables for 18 advanced economies, they suggest that the most procyclical 
components of aggregate demand147, especially investment but also exports, are also highly 
                                                        
146 We follow Constantinescu et al. (2015)’s decomposition of the growth rate of imports into its cyclical and 
structural components. In a nutshell, the cyclical component is associated to the short-run factors (i.e. the impact 
growth and the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium of trade), and the structural component to the long 
run relationship between imports and GDP. 
147 Whereas public spending is an acyclical or countercyclical and less import-intensive component, as it mostly 
includes nontradables and a high share of domestically produced goods, it remains crucial for supporting the 
recovery of GDP but it does not have a dampen effect in the fall of imports. 
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import-intensive categories, explaining the greater decline in imports relative to GDP during 
recessions148. Therefore, their findings support the view that changes in the composition of 
demand may lead to changes in trade elasticity.  
Following Bussière et al. (2013), Boz et al. (2015)’s findings for advanced 
economies suggest that most of the recent trade slowdown, which is more pronounced in the 
Eurozone, is explained by cyclical factors, i.e. weak demand. In similar lines, Ollivaud and 
Schwellnus (2015) and ECB (2015) consider that most of the trade slowdown reflects cyclical 
factors rather than structural factors, highlighting the role played by weak demand in the 
Eurozone and the higher levels of uncertainty. However, it is argued that the trade slowdown 
in intra-euro area accounts for only a small part of the lower global trade elasticity (ECB, 2015). 
Constantinescu et al. (2015) agree that a prolonged reduction in the most trade-intensive 
components of GDP may lead to a decline in the long-run trade elasticity. Although the weak 
investment can help to explain the lower elasticity in the afterward of the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis, the authors consider that it cannot be taken as the main factor behind the recent changes 
in elasticity. Otherwise, one would also have to consider that the global trade elasticity should 
have been increasing in the pre-crisis period throughout the 2000s, as the share of investment 
in aggregate demand was rising, but this was not the case.  
Based on an extended pool of advanced and emerging countries, Borin et al. (2016) 
argue that the behavior of income elasticity is mostly affected by business cycle conditions149. 
In addition to a long-run trend, they find that trade elasticity is lower when business conditions 
are weak and this result may help to explain the recent trade slowdown. Based on a general 
equilibrium model, the IMF (2016) indicates that the overall sluggish economic recovery and 
changes in the composition of aggregate demand explains about 60 percent of the 2012-2015 
decrease in the imports-to-GDP growth ratio, with the demand compositional shifts playing a 
larger role in the trade slowdown of AE relative to that in EME. However, this result may be 
biased, since it considers only the growth rate of goods, excluding services. Later on, following 
Bussière et al. (2013) methodology, the IMF (2016) reveals that up to three-fourths of the trade 
slowdown is explained mostly by the overall weakness in economic activity, particularly in 
investments. However, they argue that other factors are also weighing on trade, highlighting 
                                                        
148 More specifically, they focus on the dynamics of world trade in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis (namely the  “Global Trade Collapse”, GTC (BALDWIN; TAGLIONI, 2009)). 
149 They argue that income elasticity is itself a cyclical variable, given two standard features of real trade flows: 
high volatility and high pro-cyclicality relate to real GDP. In that sense, the higher trade volatility is given by its 
different composition relative to GDP, i.e. trade is more intensive in the more volatile categories (capital goods 
and manufactured goods). 
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the role of the recent slowdown in the growth of global value chains, as we will further 
discuss150.  
 
4.2.2. Structural factors 
The dismal performance of global trade growth in more recent years has called 
attention to the possibility that a deeper and longer-term change established in the relationship 
between economic growth and trade. For the sake of simplicity, we summarize the structural 
arguments in the related literature in terms of: i) regional changes in global economic activity 
and trade; ii) sectoral changes in global trade; iii) changes in trade policies; and iv) changes in 
the developments of global value chains.  
The first structural factor behind the decline in trade growth is characterized by the 
changes in relative growth and trade from advanced economies (AE) toward emerging and 
developing economies (EME) during the mid-2000s. By decomposing the long-run global trade 
elasticity into a weighted average of regions’ (or countries’) trade elasticities, Constantinescu 
et al. (2015) consider that an increase in the import share and in the relative economic growth 
of regions with lower trade elasticity helps to explain the lowering in the global trade elasticity, 
as well as the decrease in their import-GDP elasticity. The authors investigate the combination 
of these three factors separately for advanced and emerging and developing economies, finding 
that the responsiveness of trade to income decreased for both groups of countries in the 2000s.  
Following a similar accounting exercise, Slopek (2015) demonstrates that the 
changes in relative national real GDP growth from AE to EME have contributed to great part 
of the recent decline in global trade elasticity, given that the EME usually exhibit lower income 
elasticities of imports. These findings are in line with the estimates by the IMF (2016) and the 
IRC Trade Task Force (2016), for which the AE presented higher import-income elasticity than 
the EME, on average. In addition, the magnitude of the decline in trade elasticities is greater 
for EME than AE between the periods 1980-2007 and 2012-2015 (1.5 to 0.8, and 2.1 to 1.8, 
respectively) (IRC TRADE TASK FORCE, 2016) 151 . In a much more simple exercise, 
                                                        
150 Some studies argue that other cyclical factors, such as weak trade finance mechanisms, may also play a role in 
the recent trade dynamics, especially in the earlier collapse in world trade, once a trade credit crunch has a more 
severe impact on international trade when it is based on GVC (MILBERG; WINKLER, 2010), but not that much 
in the decline in trade elasticity (CHEUNG; GUICHARD, 2009; ECB, 2015).  
151 It should be noted that their research re-named the categories used to explain the recent trade slowdown. Instead 
of using “cyclical” factor to refer to the demand channel, and “structural” factor for the changes in GVC, trade 
policies and regional or sectoral trade (as most of the literature), they re-named the former as “compositional 
factors”, encompassing the changes in geographical, sectoral and demand composition of economic activity, while 
the later (“structural developments”) includes the role of GVC, transportation costs, trade protectionism, foreign 
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Nakajima et al. (2016) associate the current trade slowdown to the weaker performance of real 
imports growth rates in EME if compared to the pre-crisis period.  
Even though the global elasticity could change in the absence of changes in 
individual countries’ elasticities, this does not seem to be the case in the recent years. By 
focusing on the contribution of specific countries, Constantinescu et al. (2015) suggest that a 
few countries with a larger share in world trade and/or faster economic growth relative to the 
rest of the world have played an important role in the recent shift in global elasticity. For 
instance, China accounts for 13 and 32 percent of the change in the world trade elasticity in the 
long 1990s and in the 2000s, respectively, while the United States accounts for 20 and 8 percent. 
In particular, China has played an important role in the recent trade slowdown, with its trade 
elasticity sharply decreasing from 1.8 (1980-2007) to 0.8 (2012-2015) (IRC TRADE TASK 
FORCE, 2016).   
Despite the Chinese robust economic activity, the current weakness in China’s 
import growth can be seen as the result of changes in their national development strategy. On 
the one hand, China has appreciated its currency and has diminished its expansion process of 
export markets in recent years (IRC TRADE TASK FORCE, 2016). On the other hand, China 
is rebalancing away from investment and exports toward more consumption-led growth. 
Considering that investment is more trade-intensive than consumption and the size of the 
Chinese economy, this process may have contributed to the current sluggish in world import 
growth (BOZ; BUSSIÈRE; MARSILLI, 2015; IMF, 2016). In particular, the Chinese 
expanding in-house production of capital and intermediate goods, which is illustrated by the 
increasing domestic value added in Chinese firms, is an important phenomenon behind the 
recent weak global trade dynamics (IMF, 2015; KEE; TANG, 2015; NAKAJIMA et al., 2016). 
Therefore, Timmer et al. (2016) observe that  the "China-factor", i.e. the Chinese movement 
towards services and products finalized domestically, should be considered with caution, given 
that the import intensity of Chinese demand has been falling since the early 2000s.  
The second factor is related to the changing composition of world trade towards a 
trade category with lower trade elasticity. Constantinescu et al. (2015) estimate separately the 
income elasticity of services trade and of goods trade, finding that the decrease of the later in 
the 2000s has mainly contributed to the decline of world trade elasticity and not the changing 
composition of world trade towards services. More specifically, they find that the long-run 
                                                        
direct investment, and the trade-finance nexus. As the overall findings suggest that the compositional effects 
explain most of the decline in global trade elasticity, this change in categories cannot be ignored.  
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income elasticity of manufacturing trade fell (from 2.6 to 0.8) and services trade elasticity 
actually increased (from 1.8 to 2.2) between the 1990s and the 2000s. It is also important to 
note that the share of trade in goods in relation to total trade has been considerable stable and 
services trade slowed less than goods in the 2012-2015 period (IMF, 2016). Thereby, the role 
of sectoral changes from goods to services is pointed as the less certain, although more difficult 
to assess, of the compositional factors (CONSTANTINESCU; MATTOO; RUTA, 2015; IRC 
TRADE TASK FORCE, 2016).  
The third structural argument refers to the rising trade protectionism, with an even 
more recent wave of this phenomenon named “Trumpism” given Trump’s trade protectionist 
promises, or also a slowdown in the pace of trade liberalization if compared to prior periods. 
The widespread trade liberalization and reduction of global tariffs that marked global trade in 
the 1990s and early 2000s were replaced by a relative stagnation of trade liberalization and a 
rise in non-tariff measures (EVENETT; FRITZ, 2015). In that sense, some studies argue that 
the pace of trade liberalization is an important factor in the current trade slowdown (BOZ; 
BUSSIÈRE; MARSILLI, 2015; HAUGH et al., 2016). By using a measure that accounts for 
both tariff and non-tariff barriers152, Haugh et al. (2016) find that the pace of trade liberalization 
is responsible for one-quarter of the slowdown in global trade growth. On the other hand, some 
studies emphasize that the rise in protectionism is perhaps a factor at the margin concerning its 
effects in lowering trade elasticities. Although it cannot be fully disregarded, it should not be 
overvalued, given that the rise in trade barriers in the 2000s has not been quiet substantial nor 
has the share of world trade affected by the upsurge of restrictive trade measures become higher 
(CONSTANTINESCU; MATTOO; RUTA, 2015; ECB, 2015; IMF, 2016; NAKAJIMA et al., 
2016; OLLIVAUD; SCHWELLNUS, 2015; WTO, 2014)153. Therefore, the contrasting results 
reflect both differences in the measures of trade policy and methodology applied in these 
studies.  
 
i) The role of Global Value Chains 
The fourth structural argument is about the changes in the pace of global value 
                                                        
152 The authors use the index of global trade liberalization from the Fraser Institute for Economic Freedom. 
153 By adding a variable that captures the level of trade barriers in their model, Constantinescu et al. (2015) 
estimated no considerable change in the long-run trade elasticity to income in China, as well as this variable of 
protectionism is not significant. The story in the case of the United States is slightly different, suggesting that an 
increase in protectionism may have played a (although minor) role in the responsiveness of imports of the United 
States to changes in income. However, these results should be taken with caution, once their model does not 
capture many changes in non-tariff measures and given the remarkable difficulties of measuring protectionism. 
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chains, i.e. the vertical specialization of production processes. While the rapid expansion of 
GVC trade throughout the 1990s was accompanied by an increase in global income elasticity154, 
it seems reasonable to consider potential changes in the pace of expansion of GVC as an 
explanatory factor for the most recent change in the trade-income relationship. Although, 
regardless of the period analyzed, a key question is whether and through which specific 
channels the emergence of GVC has affected the responsiveness of trade to changes in income. 
In that regard, the related literature points to three possible ways: i) the composition effect; ii) 
the supply chain effect, and iii) the bullwhip effect.155   
Considering these three potential effects, it should be noted that the first and second 
effects are related to the impact of a country's backward GVC participation in trade-income 
elasticities, while the third effect is about the impact of forward participation in 
GVC156(GANGNES; ASSCHE, 2016). Therefore, the more recent lower trade elasticity could 
be explained by a lower share of durable goods in gross exports (compositional effect, explained 
by structural or cyclical factors) or by a general drawback from GVC production arrangements 
(supply side effects) (GANGNES; ASSCHE, 2016).  While it does not appear to be the case for 
the first explanation, as the share of durable goods has remained stable (GANGNES; MA; 
ASSCHE, 2015), the second argument appears to have a more important role in explaining the 
trade elasticities falloff and the current trade slowdown.  
In general lines, the GVC driver is posed as the slower pace of international 
fragmentation of production processes or, in this respect, a slowdown in offshoring (foreign 
outsourcing). Considering that the expansion of GVC may have reached its peak, some studies 
emphasize that the regional distribution of value chains rather than globally is an important 
feature for explaining the recent slowdown (CROZET; EMLINGER; JEAN, 2015; ECB, 2015; 
HAUGH et al., 2016; KEE; TANG, 2015). However, it is still hard to assess the slowdown in 
GVC or its role in the lower trade elasticity because of the absence of up-to-date international 
input-output tables (IOT). Furthermore, the causes of the apparent slowdown in the pace of 
international fragmentation of production processes are even harder to determine. For instance, 
                                                        
154 It is important to highlight that it is not the globalization of production per se what influences the increase in 
trade elasticities, but the rising sensitivity of trade to changes in GDP, i.e. the nature of GVC and not larger trade 
openness (MILBERG; WINKLER, 2010). Although it is also important to note that part of this effect is due to 
how trade is measured in gross terms, which results in double-counting errors of intermediate inputs.  
155 See Box 4.1 in Annex 4.1 
156 In general terms, the GVC literature considers that a country may participate in GVC in two distinct ways: i) 
using imported intermediate inputs to produce exports; and ii) exporting intermediate goods that are used as inputs 
by another country to produce goods for exports. The concepts and metrics to understand how countries are 
interconnected in the context of GVC are discussed in the next section. 
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one may point to the deceleration in the decline in trade costs, potential higher obstacles to 
cross-border investment, the presence of distorted policies, a natural maturation of existing 
GVC, a profit-led decision of business managers to shorten supply chains, and the adoption of 
new technologies (BALDWIN; VENABLES, 2013; CROZET; EMLINGER; JEAN, 2015; 
FERRANTINO; TAGLIONI, 2014; IMF, 2016).   
Some recent studies attempt to overcome this challenge by using different measures 
of GVC participation based on different databases. Considering a simple decomposition of the 
import growth into structural and cyclical factors, Haugh et al. (2016) suggest that structural 
factors account for around two-thirds of the unexpected trade slowdown in the 2011-2015 
period. The authors use the ratio of intermediate goods imports to final domestic demand as 
proxy of GVC participation, considering the connection between trade of intermediate goods 
and vertical specialization. This indicator, restricted to the perspective of the backward 
participation in GVC, is corrected for cyclicality and commodity price effects and then 
computed at a global aggregate level in a regression of the world trade elasticity. Their results 
indicate that the GVC slowdown contributed with almost half of the decline in the world trade 
elasticity.  
By using a measure based on the gross export decomposition of Koopman et al. 
(2014) based on the Eora MRIO database, the IMF (2016) finds an important, but less 
pronounced if compared with Haugh et al. (2016), role of the decline in GVC participation 
(both backward and forward perspectives) in the observed global trade slowdown. Moreover, 
the study suggests that both trade policies and GVC participation play a more important role in 
the EME’s trade slowdown. On the whole, the study suggests that a slower pace of GVC 
participation (and a slower growth in the coverage of free trade agreements) is associated157 
with lower import growth. By using a gravity model, Crozet et al. (2015) show that the recent 
trade slowdown may mark the end of an era of widespread expansion of GVC. More than solely 
the rebalancing of the Chinese economy, the authors find that the slowdown was greater for 
trade flows where GVC participation are more widespread. 
The seminal study by Constantinescu et al. (2015) argues that both cyclical effects 
and structural factors have played an important role in explaining the recent world trade 
slowdown. In that regard, cyclical factors, mostly explained by weak global demand, were 
dominant during the financial crisis, and structural factors, especially the changes in vertical 
specialization, appear to play a major role in the most recent sluggish rates of world trade 
                                                        
157 It should be noted that this analysis does not attempt to identify causation, only association.  
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growth. In particular, they suggest that the recent decline in the long-term trade elasticity may 
reflect the absorption of the technology shock of the long 1990s and a slowing pace of 
international fragmentation of production processes. Instead of using a control variable for the 
impact of GVC participation, the authors estimate the long-run elasticities of value added to 
changes in income and compare the results with the estimated trade elasticities based on gross 
trade. As they expected, they found that the gap between both elasticities decreased over time, 
converging to a value closer to the (lower and more stable) trade elasticities in value added 
terms in light of the role played by the slowdown in the expansion of vertical specialization.  
To shed some light on different explanations for the recent trade slowdown in the 
same framework, Timmer et al. (2016) emphasize both the changes in the composition of final 
demand and in the structure of production. They present evidence that international production 
fragmentation has contributed to the upsurge in global import intensity, which is a concept 
developed by the authors to measure the imports needed in any stage of production. This 
phenomenon has been reinforced by the change in global demand towards goods and services 
that are highly fragmented, such as consumer durables and investment products. Although, not 
only the process of fragmentation has come to a standstill since 2011 but also global demand 
has shifted towards services associated with much less trade intensive production processes. 
Thereby, the outcome was a great decrease in the global import intensity in the period 2011-
2014. However, these results are based on nominal input-output tables and then caution is 
needed when considering them.  
By adding a control variable of GVC participation in their import demand model, 
Al-Haschimi et al. (2015) investigate the effect of GVC participation 158  accompanied by 
demand growth for the behavior of income elasticity of imports for two groups of countries, 
emerging and advanced economies. Their findings suggest that trade elasticity of emerging 
countries tend to be higher than for advanced economies, and imports react more strongly when 
are followed by stronger GVC participation in both emerging and advanced countries. 
However, this additional effect on trade growth appears to be weaker since the mid-2000s, 
suggesting that the process of GVC integration may have recently reached its peak. Beyond 
that, trade elasticity increased since the recent financial crisis for advanced economies, while it 
has declined for emerging economies. Following a similar line, but considering other 
                                                        
158 Their measure of GVC participation is based on the decomposition of trade flows proposed in Koopman et al. 
(2014), which is discussed in further sections.  
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variables159 besides the GVC participation index, the IRC Trade Force (2016) shows that GVC 
participation was globally increasing in the period between 1996 and the 2008-2009 crisis and, 
while the emerging economies were leading this process, this trend had already changed for 
those countries prior to the crisis. Overall, they find that the changes in GVC participation have 
played a role in the behavior of global trade elasticity, however this contribution has diminished 
after the Great Recession.  
Based on a measure of the average number of border crossings for each unit of 
imported final good developed by Fally (2012), Ollivard and Schwellnus (2015) find no 
evidence that the international production fragmentation experienced a structural break. They 
find that the international production fragmentation accelerates when the global GDP is 
growing, and this procyclicality may reflect Ferrantino and Taglioni (2014)’s findings of a 
compositional change of trade towards products with shorter value chains during economic 
downturns or even the postponement of investment projects related to international outsourcing. 
Overall, one could say that the broad spectrum of results is a reflection of the use of different 
metrics, resulting in the absence of consensus regarding the deceleration of the pace of GVC 
and its role in the falling trade elasticity.  
 
4.3. The trade-income relationship: econometric appraisal and data 
Our empirical analysis starts with a simple import demand equation that has been 
used in the empirical trade literature under the theoretical underpinning of the standard constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) demand system, under which import demand is a function of 
aggregate demand160. We adopt a dynamic panel error correction model to account for both 
short and long run determinants of import volumes by dealing with non-stationary 
heterogeneous panels of a broad sample of AE and EME. Instead of estimating the long-run 
elasticity for each country separately by using a time-series model, the panel ECM is preferable 
because both cross-section and time dimensions present a moderated size. Considering a panel 
cointegrating framework, all the variables in the system are endogenous with each one of them 
expressed as a linear function of its own lagged values and the lagged values of all the other 
variables considered. Thereby, the manipulation of this system produces an error correction 
                                                        
159 Their analysis considers two groups of factors driving the recent weakness in global trade: compositional factors 
and structural developments. The first group involves the changing composition in terms of regions, sectors and 
composition of aggregate demand. Secondly, the structural developments are posed in terms of dwindling global 
value chain participation, waning reductions in transportation costs, in trade liberalization and in trade finance.  
160 Similar empirical approach is used by Bussière et al. (2013) , Constantinescu et al. (2015), Escaith et al. 
(2010a), and Milberg and Winkler (2010). 
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equation in which differenced vector terms are explained as lagged differenced vector variables 
plus lagged levels terms that represents the error correction phenomenon. In our first empirical 
exercise, we assume the following equation161:  
 
∆𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜𝑡 + γ𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + β∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  η∆𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +  θ𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1  +   𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where ∆ denotes first differences, the subscripts t and i denotes time and country, respectively; 
𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the import series in volume terms; 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the real GDP; 𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the real exchange rates, 
as a proxy for relative prices and competitiveness changes. All variables are expresses in natural 
log-form, and we add the lagged values of trade (𝑚𝑡−1), GDP (𝑦𝑡−1) and exchange rate 
(𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 ). Further, γ captures the lagged adjustment, i.e. the speed at which imports adjust to 
trade, and β captures the short-term trade elasticity. The long-run trade elasticity is estimated 
from the coefficients: − δ γ⁄ .  
As we are interested in common long-run trade elasticities, we used a pooled mean 
group (PMG) estimator. Following Martinez-Martins (2016), we adopt the mean group 
estimation, which means that the group parameters are the unweighted mean of the N individual 
regression coefficients. Hence, we have estimated a traditional dynamic fixed-effects model 
restricting the coefficients of the cointegrating vector to be equal across all panels. Further, to 
test the hypotheses that the trade-income responsiveness is not constant over time and it is not 
homogeneous between both groups of countries, we estimate separately the long-run trade 
elasticity for AE and EME.  
Following Constantinescu et al. (2015), we then use the estimated coefficients to 
the actual data in order to obtain the import growth predicted by our model and decompose the 
import growth rate into its cyclical and structural components for both groups of countries. The 
cyclical component of import growth (short-run factors) is associated with the impact elasticity 
and the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium of trade, and it is obtained from 
subtracting the predicted long-run growth of imports from the import growth predicted by the 
model.   
Annual data were used from the IMF World Economic Outlook (2017) over the 
period 1989-2014 for 44 selected countries (23 advanced economies and 21 emerging market 
and developing countries). The data, in constant prices, is consistent with controlling for 
                                                        
161 Recently, this econometric approach was explored to estimate trade elasticities by Martinez-Martin (2016) but 
considering different variables.  
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changes in relative price. As it is considered desirable for estimating income elasticities, we 
also use real exchange rates as one of the controlling variables following McCombie (1997) 
and Cimoli, Porcile and Rovira (2009). In that sense, we use data for countries’ GDP price 
indices available in the Penn World Table 9.0 (FEENSTRA; INKLAAR; TIMMER, 2015).  
Our second empirical strategy is based on an extension of the previous import 
demand function to account for the effect of GVC participation on trade elasticities of AE and 
EME. Considering that the vertically fragmentation of production processes creates additional 
linkages across countries, which affects the trade-income responsiveness, we propose to take a 
closer look at the contribution of both backward and forward participation in GVC under a 
panel cointegrating framework based on international input-output data. To test the hypotheses 
that the different patterns in trade elasticities between AE and EME are associated with different 
patterns of GVC participation, we use a disaggregated version of the GVC participation index 
developed by Koopman et al. (2014).  
In general terms, a country may participate in GVC in two distinct ways: i) using 
imported intermediate inputs to produce exports; and ii) exporting intermediate goods that are 
used as inputs by another country to produce goods for exports. To quantify the extent of a 
country-sector GVC participation, two broad measures have been used widely in the literature: 
i) VS: measure the value of imported contents embodied in a country’s exports, and ii) VS1: 
measure the value of intermediate exports sent indirectly through other countries to final 
destinations, i.e. the percentage of exported intermediate goods and services that are used as 
inputs to produce other countries’ exports (HUMMELS; ISHII; YI, 2001). The VS share 
estimates the importance of upstream links, providing a metric of the involvement of a country-
industry as a user of foreign inputs (i.e. backward participation). The VS1 share estimates the 
importance of downstream links, measuring the involvement in GVCs from a supplier 
perspective (i.e. forward participation) (BACKER; MIROUDOT, 2013; CADESTIN; 
GOURDON; KOWALSKI, 2016).  
Hence, instead of using the original formulation of the GVC participation index162 
developed by Koopman et al. (2014) to account for the overall GVC participation, we choose 
to use both backward and forward participation measures separately. Taking advantage of their 
method of decomposition of gross trade, the measures are as follows: i) backward participation: 
measures the total foreign value added in gross exports; ii) narrow forward participation: 
                                                        
162 The GVC participation index developed by Koopman et al. (2014) is defined as the sum of the VS1 share (i.e. 
forward participation) and the VS share (i.e. backward participation). 
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measures the domestic value added in intermediates re-exported to third countries; and ii) broad 
forward participation: includes the domestic value added in final and intermediates goods 
absorbed by direct importers. As we also aim to consider a broad vision of how a country can 
contribute with its domestic value added into the global production networks, we use the two 
measures of forward participation. This is consistent with a detailed analysis of how the 
different patterns of GVC integration163 of both groups of AE and EME are related to different 
trade-income responsiveness in the recent years.  
To assess whether both groups of countries experienced a recent decline in trade 
elasticity, we estimate a panel ECM by dealing with a non-stationary panel of 21 advanced 
countries and 11 emerging countries at the disaggregated level of 35 sectors. By combining 
time series with panel data considering the set of sectors of each country, we have a more 
informative model, with greater variability and less collinearity between variables, more 
degrees of freedom and more efficiency. In other words, this model is more adequate to study 
the dynamics of changes in trade elasticities since it reduces the bias that results from the 
aggregation of sectors.  
Annual data were used from the World Input-Ouput Database (WIOD) release of 
2013 over the period 1995-2009. The sample period for trade in value added is more limited 
due to data availability and being split into two periods: 1995-2009 and 2000-2009, in order to 
assess the developments of trade elasticities over time. The data for trade in value added are 
processed based on the method of decomposition formulated by Koopman et al. (2014), using 
the decompr algorithm developed by Quast and Kummritz (2015).  
We use the following panel ECM specifications to investigate the behavior of real 
GDP (𝑦𝑖,𝑡) and import volumes (𝑚𝑖,𝑡): 
 
(1) ∆𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜𝑡 + δ1𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ2∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + δ3𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  δ4𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ5𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(2) ∆𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜𝑡 + δ1𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ2∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + δ3𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ4𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤_𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 +  δ5𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +   𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(3) ∆𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜𝑡 + δ1𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ2∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + δ3𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ4𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤_𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 +  δ5𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +   𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(4) ∆𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜𝑡 + δ1𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ2∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + δ3𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  δ4𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ5𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤_𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ6𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
  δ7𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(5) ∆𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜𝑡 + δ1𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ2∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + δ3𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  δ4𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ5𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤_𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + δ6𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
  δ7𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
                                                        
163 In that regard, EME are usually known for having a bigger share of domestic value added in third country 
exports (forward participation) if compared to their foreign value added in exports (backward participation). 
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where ∆ denotes first differences, the subscripts t denotes time, and i  country; 𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the real 
exchange rates, 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  is the backward participation; 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤_𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
measure of narrow forward participation, and 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑤_𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 is the broad forward 
participation. Both empirical exercises are estimated by the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) (ARELLANO; BOND, 1991; ARELLANO; BOVER, 1995).  
Finally, in order to estimate the model, we checked the degree of integration 
running ADF - Fisher Chi-square and PP - Fisher Chi-square unit root tests for the panel with 
null hypothesis of individual unit root process. Our findings suggested that m and y have unit 
roots in level, but not in first differences, both being thus I (1). We then performed a Fisher-
Johansen test of cointegration, which is a system based test, that showed that the rank of 
cointegration of m and y is equal to one. Finally, to verify the suitability of the model, we tested 
for the normality distribution of the residuals (Jarque-Bera statistic), and for serial correlation 
and for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects in the residuals in all 
estimations. The results, though, should be interpreted with caution, once the model does not 
capture the structural complexity of the trade-GDP nexus. 
 
4.4. Empirical results 
Table 1 shows the results of estimations of our first empirical exercise. For the 
entire sample, we find that the long-run trade elasticity decreased during the long 2000s, i.e. 
trade has become less sensitive to changes in income. In the period 1989-1999, a 1 percent 
increase in world real GDP is associated with a 2.83 percent increase in the volume of global 
imports. The responsiveness of trade to changes in income becomes lower in the subsequent 
period (2000-2014), as the long-run trade elasticity fell to 2.43. Hence, by splitting the full 
sample of 44 countries between advanced economies (23 countries) and emerging and 
developing economies (21 countries), the long-run trade elasticity is slightly higher for the 
former group and lower for the latter in the long 2000s.  
When comparing both groups of countries, our results are in line with the seminal 
study by Houthakker and Magee (1969) and the related literature that found lower trade 
elasticities for EME than AE. We also find that the difference between both groups’ trade 
elasticities decreased throughout the 1990s, and more importantly, this processes was 
interrupted in the 2000s. In this respect, for both sub-periods, emerging economies tended to 
have lower trade elasticities than advanced economies, and the difference between both groups 
becomes larger over time. To sum up, we have adopted the two different periods based on 
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Martinez-Martin (2016)’s findings that obtained a structural breakpoint in 2000, which they 
suggest can be related to the incorporation of China into the global economy.  
 
Table 4.1 - First empirical exercise: results of estimations 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF (WEO). Notes: standard errors in parenthesis; * indicates a 
significance level of 1%, ** of 5%, and *** of 10%. 
 
In addition, the short-run elasticity (β) also decreased over time: for the entire 
sample, from 2.72 for the first period to 1.90 for the period 2000-2014, and this change in the 
short-run dynamics is greatest for the EME, although not statistically significant. Unlike the 
long-term trade elasticity, the short-run dynamics between trade and income varied in the same 
direction for both AE and EME, decreasing over time. One should note that the literature on 
the great trade collapse that followed the global financial crisis discuss the mechanisms through 
which vertical specialization is related to the changing short-term responsiveness of trade to 
GDP (discussed in Box A1). Overall, the short-term responsiveness of trade to GDP has 
decreased for both AE and EME in the 2000s, however, this decline is much stronger for the 
later. While changes in world income had a decreasing short-term impact on world trade, the 
speed of adjustment (γ) of trade to its long-run equilibrium varied more monotonically between 
EME and AE over the two periods, being higher in the long 2000s.  
As can be seen for the entire sample, imports in the 2000-2014 period would be 
reduced by 1.21 percent to restore the long-run equilibrium relationship between trade and 
Dependent	variable:
	import	demand
1989-1999 2000-2014 1989-1999 2000-2014 1989-1999 2000-2014
Import	demand	(lag)	(γ) -0,79* -1,19* -1,02* -1,19* -0,94* -1,21*
(0,08) (0,09) (0,05) (0,04) (0,02) (0,02)
GDP	(β) 2,79* 0,86 2,18* 2,08* 2,72* 1,90*
(0.30) (0,68) (0,19) (0,17) (0,14) (0,11)
GDP	(lag)	(δ) 1,86** 1,86* 2,56* 3,21* 2,67* 2,96*
(0,91) (0,75) (0,22) (0,21) (0,18) (0,16)
rer	(η) 68,03* 29,33 7,09 18,11* 24,56* 20,29*
(26,36) (22,45) (5,72) (2,40) (3,90) 3,50
rer	(lag)	(θ) -1,93 -35,57* 1,37*** -4,37 0,08 -12,73*
(18,11) (5,50) (2,61) (1,49) (2,26) (1,82)
Long-run	trade	elasticity	(-δ	⁄	γ) 2,36** 1,56* 2,52* 2,68* 2,83* 2,43*
R-squared 0,71 0,55 0,67 0,57 0,74 0,69
Observations 173 198 273 197 446 395
Emerging	and	developing	
countries
Advanced	economies Total
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income, if the volume of imports in the 1989-1999 period was 1 percent higher than the level 
predicted by the long-run relationship. The real exchange rate (rer) is positively correlated with 
real imports, which suggests that when the exchange rate of the country appreciates (i.e. rer 
increases), imports become cheaper and increase in real terms. In Table 1, time t rer is 
statistically significant when the total of countries is considered for both periods, while it is not 
always statically significant if AE and EME are taken separately.   
To examine whether there are more structural factors operating in the recent 
behavior of trade elasticities, Figures 1 and 2 reproduce the decomposition of imports growth 
into its short-run and long-run components for advanced economies and emerging countries, 
respectively. The blue bards capture the long-run component of import growth predicted by the 
model, while the orange bars indicate the predicted short-run component of import growth.  
 
Figure 4.1 - Decomposition of trade growth into its short-run and long-run components, 
advanced economies (1989-2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF (WEO).  
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Figure 4.2 - Decomposition of trade growth into its short-run and long-run components, 
emerging and developing economies (1989-2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF (WEO).  
 
The figures above show that both cyclical and structural factors are operating in the 
current trade slowdown for both EME and AE. However, in the case of EME, the short-term 
component explains a larger share of the behavior of import growth in the afterwards of the 
2008-2009 financial crisis, as well as during periods of economic turmoil such as the Asian 
Crisis and the financial crisis. Besides weak global demand, one of the potential explanations, 
as discussed in the literature review, is a compositional effect regarding the contribution of the 
sharp decrease in the Chinese trade elasticity, which reflects the expanding in-house production 
of capital and intermediate goods already in the early 2000s. Thereby, the Chinese transition 
toward more consumption-led growth has been lowering import demand in emerging 
economies.  
In the case of AE, the long-run component, capturing structural effects, dominates 
most of the historical trade growth behavior, including periods of crisis and especially in the 
last two years of the current scenario of sluggish trade growth. Therefore, considering the set 
of structural drivers of the current trade slowdown, we aim to further investigate how different 
patterns of GVC participation could underlie the changing trade-income responsiveness in the 
2000s.  
To examine how the behavior of trade elasticity is associated with GVC 
participation, our second empirical strategy, based on the estimation of a dynamic panel ECM 
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that accounts for the measures of forward and backward GVC participation in value added 
terms, provide some useful insights (Table 2 and 3).  
 
Table 4.2 - Second empirical exercise: results of estimations, emerging and developing 
countries 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; * indicates a significance level of 1%, ** of 
5%, and ***of 10%. First sub-period: 1995-2009, and second sub-period: 2000-2009. 
  
First	sub-period Second	sub-period
Dependent	variable:	∆mt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
imports	(lag) -1,17* -1,15* -1,54* -1,20* -1,36* -1,18* -1,55* -1,56* -1,55* -1,53*
(0,25) (0,37) (0,23) (0,13) (0,19) (0,16) (0,15) (0,15) (0,12) (0,10)
gdp 2,12* 5,06 3,82* 2,58* 5,02* 2,60* 3,48* 3,49* 3,48* 4,05*
(0,43) (2,30) (0,73) (0,87) (1,66) (0,50) (0,82) (0,57) (0,68) (0,89)
gdp	(lag) 2,65*** 3,68* 3,70* 3,07* 4,75* 2,50** 2,96*** 3,26* 3,29* 4,55*
(1,46) (1,16) (1,02) (0,77) (1,27) (1,25) (1,56) (0,92) (1,244) (1,37)
rer 4,15 16,35 -26,41
(13,82) (38,86) (51,25) 2,06 4,34 6,023 -9,64
15,39 (11,92) 34,018 (48,01)
rer	(lag) -17,16** -3,719 -24,20 41,89
(7,83) (11,536) (39,41) (51,77) -9,44 -0,48 18,94
(7,47) 33,20 39,64
back_part	(lag) -15,19 -46,64* 198,66
(10,64) (15,06) (126,01) -13,36 -29,80 228,36
(10,65) 21,58 (139,34)
forw_narrow	(lag) 104,25 -88,26*
(101,63) (24,36) 46,52 -42,80
140,48 43,72
forw_broad	(lag) 20,84** 173,59
(10,09) (94,34) 15,70 191,50***
(10,39) (109,28)
Long-run	trade	elasticity		(-δ3/δ1)	2,27 3,21 2,40 2,56 3,50 2,12 1,91 2,09 2,12 2,98
R-squared 0,73 0,47 0,65 0,70 0.570332 0,78 0,70 0,70 0.71 0,71
Number	of	observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121
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Table 4.3 - Second empirical exercise: results of estimations, advanced economies 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; * indicates a significance level of 1%, ** of 
5%, and ***of 10%. First sub-period: 1995-2009; Second sub-period: 2000-2009. 
 
The vertical specialization variables slightly increase the goodness-of-fit of the model 
for both groups of countries, but they are not always significant.  The estimation of the distinct 
equations regarding the indicators of backward and forward (broad and narrow) participation 
as taken together or separately shows that the overall result is of a lower trade elasticity in the 
second sub-period for both advanced economies and emerging countries. Hence, when based 
in value added terms and considering the variables of GVC participation, there is evidence of a 
falling response of imports to GDP for both AE and EME over time, and, more importantly, 
this lower responsiveness of trade to income is associated with the slower pace of global value 
chains participation. As pointed in the literature review, this may be the result of a maturation 
of the process of fragmenting production processes internationally, given the increase in 
emerging economies’ labor costs and firms’ decisions to “re-shore” production. Hence, the 
absence of further expansion of GVC changes drastically the previous scenario of increasing 
trade elasticities that marked the 1990s. Meanwhile, other structural factors may also have 
played a role in the falling trade elasticities. Moreover, considering the differences between 
both groups of countries and taking both measures of GVC participation separately, our results 
First	sub-period Second	sub-period
Dependent	variable:	∆mt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
imports	(lag) -0,842* -0,843* -0,842* -0,820* -0,808* -0,824* -0,827* -0,824* -0,841* -0,810*
(0,0952) (0,0961) (0,095) (0,076) (0,081) (0,101) (0,102) (0,101) (0,095) (0,100)
gdp 3,527* 3,532* 3,529* 2,475* 2,296* 3,049* 3,047* 3,055* 1,555*** 1,395***
(0,596) (0,599) (0,597) (0,629) (0,677) (0,580) (0,583) (0,582) (0,885) (0,869)
gdp	(lag) 2,630* 2,622* 2,631* 2,073* 2,005* 2,295* 2,290* 2,296* 1,653* 1,603*
(0,553) 0,564377 (0,553) (0,403) (0,392) (0,484) (0,487) (0,486) (0,488) (0,444)
rer 7,457*** 8,090*** 7,378 70,080* 59,868* 4,011 4,539 3,954 70,860* 62,612*
(4,752) (4,988) (4,740) (17,747) (14,611) (3,804) (3,930) (3,809) (20,374) (17,442)
rer	(lag) -59,954* -54,357* -64,717* -60,417*
(16,126) (14,776) (19,431) (17,528)
back_part	(lag) 3,518* -30,989* 105,131** 3,186* -31,062* 99,667**
(0,617) (9,208) (46,923) (0,530) (10,066) (48,306)
forw_narrow	(lag) -13,379* -130,875* -13,136* -129,927*
(4,533) (37,666) (3,299) (39,434)
forw_broad	(lag) -2,857* 86,655** -2,538* 82,378**
(0,543) (38,983) (0,503) (40,425)
Long-run	trade	elasticity		(-δ3/δ1) 3,12 3,11 3,13 2,53 2,48 2,78 2,77 2,79 1,97 1,98
Number	of	observations 286 286 286 286 286 220 220 220 220 220
R-squared 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,54 0,58 0,69 0,69 0,69 0,53 0,56
191 
 
191 
 
are in line with the previous literature and with our first empirical exercise that found lower 
trade elasticities for EME than AE164. Yet, in the light of these results, the difference between 
both groups has increased over time.  
Another important insight is that EME’s trade elasticity varies more than AE’s 
whether one consider the narrow or the broad measure of forward participation. The intuition 
behind these results is that the dynamics of trade elasticities reflects the patterns of GVC 
participation. In fact, the results are consistent with the EME’s pattern of GVC participation 
that is based on a bigger share of domestic value added in third country exports (narrow forward 
participation) and in goods absorbed by direct importers (broad forward participation) rather 
than the foreign value added in exports (backward participation). However, when both 
measures of GVC integration are taken together, even though trade elasticities are decreasing 
over time, the EME’s level is higher than AE in both sub-periods.  
 
4.5. Partial concluding remarks 
This chapter reviews the key drivers behind the falling long-term trade elasticity 
and the related global trade slowdown. Our empirical results suggest that the diminishing 
growth of trade after the Global Crisis is due not only to weak global demand (cyclical factors) 
but also because trade has become less responsive to income (structural factors). On the one 
hand, cyclical factors explain a larger share of the imports-GDP responsiveness in the case of 
EME, for instance, the weakness in aggregate demand, most notably in the Eurozone but also 
more recently in China, and a compositional change in aggregate demand towards the less 
import-intensive components, especially given the Chinese expanding in-house production of 
capital and intermediate goods. On the other hand, structural factors have played a more 
important role for advanced economies than emerging and developing countries in the recent 
slowdown in global trade.  
This means that longer-term factors are changing the fundamental relationship 
between trade and economic activity but not symmetrically between advanced and emerging 
economies. In that regard, we have emphasized the role of GVC participation on explaining the 
decline in the long-term trade elasticities. When based on trade in value added terms, our 
empirical exercises suggest that the long-run trade elasticity has decreased in the 2000s for both 
advanced economies and developing and emerging countries. Nevertheless, this finding is 
                                                        
164 With the one exception that trade elasticity is slightly higher for EME in the first sub-period of our second 
model than AE’s.  
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consistent with both estimations that consider the GVC participation indexes separately and 
together. Indeed, our estimations indicate the slower pace of global value chains as an important 
factor behind the falling trade elasticities.  
Finally, future research may want to explore a broader set of variables about the 
causes of the falling trade elasticities, including, for instance, variables of trade protectionism, 
foreign direct investment and trade finance. Further, our findings encourage further research 
about the causes of cross-country differences regarding trade elasticities and on whether the 
falling trade elasticity has different implications for advanced economies’ and emerging and 
developing countries’ economic growth. In that regard, the remarkable anemic phase of trade 
growth in more recent years, and the falling long-term trade elasticities, may constitute a “new 
normal” of global trade dynamics, affecting countries’ growth prospects through limiting export 
opportunities and with several implications for their ability to emulate development strategies.  
 
 
Annex 4.1 
 
Box 4.1 - The effects of vertical specialization in the responsiveness of trade to income 
The literature on the GTC discussed several mechanisms through which 
vertical specialization may change the short-term relationship between trade and 
GDP. 
The composition effect suggests that GVC trade is concentrated especially 
in durable goods industries, which are more sensitive to foreign income 
fluctuations, making countries that rely largely on imported inputs for their exports 
to present higher income elasticities. Durables and capital goods are more sensitive 
to income shocks, what means that households and companies disproportionately 
delay new purchases of those goods in economic downturns (GANGNES; MA; 
ASSCHE, 2014). In that regard, Eaton et al. (2011) find that less spending on 
durable goods during 2008-2009 was one of the key intensified effects of the 
economic downturn. Further, Gangnes et al. (2014) estimate how the rise in the 
Chinese backward participation into GVC affected trade elasticity to income. The 
authors suggest that the bigger share of durable goods in gross exports, which are 
much more sensitive to foreign income shocks than non-durables (nearly four 
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times)165, resulted in higher trade elasticities. This composition effect was felt 
especially in three industries: machinery, textiles, and non-manufactures.  
As noted by several authors, the GTC illustrates the income-trade 
relationship beyond the traditional macroeconomic effects (AHMAD, 2013; 
ESCAITH; LINDENBERG; MIROUDOT, 2010b; GANGNES; MA; ASSCHE, 
2014, 2015; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 2013). Part of the 
peculiarity of this synchronization of business cycles across regions is connected to 
the fact that the demand shock was large but highly concentrated in a narrow 
category of goods (machinery, electronic and telecommunications equipment, 
automotive products) and intermediate products (WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, 2014a). Not by chance, several studies have documented the 
role of composition of trade, notably that of durable goods, in the volatility of trade. 
Put it simply, GVC trade alters the composition of trade and turn aggregate trade 
more sensitive to foreign income shocks (BEMS; JOHNSON; YI, 2010; EATON 
et al., 2011; GANGNES; MA; ASSCHE, 2014).  
The supply chain effect addresses that the characteristics inherent to the 
borderless production systems, i.e. GVC itself, increase the responsiveness of trade 
to changes in income (ALESSANDRIA; KABOSKI; MIDRIGAN, 2013; 
GANGNES; ASSCHE, 2016; GANGNES; MA; ASSCHE, 2014). Thereby, the 
income elasticity of demand would be higher for GVC trade than for non-GVC 
trade. As it has been discussed, the simplistic world where imports depend on 
national income and exports depend upon foreign income gives place to a world 
with increasing imports of intermediate inputs into exports, where foreign demand 
can determine both exports and imports of several nations (BALDWIN, 
RICHARD; TAGLIONI, 2009). Given this tighter connection between imported 
intermediate linkages and vertical specialization, Bems, Johnson and Yi (2009) 
argued that a country’s exports and imports tend to move in the same direction in 
response to changes in both domestic and foreign demand. The general idea is that 
the magnitude and timing of international transmission of macroeconomic shocks 
along the supply chain may then differ from traditional demand shocks on final 
goods (ESCAITH; LINDENBERG; MIROUDOT, 2010b). 
                                                        
165 According to Gangnes et al. (2014), there are no shred of evidences that durable goods exports have different 
price elasticity than non-durables.  
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The hypothesis of a potential different responsiveness of GVC trade to 
variations in demand has been tested from different perspectives. By using a dataset 
covering China’s trade by custom regime, Gangnes et al. (2014) evaluate the 
existence of both supply chain and composition effects in Chinese exports and finds 
no evidences of the former. They suggest that the supply chain effect may occur 
only under certain circumstances, such as the degree of demand uncertainty, and 
suggest that further research is necessary to assess which are the particular 
conditions for this effect. Considering the performance of trade in intermediates and 
the hierarchies of firms belonging to the same multinational groups, Altomonte et 
al. (2012) find evidences of a different performance of trade in intermediates, which 
has been shown to be the main determinant of the magnitude of the recent GTC. 
They also show a specific dynamic in intra-group trade with initially faster reaction 
to negative demand shocks followed by faster recovering if compared with arm’s 
length trade. Part of the explanation given for those findings applied to the French 
firms is consistent with the research of Alessandria et al. (2013) for the United Sates 
case. Both studies highlighted the adjustment in inventories during the Great 
Recession of 2008-2009. 
There are empirical and theoretical reasons for considering the inventory 
management decisions as a key determinant of amplified fluctuations of trade to 
income. This has been called bullwhip effect166 and refers to how small changes in 
final demand can cause a relevant change in the demand for intermediate goods 
along the value chain (LEE, HAU L.; PADMANABHAN; WHANG, 1997; 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 2014b). Put it simply, the traditional 
macroeconomic effect on inventories was amplified on the microeconomic side by 
structural changes in world production and the increasing international vertical 
integration (ESCAITH; LINDENBERG; MIROUDOT, 2010b). As large players 
keep their inventories at a minimum level (buffer stocks) in order to face the usual 
risks of international transportation, the “just-in-time” management of 
internationally fragmented value chains makes them pressure their suppliers to 
maintain large stocks in order to quickly respond upon request. The result is 
significant levels of inventories in importing firms that operate within GVC. In an 
economic downturn, the purchases of new imported inputs are reduced and the 
                                                        
166 The “bullwhip effect” is also referred to as the “whiplash” or “whipsaw” effect (WTO, 2014). 
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production process has to continue by drawing down these large inventories that 
firms used to hold, what would pressure upstream exporters within GVC and result 
in an increased sensitivity of trade to foreign income shocks (AL-HASCHIMI et 
al., 2015; GANGNES; MA; ASSCHE, 2014). Therefore, upstream firms are forced 
to keep greater levels of stock to face the greater demand volatility. In other words, 
would be an extension of an initial demand shock along the GVC due to an 
adjustment of production and stocks to new expectations (ALTOMONTE et al., 
2012).  
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Figure 4.3 - World real import and GDP growth (1960-2015) 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2016). 
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Figure 4.4 - Ratio of world merchandise trade volume growth to world real GDP growth, 
1981-2016 (% change and ratio) 
 
Source: WTO. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This research aimed to investigate the conceptual and methodological aspects of 
trade integration in the context of vertically fragmented production and the emergence of global 
and regional value chains, to evaluate different patterns of specialization, as well as to 
understand how trade’s responsiveness to income has changed at the current phase of 
globalization.  
In the first chapter, we presented some of the key concepts in GVC theorization to 
further analyze the manifold outcomes usually associated with participating in GVCs, 
contributing to the organization of a formal theoretical apparatus within the GVC literature. We 
have documented the three strands of network- and chain-based research that are relevant to 
describe the new patterns of global production and trade organization, as well as its main 
drivers. Beyond being considered an analytical tool, we argued that GVC has also become a 
practical and useful explanatory framework for understanding how firms and countries are 
engaged in the process of value creation, distribution and capture.  
We have documented part of the growing literature on GVCs, reviewing the 
concepts and measures of one particular dimension of the GVC analysis that is two-fold: the 
economic and social upgrading. While economic upgrading is mostly seen regarding the 
efficiency of production processes and the peculiarities of products and tasks developed by 
producers, social upgrading is commonly analyzed regarding the effects of GVC participation 
on living standards and conditions of employment. This chapter highlighted that the economic 
gains from greater integration in GVCs may not automatically translate into improvements in 
living standards. For that reason, it focused on how both dimensions are related to each other 
in recent analysis. Overall, we emphasized the important diversity of definitions and measures 
within the GVC literature, considering it as a reflection, to a certain extent, of the absence of a 
systematic theoretical apparatus in the GVC literature. 
The second section of this research has quantified a country's engagement in GVCs 
during the second wave of globalization, as well as the regional trade dynamics of global 
production sharing, using value-added trade metrics built from international input-output tables 
rather than using traditional trade metrics based on gross values. 
Chapter 2 has explored a vast set of indicators based on value-added trade to 
provide a comprehensive picture of the patterns of specialization in vertically integrated 
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production networks connected by international trade. In general, our empirical findings 
confirm our previous assumption that the vertically fragmentation of production has changed 
our ability to analyze countries’ patterns of specialization based on gross trade flows. That is 
because parts and components are crossing borders several times until they compose final 
goods, causing a multiple-counting effect.  
Overall, countries have increasingly relied on foreign value added for their own 
exports, which may then be further processed in partner countries, but there were no substantial 
changes among countries regarding their relative position on GVCs between 1995 and 2011. 
Vertical specialization was mainly driven by an increase in the double counted intermediate 
exports produced abroad, as a reflection of the multiple-border crossing and the back-and-forth 
aspects of production processes. Furthermore, we found that a limited number of countries had 
the ability to become more integrated into GVCs hand in hand with scaling them up.  
In particular, we have shown that countries with the largest GVC participation were 
mostly small economies, which have lower availability of domestically sourced intermediates, 
and have expanded their overall GVC participation underpinning their role as buyers of foreign 
inputs. For instance, Southeast Asian economies showed relatively high GVC participation 
indexes and were generally located downstream in a supply chain, boosting the importance of 
its backward linkages rather than its forward linkages over time. Most countries have 
increasingly used intermediate imports as source of international competitiveness to their 
exports. But we have found no linear relationship between GVC participation and a country’s 
relative upgrading in complexity of production. 
Chapter 2 also showed how the use of traditional trade statistics can lead to errors 
in estimating bilateral trade balance and the gains of international competitiveness at the sector-
level. While the gaps between bilateral trade balance in value added and gross terms are a 
reflection of the relative position of countries in GVCs, it is also true that the differences in 
terms of international competitiveness and specialization patterns vary according to the specific 
sector, becoming more significant in those most influenced by GVCs. In particular, we found 
no evidence of a worldwide positive association between higher levels of domestic value-added 
in gross exports and gains in sector competitiveness. But, more importantly, we found that the 
countries that already showed relative gains in international competitiveness among 
manufacturing sectors in 1995, and continued to show it in 2011, are those that most increased 
the domestically added value of exports throughout this period. This leads us to believe that 
countries are not doomed to gain competitiveness in manufacturing from higher import content.  
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One country has proved to be an exception in terms of the changing patterns of 
trade specialization, that is China. While most countries are relying less and less on domestic 
inputs for production, China is against this trend and it is increasingly adding domestic value 
to its exports. In addition, China showed signs of advancing its production to other stages 
located more at the beginning of the GVC, while becoming more competitive especially in the 
production of components. China has declined its role as the final point in Factory Asia, which 
is a key dimension of a much broader structural transformation in China.  Although some argue 
that this process could affect negatively the Chinese capacity of producing new products, our 
analysis showed that China has achieved a greater diversification of its exports, while relying 
less and less on imported inputs as a way to gain international competitiveness. But the 
relevance of China as a processing hub of imported intermediates from other countries should 
not be underestimated, as it was illustrated by China’s trade rebalance in value-added terms.  
Chapter 3 has investigated the regional dynamics of global production sharing, 
analyzing inter and intra-regional blocs’ value-added trade and relative market 
interdependences. Our contributions to the literature on the geography of global value chains 
and its regionalization are centered on the analysis of the pattern of participation of South 
America in value chains compared to other regional blocs. Factory South America has been 
acting as a supplier of inputs, especially primary products, to other countries exports. Although 
Factory South America is the least integrated to global value chains compared to other regional 
blocs, it is also the regional bloc that has increased the most its total participation in GVCs. A 
closer look to its value-added export growth showed that Factory South America is the regional-
bloc with the lowest diversity of growth sources, mainly based on primary products but also on 
manufacturing. This lack of a diversified production structure together with poor technological 
capacities turned the regional-bloc more exposed to falling into a “low-growth trap” compared 
to other regional-blocs. In summary, we found evidence of the deepening of the pattern of trade 
integration verified historically and traditionally from gross value measures for South American 
countries. 
As we have showed, GVC trade has taken the place of direct exports, expanding 
even more considerably between South American countries. Our analysis based on the origin 
and destination of value-added through backward and forward linkages across different 
countries has revealed that South American countries had weaker backward and forward 
linkages within Factory South America rather than with other regional-blocs. Factory North 
America, and more specifically the United Sates, and Factory Europe are still the main partners 
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of South American backward and forward linkages. But we have showed signs of stronger intra-
regional linkages and, more importantly, Factory South America has become more and more 
oriented towards Asian countries, especially from a supplier perspective (i.e. forward GVC 
participation). Another major development was the increasing Chinese influence on the 
production arrangements within its regional partners and beyond its regional boundaries. Thus, 
although we cannot say that there is a tendency of weakening the South American intra-
linkages, we have found that the interregional links were much stronger, providing insights to 
a possible change in the regional dynamics of global production towards Asia with China as a 
main hub in the context of vertically fragmented production.  
Further, one of our contributions was the creation of a hubness measure in terms of 
added value. By measuring the degree of relative market interdependence, we have created a 
simple way to assess the hierarchical organization of global and regional production network 
around hubs. Our findings illustrated the rise of China as a hub-nation at the regional and global 
level. In particular, China has deepened its relative market interdependence mainly with other 
Asian economies but also with South American countries, meanwhile the United States have 
lost importance as a hub with both regions.  
Brazil has emerged as the only country in South America with the potential to 
become a hub-nation. More interestingly, our hubness index has shown that the pattern of 
Brazil's participation in value chains is very much grounded in the externalization of its 
domestic demand and not purely and simply in the forward and backward linkages of its value-
added exports. These findings may help to illustrate how simplistic it can be to take a country’s 
participation in the current production-trade arrangements only from the traditional indicators 
of GVC participation. Despite the merit of being more consistent with the fragmentation of 
production and the emergence of global and regional value chains, these are purely anchored in 
a country’s exports and do not capture other critical phenomena that have political and 
economic developments, such as the externalization of domestic demand as a result of feebler 
intra-regional and domestic production linkages.  
Despite our contributions in this third chapter towards capturing the degree and 
nature of trade interactions along global and regional value chains, this research can be 
deepened in many different ways. To name a few, first, the country-level analysis imposes a 
number of limitations, since many characteristics are sector-specific. Second, by choosing to 
use the ready-to-use TiVA indicators, the ability to develop a more detailed analysis that goes 
beyond the pre-defined indicators is partially left out. Further on, GVC indicators capture only 
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a fraction of cross-border trade flows. Since the domestic value-added trade sent to consumer 
economy is not considered as part of GVC trade, and so it has not been included in the most 
used indexes of participation in GVCs. In addition, the GVC indicators only partially portray a 
country's trade integration, not adding any causal link, as many scholars often want to impute. 
In other words, there is a complex mix of determinants of a country´s engagement in GVCs that 
is not reflected by GVC indicators nor one can assume that the greater the share of domestic 
value added in exports, the better the country's situation regarding the gains from trade 
integration.  
The third section of this research has analyzed one of the multidimensional impacts 
of countries’ integration into GVCs, which is the responsiveness of trade to changes in income 
in the current phase of globalization.  
We have seen a remarkable anemic phase of trade growth in more recent years, as 
illustrated by the historical relationship between growth in imports and global economic 
activity. This dismal performance of world trade has raised questions concerning a potential 
deeper and longer-term change in the trade-income relationship, which has been estimated in 
terms of the elasticity of imports to changes in income. However, we have showed that the 
empirical evidence on the drivers of this shift still remains inconclusive. In that sense, we have 
reviewed the related literature on both cyclical and structural factors behind the decline in trade 
elasticities, and related current trade slowdown.  
We have shown that for some scholars the behavior of trade elasticities is a 
reflection of the economic environment, and its decline would be therefore a purely cyclical 
phenomenon that would dissipate after the weak economic environment recovers. This means 
that the weak demand, especially in the Eurozone and more recently in China, as well as a 
compositional change in aggregate demand towards the less import-intensive components, 
would be the main determinants of the decline in the long-term income elasticity of global trade. 
On the other hand, some studies argued that there are structural or longer-term factors acting in 
this phenomenon. The main arguments in this regard are: i) regional changes in economic 
activity and trade; ii) changes in the composition of trade (from goods to services); iii) changes 
in trade policies (increased protectionism); and iv) changes in the pace of international 
fragmentation of production processes, i.e. deceleration of GVCs.  
Further, our empirical exercise was based on a dynamic error correction model to 
examine the short-run and long-run dynamics of the import-income relationship for a broad 
sample of advanced economies (AE) and developing and emerging countries (EME). We found 
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that the global long-run trade elasticity decreased during the long 2000s, i.e. trade has become 
less sensitive to changes in income in recent years. When considering the behavior of the long-
run trade elasticity for both groups of countries separately, we found that it became lower for 
developing and emerging countries over time. When comparing both groups of countries, we 
showed that the difference between both groups’ trade elasticities decreased throughout the 
1990s, but this process was interrupted in the 2000s, and that the trade elasticity of EME was 
lower than AE’s.  
As we aimed to examine whether there are more structural factors operating in the 
recent behavior of trade elasticities, we have decomposed the imports growth into its short-run 
and long run components for advanced economies and emerging countries, respectively. In the 
case of EME, our findings showed that cyclical factors explain a larger share of the behavior of 
imports growth in the afterwards of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, as well as during periods of 
economic turmoil such as the Asian Crisis. Besides weak global demand, we have suggested 
that another explanation could be a compositional effect concerning the contribution of a recent 
sharp decrease in the Chinese trade elasticity as China is expanding its in-house production of 
capital and intermediate goods, which was also illustrated in the second section of this research. 
In that sense, the Chinese transition towards more consumption-led growth has been lowering 
import demand in emerging economies. Meanwhile, the long-run component, capturing 
structural effects, dominates most of the historical trade growth behavior, including moments 
of economic crisis and especially in the last two years marked by the global trade slowdown.  
More importantly, the changes in the relationship between trade and income may 
indicate that development strategies anchored in greater trade integration may not achieve the 
same results as in the past. The symbiotic relationship between trade and economic growth is 
one of the bases of these development strategies, especially for emerging and developing 
economies. Thus, our findings shed light to potential consequences for the long-term economic 
growth dynamics of these countries, since we have found that trade has become less sensitive 
to changes in income. Furthermore, the difference between EME and AE's degree of trade 
responsiveness to income may suggest that the strategies based on GVC integration for 
promoting long-term economic growth may not have the same results, with EMEs, once again, 
showing up as the weak side. 
Therefore, considering the set of structural drivers of the current trade slowdown, 
we aimed to further investigate the particular role played by vertically fragmented production 
across global value chains in the behavior of trade’s responsiveness to income in the 2000s. In 
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that sense, in our second empirical exercise, in this final chapter, we have expanded the import 
demand function by further accounting for the GVC participation index concerning both buying 
and selling perspectives. We have added new nuances on the selling perspective by creating 
two versions of the forward participation measure. Besides the traditional measure in the GVC 
literature, which we have named narrow forward participation, we accounted for the domestic 
value-added in final and intermediates goods absorbed by direct importers, named broad 
forward participation. This has helped to avoid underestimating the role of GVC participation 
of countries with large domestic consumer markets, such as Brazil and China.  
We have found lower trade elasticities for both AE and EME countries over time. 
More importantly, this lower responsiveness of trade to income may be associated with a slower 
pace of international fragmentation of production processes. As pointed in the literature review, 
this may be the result of a maturation of the process of fragmenting production processes 
internationally, given the increase in emerging economies’ labor costs and firms’ decisions to 
“re-shore” production. Clearly, other structural factors may also have played a role in the falling 
trade elasticities. When taking both measures of GVC participation separately, our second 
empirical exercise has also showed lower trade elasticities for EME than AE, and that the 
difference between both groups has increased over time.  
In summary, the changing trade-income relationship has posed some challenges 
that may have consequences for the long-term economic growth dynamics across countries, 
being even more important for developing and emerging economies, and ultimately can 
transform the idea that trade integration can promote economic growth in a fallacy. Moreover, 
we have reinforced the need for measurement tools that encompasses the increasingly complex 
economic reality within GVCs and can guide strategic policy responses for trade integration to 
ensure economy-wide benefits and sustained economic growth. Therefore, an important 
development of this discussion lies in revealing the obsolescence of the label "made in" and the 
policies that involve it. 
More recently, a backlash against trade has been the tonic of anti-globalization 
narratives that have been multiplying throughout the world, and mainly in developed 
economies. From offshoring (as outsourcing or insourcing) to “reshoring”, the rumors about 
the world’s largest manufacturers been returning home are highly political and controversial. 
As we have shown, countries are specializing in different stages of production processes within 
GVCs, and measuring the real participation of individual countries and the gains from trade 
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integration has become less straightforward. Therefore, anti-globalization discourses can be just 
as simple as a completely misleading strategy in the face of such a complex picture.  
The cross-border activity can spur several benefits, but it is also true that trade, such 
as technological advances, can skew the distribution of income (MALLABY, 2016).   However, 
the answer to inequality does not lie in protectionism. Actually, spending policies and taxing, 
as well as tax reform, are some of the key steps to put forward the redistribution of the overall 
gains to those who are damaged by trade. Binary protectionist responses in the sense of "us" 
versus "them" may end up in different outcomes from what is expected. Superficial in their 
analytical form, such discussions reached the profound discontentment and feeling of non-
belonging of a large part of the population. Despite the lack of analytical robustness, the 
electoral appeal of these discussions captured frustration and converted it into votes. Therefore, 
it is not a matter of responding to these discontents with policies shaped in the midst of 
economic scenarios from the past. To the extent that shortcuts should be avoided, we argued 
that the paralysis of policymakers, in the face of the complexity of trade transactions in a 
vertically fragmented structure, is also not a possible way out, especially not for those that aim 
to have a bigger share of the gains.  
Of course, the economic scenario portrayed is constantly changing. Hence, it is 
certain that a number of issues that have arisen throughout its construction have not been fully 
addressed here. Just to name a few, the relationship between participation in GVCs and the 
income inequality across countries; an empirical analysis that estimates the determinants behind 
participation in GVCs; an empirical research that addresses the relationship between trade 
integration and social upgrading, particularly with regard to job creation and labor conditions 
(especially in countries where anti-globalization movements have been stronger, such as the 
United States); the risen movement of reshoring, its determinants, and effects in terms of social 
and economic upgrading; among others. A wide range of national policies areas, such as trade, 
labor market, innovation, education, infrastructure, and investment regulations, can affect the 
chances of success in GVCs. Hence, another field that deserved to be further developed is the 
policy options to guarantee the mechanisms through which countries can maximize the benefits 
from GVC participation.  
Finally, this research sought to contribute to a research agenda that showed to be 
even more comprehensive than one could expect. Although the GVC literature has often been 
associated with some particular political propositions of dubious character, it can also be a 
fruitful field of research with several contributions in positive terms and potential applications 
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for future work in several areas of economics. Despite its limitations, which should act more as 
a stimulus for future work than as an obstacle, there is an important field for those who want to 
endeavor through these research paths. 
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